Military coups transfer power from elected leaders to armed forces, stripping people of the right to choose who governs. Economist and legal scholar John Mukum Mbaku argues that seizing state power can deepen conflict, undermine livelihoods and open the door to human rights abuses—even as coup leaders claim they’re fixing government failures.
Who Takes Power—and Who Loses a Voice
Mbaku defines a military coup d’état as the ouster of an elected president or head of state, usually through force or its threat. Coup participants, or putschists, often defend a takeover by accusing governments of mishandling the economy, lowering living standards or permitting political instability. But replacing rulers by force doesn’t itself bring the legal stability, regulatory reforms or institutional changes needed to fight poverty, Mbaku writes.
His studies of military and constitutional takeovers in Egypt, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, The Gambia and Sudan identify four consequences: worsening intergroup conflict, weakening entrepreneurship and wealth creation, encouraging abuses of vulnerable groups, and damaging democracy and the rule of law. Ordinary people bear the costs when their lives and livelihoods depend on stable rules, while military elites take control of the state apparatus.
In ethnically and religiously diverse countries, Mbaku writes, governments have often failed to build institutions that support peaceful coexistence. That failure can allow majority factions to tyrannise minorities. Political elites use ethnic identity to assemble voting blocs and secure power; military elites may fill senior military and security posts with officers from their own ethnic group, a practice known as ethnic stacking. Mbaku says it has occurred in Kenya, Ethiopia and Nigeria.
Power concentrated in one military faction can set off security crises. Marginalised minorities may turn to violence to defend themselves, their resources and their political representation, while coups can tear down power-sharing arrangements and democratic frameworks that had given people a voice in governance.
The Price of Rule by Decree
Coups can unsettle legal systems and make the future harder to predict, discouraging investment and entrepreneurship. Investors need assurance that tax rules, environmental standards and laws governing operations won’t change overnight. Courts must be reliable and accessible, and legal frameworks must let parties enforce long-term trade contracts.
A 2026 International Monetary Fund report estimates coups “can reduce GDP growth by around 2.3 percentage points in the same year.” It says coups in Africa reduce investment by 14.3%, with effects that can persist in subsequent years. Those figures show the economic penalty of replacing predictable institutions with military rule.
Mbaku writes that coups usually create conditions for routine human rights violations because leaders no longer answer to the constitution or the people. Coup leaders often suspend or discard constitutions and bills of rights. Military regimes also have a record of arbitrary detentions and torture; they typically ban peaceful protests, censor media and jail critics without trial.
After a forceful takeover, military elites usually rule by decree rather than through an elected legislature or independent judiciary. Military leaders can take executive, legislative and judicial powers, while people lose the right to choose leaders through elections. Mbaku points to Egypt, Sudan and several Sahelian states, where forceful changes of government can invite counter-coups, civil conflict, political violence and instability.
Elections as a Remedy—and Their Limits
Mbaku calls for regularly scheduled elections, elected civilian authorities to control the military, and armed forces accountable to the constitution. He also says military education should cover human rights law and the duty to defend the constitution. Yet coups can dismantle the very institutions these proposals rely on, and his examples show that holding an election after a takeover doesn’t necessarily keep coup leaders out of power.
In Egypt, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi overthrew the democratically elected president Mohamed Morsi in 2013 and became the country’s president. In Gabon, Gen. Brice Oligui Nguema led the 2023 coup, won the April 2025 presidential election and became the country’s new president. Mbaku says coup leaders shouldn’t be allowed to participate in elections intended to restore democratic order or hold positions of responsibility in state political institutions. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance provides for this, but Mbaku says the African Union hasn’t ensured it happens.
Afrobarometer surveys show strong opposition to coups among respondents in Zambia (90%), Uganda (87%), Eswatini (85%) and Seychelles (85%). Mbaku says countries that have avoided coups generally developed strong constitutions and institutions, credible elections and professional armed forces accountable to civilian authority. South Africa and Namibia placed their armed forces under civilian oversight; Botswana and Mauritius combined good governance with economic development. His analysis argues that coups are harder to stage when political, military and economic institutions offer peaceful ways to resolve grievances.