Right-wing and center-right parties hold a majority in Brazil's Congress, giving the conservative bloc leverage over the government no matter who wins the presidential runoff on October 25. Right-wing parties won 260 of 513 lower-house seats, while center-right parties took another 81. Bolsonaro's Liberal Party elected 121 lawmakers, the largest caucus, and is projected to hold 28 Senate seats in the next legislature. The ballot decides the presidency. It doesn't decide who holds power across the institutions.
The vote isn't the whole apparatus
During “grassroots digital activism” in the 2022 election, religious framing helped strengthen loyalty to Bolsonarismo and portray institutional oversight as censorship. That identity, the account says, mobilizes opposition to the left beyond individual elections. The conservative bloc doesn't need one leader directing every move.
The next president will have to negotiate with a conservative majority. Those lawmakers may not vote as a disciplined bloc, but the presidency alone won't capture the balance of power. Brazil has long had a conservative Congress, and Lula knows how to bargain with it. The political cost of those bargains has shifted: congressional brokers now work alongside a right with mass loyalties and claims to executive competence, while the electoral cost of helping a left-wing government advance has grown.
Senator Flávio Bolsonaro could bring the presidency into closer alignment with conservative strength elsewhere in government. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva could resist or dilute parts of the right's agenda if he wins reelection. Neither outcome erases the right's influence in Congress and state institutions.
Technocratic São Paulo Governor Tarcísio de Freitas won reelection with 62.65% of valid votes on October 4. His government's privatization of water company Sabesp offers a conservative pitch built around investment and administrative performance. That approach appeals to voters tired of confrontation; a less combative presentation doesn't necessarily signal a more moderate agenda. The managerial right broadens the movement's appeal without adopting its most confrontational style.
Brokers, bosses, and competing interests
The Centrão, a loose congressional grouping known for bargaining with presidents from different parties, connects conservative constituencies to government through local networks and influence over public spending. Its cooperation with Lula doesn't signal ideological conversion. Participation in government can go hand in hand with limiting government action. Bolsonarismo supplies mobilization, managerial conservatives appeal beyond its core, and congressional brokers turn political strength into agreements. These groups compete. Cooperation isn't automatic.
Examples from elsewhere in Latin America show how a presidential mandate can run up against lawmakers with their own leverage. Argentina's Javier Milei urged moderate opposition lawmakers to back his reforms after winning last year's midterms. Chile's José Antonio Kast inherited a divided Congress, with an evenly split Senate and a lower house where an anti-establishment party could hold the balance. In both cases, coalition-building remained unfinished after right-wing presidential victories.
El Salvador took another route. Nayib Bukele's Nuevas Ideas party won 54 of 60 legislative seats in 2024, and lawmakers abolished presidential term limits the following year. Brazil's conservative influence sits across politicians and institutions with their own resources, making coordination harder but allowing the right to remain influential even if it loses the presidency.
Trumpism offers only a limited comparison. President Donald Trump consolidated authority within the Republican Party; Brazilian conservatives must coordinate across several parties and autonomous regional leaders. Their economic interests pull in different directions, too. Trump's 2024 Republican platform called for baseline import tariffs and reduced dependence on China, while Milei favors radical market reform. Brazil's conservative coalition includes exporters with different calculations: China bought 30.7% of Brazil's exports between January and August of this year, and a confrontation with Beijing would hurt constituencies a conservative president needs.
The runoff will determine how conservative strength interacts with executive power, not whether that strength exists. Flávio would have more room to advance a shared agenda, though competing right-wing groups would make demands. Lula could block or dilute parts of it, but reelection wouldn't restore the left's influence across Congress and the states. Whoever wins on October 25 will govern in a political environment where the right can shape government inside or outside a coalition, starting in January. Fernanda Magnotta, a senior fellow at the Brazilian Center for International Relations and a professor of the International Relations Program at Fundação Armando Alvares Penteado in São Paulo, wrote the analysis. It was published October 6, 2026; its opinions don't necessarily reflect those of Americas Quarterly or its publishers.