The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement commits Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to collective defense, but its public terms leave open who would command forces, decide when to fight and pay for operations. Taiwan, meanwhile, is shifting military preparations toward sustained defense, as an AI researcher warns that surveillance and centralized control could weaken democratic institutions.
Who Controls Collective Defense
Turkiye's Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Saudi Arabia's Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistan's Shehbaz Sharif signed the agreement on August 7, 2026. It builds on the Saudi-Pakistani Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement of September 2025. The full text hasn't been made public. A Pakistan Foreign Ministry statement says an armed attack against any of the three states would count as an attack against them all.
The public terms don't say which forces would fight, who would command them or how quickly they would respond. Nor do they explain how members would decide military action was necessary, divide the costs or define common threats. On August 31, the countries' foreign ministers, defense ministers and military chiefs met in Istanbul. They announced a secretariat in Saudi Arabia, initially led by a Pakistani secretary general, and cooperation in military technology and production.
Each state brings different capabilities and military ties. Turkiye has NATO experience and a substantial domestic defense industry. Pakistan increasingly depends on Chinese equipment; Saudi Arabia relies heavily on foreign suppliers. SIPRI's 2026 data showed that China supplied 80 percent of Pakistan's major arms imports in 2021–2025, while the United States supplied 77 percent of Saudi Arabia's. Integrating their forces would require intelligence-sharing and coordination across military systems, and suppliers could restrict cooperation over access to sensitive technology.
Their political interests don't align neatly. Pakistan borders Iran, and Islamabad and Ankara both maintain relations with Tehran; Saudi Arabia, by contrast, faces attacks from Iranian rockets and Houthi allies. Turkiye has said the agreement isn't directed against Iran. The countries also differ on Israel, while Saudi Arabia maintains a close partnership with India, Pakistan's principal strategic rival. Saudi Arabia and India recorded bilateral trade of $41.88 billion in fiscal 2024-2025.
AI, Government Power and Democracy
In an interview by Mercy A. Kuo, Dr. Matthew Botvinick said AI could intensify threats to constitutional democracy by amplifying social insecurity and vulnerability when public trust in government institutions is low. Botvinick, author of “AI and Political Reform: The Risk to Democracy and How to Respond,” said the combination could create conditions for what has been called “the demagogue's playbook.” He called AI-driven threats risks, not certainties.
AI could help authoritarian governments entrench their power, Botvinick warned, through surveillance and control over information citizens can access or share. He said AI might give the executive branch too much power if it automates obedience to central authority. Surveillance or propaganda could also weaken citizens' ability to act together. China offers an example: AI can analyze data from cameras, sensors and online activity to monitor and control people.
Democracies, he said, must use AI for legitimate law-enforcement and national-security needs without creating tools that are easy to abuse. Botvinick cited abuses in the United States from FDR and J. Edgar Hoover to disclosures by Edward Snowden. Civil liberties and the rule of law, he said, should be protected before problems arise. “Constitutional democracy was absolutely mandatory for AI safety,” he said, arguing that even a technically safe AI system could help an authoritarian state oppress dissent and enforce political compliance.
Speaking in a purely personal capacity, not on behalf of Anthropic, Botvinick said companies that claim to care about AI safety, including all major AI labs, have a responsibility to protect and strengthen democracy. He urged attention to government-industry relations and support for AI labs when they defend democratic institutions and the rule of law.
Taiwan Builds a Layered Defense
Taiwan has moved away from plans to defeat an enemy on the opposite shore or seek a decisive battle in the littoral area. It now focuses on an erosion strategy and sustained operations. More than one-third of Taiwan's population lives in the north, home to the political center, important command organizations and transportation hubs. More than about half of the Republic of China (ROC) Army and Marine Corps' active-duty brigade-level forces are normally stationed north of Miaoli and Yilan.
For exercises, forces from other regions have reinforced the north, potentially bringing nearly two-thirds of Taiwan's active-duty ground forces there. During the 2025 Han Kuang Exercise, the Marine Corps 99th Brigade moved from southern Taiwan to reinforce Taoyuan and greater Taipei. Forces from southern and central Taiwan also moved north in the 2026 exercise.
Taiwan's navy has taken on a larger role. The Marine Corps has shifted from offensive amphibious operations toward urban defense, trading tanks and self-propelled artillery for drones and anti-tank equipment. The navy established a Coastal Operations Command to bring together shore-based anti-ship missiles, radar, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and unmanned aerial systems. In late September 2026, the Coast Guard appointed a Navy vice admiral as deputy director-general to support its transition from peacetime to wartime and strengthen coordination with the military.
Taiwan's authors identified joint operations and command and control as ongoing challenges. The Joint Operations Training Base has limited capacity. Limited airspace also makes it difficult for the navy, Army Aviation and Air Force to train together as formed units. Media reports in January 2026 said U.S. personnel had been stationed at Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense Joint Firepower Coordination Center. The authors said decentralization can keep operations going when command and control is disrupted, but joint capability remains necessary to use Taiwan's military resources effectively.