African governments are developing a continent-wide framework to address how climate pressures amplify security threats, a response to mounting evidence that environmental stress is exploiting weak governance and fueling instability across the continent. The Common African Position on Climate, Peace and Security represents the first coordinated effort by the African Union and its member states to tackle these interconnected challenges.
The initiative comes as climate-related disasters affected more than 2.5 million people in Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe in 2021 and 2022 alone. Rising temperatures, changing rainfall, droughts and floods reduce crop and livestock production and increase competition for land and water. These aren't abstract threats. They're forcing people from their homes and straining already limited government resources.
The Security Challenge
Many African countries face peace and security problems that go far beyond war, including political instability, violent extremist groups, organised crime and armed militias. Weak governments, corruption and poor quality public services make unstable countries worse. Armed groups can exploit anger and hardship in places where livelihoods have collapsed and government support is limited. This has happened in Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
In the Sahel, west Africa and the Horn of Africa, environmental pressures have sometimes heightened tensions between farmers and pastoralists. Pastoralists are changing their traditional routes to find water and grazing land, sometimes increasing tensions between communities and across borders. Climate disasters also force people to move in search of safety and work, adding pressure on jobs and public services elsewhere.
The Government Response
In February 2026, the African Union Peace and Security Council called on experts from all member states to complete the framework, preferably during the second half of 2026. It said the position must reflect conditions in different countries and regions, and be developed through broad consultation. Agreement on paper won't be enough. The position needs an implementation plan setting out what must be done, who will do it and how progress will be measured.
National governments can include climate-related security risks in their development and climate adaptation plans, budgets, early warning systems and conflict prevention work. They should also review policies covering agriculture, water, land and disaster management to determine whether they reduce tensions over scarce resources or unintentionally make them worse. Regional organisations can strengthen cross-border warnings about droughts, floods and displacement, and coordinate responses between countries.
In the Horn of Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development has already included climate, peace and security in its work and secured political support from its member states. That regional approach offers a template for broader coordination.
Funding and Implementation
Governments must fund this work through national budgets. The African Union, international partners and donors can direct additional funding towards places facing both severe climate threats and conflict or instability. There's no cost estimate yet because the Common African Position is still being finalised. Donors should support priorities set by African countries and strengthen existing institutions instead of creating competing initiatives.
The framework aims to help African countries deal with the ways climate change is making conflict and insecurity worse, and to give governments a shared approach so they can work together on peace, security, disaster response and development. The article is signed by Katongo Seyuba, Researcher at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and Gracsious Maviza, Gender and Migration Scientist and Regional Lead for Southern Africa in the CGIAR FOCUS Climate Security Team.
Why This Matters:
The Common African Position recognizes that security threats don't exist in isolation from governance failures and resource scarcity. Where governments can't deliver basic services or protect property rights, environmental pressures become security crises. The framework's emphasis on national budgets and existing institutions reflects a pragmatic understanding that sustainable solutions require domestic ownership, not dependency on external aid. Whether African governments can implement coordinated policies across borders while strengthening their own institutions will determine if this initiative produces tangible security improvements or becomes another unfunded mandate. The success of regional efforts like those in the Horn of Africa suggests that focused, locally-driven coordination can work when backed by political will and adequate resources.