At least 14 apartment towers in La Guaira collapsed nearly simultaneously during the June 24 earthquakes, trapping hundreds as gas tanks exploded and fires broke out. Scientists had warned Venezuela’s government not to build along the coastal strip, where loose, silty soil can amplify shaking and a major fault runs offshore and beneath La Guaira state. The quakes killed more than 6,500 people and left more than 17,000 homeless.
Carlos Valdés, head of the seismology department at the Institute of Geophysics of the National Autonomous University of Mexico, said officials were “defying nature” by building there. According to an Associated Press investigation, the government of acting President Delcy Rodríguez hasn’t addressed why so many buildings collapsed and so many people died.
Warnings, Then Towers
Housing decisions took shape after mudslides and heavy rain displaced more than 100,000 people across Venezuela in 2010. In 2011, President Hugo Chávez directed the government to expand public housing for people displaced by late-2010 floods and mudslides. Many had been relocated to public schools, government buildings, military facilities and the presidential palace. Land was scarce, so the government turned to expropriations, and Chávez urged Venezuelans to help the state identify abandoned lots.
Trade and watchdog organizations raised concerns about whether construction met building standards, seismic-resistant design requirements, and standards for cement and steel. The coastal region had a record of disaster: a magnitude-6.6 earthquake in 1967 damaged buildings in Caraballeda and Caracas, while floods and mudslides in 1999 killed tens of thousands.
After the 1999 disaster, Chávez’s government selected engineer and then-science minister Carlos Genatios to lead a reconstruction plan. His team worked with local and international experts on a hazard-mitigation program that included coastal land-use restrictions, mainly to reduce flood risks and, to a lesser extent, earthquake risks. Genatios said scientists warned officials that the region’s history of floods and mudslides also raised earthquake dangers: buildings would stand on loose, rocky soil deposited over centuries.
Housing Delivered; Answers Withheld
The towers in Caraballeda belonged to the Great Housing Mission Venezuela program. All but four of the 43 towers built in La Guaira state stood in Caraballeda. A state-owned newsletter described one tower as a structure that “proudly stands as a symbol of revolutionary justice.” At least 13 of the 43 towers collapsed in the June earthquakes.
Residents who received apartments welcomed having their own bedrooms and bathrooms, with the beach a short walk away. Many had previously lived with relatives or in shelters. But the buildings brought almost no potable water, broken elevators and trash chutes that attracted rats and cockroaches. Experts said towers between 10 and 20 floors could sway at the same rate as seismic waves, increasing pressure on columns and the likelihood of damage and collapse.
No one knows whether contractors followed Venezuela’s building codes or whether officials conducted soil studies before construction. The government hasn’t released blueprints, soil studies, inspection records or the “descriptive memorandum,” which should contain engineering and architectural specifications. Francisco “Farruco” Sesto, who headed the office responsible for Chávez’s housing mission, didn’t respond to an AP interview request.
Less than two weeks after the earthquakes, Sesto told a government-affiliated influencer that land selected for public housing had undergone soil studies, but offered no proof. He called criticism an “insidious, malicious campaign” against the housing mission and said the private sector built most state housing. “The state acts as the great organizer — the great planner, if you will … Who performs these soil studies? Primarily, specialized private companies,” Sesto said.
The Cost of Construction and Collapse
Michael Schmitz, a Central University of Venezuela geologist formerly affiliated with the country’s earthquake-monitoring agency, described the quake as “very, very, very violent, very fast.” The earthquakes delivered a near-fault pulse, concentrating energy at buildings’ bases. Schmitz said the force “abruptly knocked the support out from under the building.” Buildings in Caracas also experienced sediment amplification, but withstood the earthquakes because they could sway and dissipate energy.
Local seismic instruments had gone dark, leaving scientists without data to measure how shaking differed between communities and streets. Eduardo Miranda, a Stanford University professor of civil and environmental engineering, and a research team analyzed security-camera footage near a bowling alley in Caraballeda. It showed eight buildings collapsing in less than a second. Their paper reported one of the largest ground motions ever documented and the only quantitative information about ground motion near the rupture.
Residents found Styrofoam in the rubble and accused the government of using substandard materials to cut costs. They also cited documented corruption schemes in which officials and contractors colluded to overbill the state, use cheaper materials than reported and keep the difference. The government hasn’t released information about on-site forensic analyses that experts said were needed to determine causes and responsibility.
Cleanup, including demolitions using explosives, and rebuilding were underway. Thousands of displaced people have since lived in shelters, encampments or on sidewalks near their former homes, while some received public housing in Caracas. Weeks after the earthquake, the government said it had found land in La Guaira where construction could soon begin. Experts urged a careful approach and warned against repeating earlier mistakes. Carlos Valdés put the question plainly: “At what cost?”