Scientists warned Venezuela’s government against building on the coast near Caracas. The soil would amplify earthquake shaking, and a major fault line runs beneath the area. Officials built anyway: 43 concrete towers in La Guaira state, where thousands of families had sought shelter after the 2010 floods displaced more than 100,000 people.
On June 24, 2026, two earthquakes, with magnitudes of 7.2 and 7.5, struck the region in quick succession. At least 14 apartment towers in La Guaira fell almost simultaneously. More than 6,500 people died, and more than 17,000 lost their homes. According to an AP investigation based on interviews with dozens of engineers, seismologists and former government officials, acting President Delcy Rodríguez’s government hasn’t explained why so many buildings collapsed or so many people died.
The towers belonged to the Great Housing Mission Venezuela, a program launched after catastrophic mudslides and floods displaced entire communities in 2010. In 2011, President Hugo Chávez directed the government to expand public housing for people relocated from schools, government buildings, military facilities and even the presidential palace. Land was scarce, so the government expropriated property. But the choice of building sites raised concerns from the beginning.
Warnings Ignored, Design Flaws Built In
A magnitude-6.6 earthquake in 1967 had already damaged buildings in the same area. It prompted the creation of quake-resistant construction guidelines and the Venezuelan Foundation for Seismological Research. Then, in 1999, floods and mudslides killed tens of thousands. Both disasters should have signaled danger.
Engineer Carlos Genatios, then-science minister, led reconstruction efforts after the 1999 disaster. He worked with local and international experts on a hazard-mitigation program that included restrictions on coastal land use. Genatios said scientists warned officials that the area’s history of floods and mudslides made earthquakes more dangerous: buildings would stand on loose, rocky soil deposited over centuries. The San Sebastian Fault runs offshore and beneath La Guaira state.
Still, decades of warnings didn’t stop construction. Trade and watchdog organizations questioned whether the towers met building standards, seismic-resistant design requirements, and standards for cement and steel quality. The buildings stood between 10 and 20 floors tall, a height at which they can sway at the same rate as seismic waves. Engineers call this resonance. It can make a building sway farther and longer, increasing pressure on columns and the risk of damage or collapse.
The government never released blueprints, soil studies, inspection records or the “descriptive memorandum,” which should contain engineering and architectural specifications. Francisco “Farruco” Sesto, who led the office responsible for Chávez’s housing mission, didn’t respond to an AP interview request. Less than two weeks after the earthquakes, he told a government-affiliated influencer that the government had conducted soil studies at sites selected for public housing, but offered no proof. He called criticism an “insidious, malicious campaign” against the housing mission and blamed the private sector.
“The state acts as the great organizer — the great planner, if you will … Who performs these soil studies? Primarily, specialized private companies,” Sesto said.
The Seismic Force That Buildings Couldn't Withstand
The earthquakes’ unusual physics made the June 24 disaster even worse. Their tremors delivered a near-fault pulse, a type of force engineers fear because it concentrates energy at a building’s base. Michael Schmitz, a Central University of Venezuela geologist formerly affiliated with the country’s earthquake-monitoring agency, described the violence: “It was truly instantaneous—very, very, very violent, very fast.” As the rupture moved eastward, seismic energy stacked up at its front, delivering “a very strong blow to the building's base” that “abruptly knocked the support out from under the building, leaving it unable to dissipate the energy in the way it was designed to do.”
Buildings in Caracas, across the mountain range, experienced sediment amplification but survived because they could sway and dissipate energy. Caraballeda, the hardest-hit community in La Guaira, wasn’t so fortunate. Local seismic instruments had gone dark, leaving scientists without data on the intensity of the shaking. Stanford University professor Eduardo Miranda and a research team traveled to Venezuela days after the quake. They analyzed security-camera footage recorded near a bowling alley. It showed eight buildings collapsing simultaneously in less than a second.
The researchers tracked the footage frame by frame to reconstruct the ground motion. Their paper, shared with AP and under peer review for publication in The Seismic Record, reported one of the largest ground motions ever documented. Miranda said even buildings that met Japan’s safety standards, among the world’s strictest, would have struggled to survive what happened June 24. The study found that buildings in Caraballeda were pushed in one direction for so long and so far that they reached their breaking points.
“The number one reason for the large impact in La Guaira is definitely how strong the ground motion was,” Miranda said. “Typically, collapses are the result of a number of factors, but that's an overwhelming main factor of the problems that were there.”
Residents' Hopes and Material Failures
When families first got the keys to their apartments, many welcomed having bedrooms and bathrooms of their own. The beach was only a short walk away. Many had lived with relatives or in shelters after the 2010 rains. Soon, though, they faced almost no potable water, broken elevators, and trash chutes that attracted rats and cockroaches. After the collapse, residents found Styrofoam in the rubble and accused the government of using substandard materials to cut costs. They also pointed to documented corruption schemes in which officials and contractors colluded to overbill the state, use cheaper materials than reported, and pocket the difference.
Carlos Valdés, head of the seismology department at the Institute of Geophysics of the National Autonomous University of Mexico, said officials were “defying nature” by building there. Asked about the cost of stronger construction standards, he reframed the question: “I would put it another way: how much is a life worth?”
The government hasn’t released information about on-site forensic analyses, which experts say are necessary to determine causes and responsibility. Cleanup and rebuilding continue. The government estimated that more than 17,000 people were displaced. Thousands have since lived in shelters, encampments or on sidewalks near their former homes, while some received public housing in Caracas. Weeks after the earthquake, the government said it had found land in La Guaira where construction could soon begin.
Experts urged the government not to repeat the mistakes of 15 years earlier and to rebuild carefully. The extra design and construction work required for earthquake-resistant high-rises could deter the state and some private investors from developing certain areas, they said. Miranda reflected on the broader lesson: “It's clear that they need to raise the level of design.”
Why This Matters:
This isn’t a case where nature simply overwhelmed human capability. Venezuela’s government had scientific expertise, historical evidence and international best practices available. A 1967 earthquake and 1999 floods had already shown the danger. Scientists involved in the government’s own reconstruction efforts warned against building at this exact location, on this exact geology. What happened on June 24 reflects a choice: to prioritize speed and cost over structural safety, ignore expertise and avoid public accountability for those decisions.
More than 6,500 people paid with their lives. Over 17,000 lost their homes. The government’s failure to release blueprints, soil studies and inspection records suggests an institutional unwillingness to confront what decisions officials made and why. For communities still living in shelters months later, the question isn’t only about past failures. It’s whether rebuilt housing will actually protect residents, or whether the same cost-cutting calculations will return.