Conservative parties won 260 of 513 lower-house seats in Brazil’s election, while another 81 went to the center-right. That’s a governing majority waiting for whoever wins the October 25 runoff. It won’t disappear if President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva wins reelection.
The numbers are lopsided. Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party elected 121 lawmakers, the chamber’s largest caucus, and is projected to hold 28 senators in the next legislature. Those lawmakers may not vote as a disciplined bloc. Still, any incoming president will have to negotiate with a conservative majority.
Who Holds the Power
Senator Flávio Bolsonaro could bring the presidency into closer alignment with conservative strength already entrenched elsewhere in government. Lula could resist or dilute parts of the right’s agenda if he wins. But the presidency alone doesn’t capture the balance of power. Brazil has long had a conservative Congress, and Lula has experience bargaining with it. What’s changed is the environment around those negotiations. Congressional brokers now operate alongside a right with mass loyalties and claims to executive competence, and helping a left-wing government advance now carries a greater electoral cost.
Fernanda Magnotta, a senior fellow at the Brazilian Center for International Relations, describes three overlapping sources of that strength. “Bolsonarismo” sustains an identity that outlasts any single election and mobilizes opposition to the left. During grassroots digital activism in the 2022 election, religious framing helped reinforce loyalty and cast institutional oversight as censorship. A “managerial right” broadens the movement’s appeal. Technocratic São Paulo Governor Tarcísio de Freitas won reelection with 62.65% of valid votes on October 4, and his government’s privatization of water company Sabesp represents an offer centered on investment and administrative performance. That approach draws conservative voters tired of confrontation, though a less combative presentation doesn’t necessarily mean a more moderate agenda.
The Transactional Right and the Limits on Government
The third group is the “transactional right.” Much of the Centrão, a loose congressional grouping known for bargaining with presidents of different parties, operates through local networks and influence over public spending. Its cooperation with Lula doesn’t signal ideological conversion. Participation in government can coexist with the ability to limit what government does.
The three groups compete, and cooperation isn’t automatic. Bolsonarismo supplies mobilization, managerial conservatives reach beyond its core, and congressional brokers turn political strength into agreements. The Bolsonaro family doesn’t need to command every participant for the broader coalition to shape political calculations.
Lessons From Neighbors
Elsewhere in Latin America, right-wing victories have shown how hard it is to turn a mandate into governing power. Argentina’s Javier Milei built support around economic rupture, then urged moderate opposition lawmakers to back his reforms after winning last year’s midterms. Chile’s José Antonio Kast campaigned on crime and immigration but inherited a divided Congress, including an evenly split Senate and a lower house where an anti-establishment party could hold the balance.
El Salvador took a different route. Nayib Bukele’s Nuevas Ideas party won 54 of 60 legislative seats in 2024, and lawmakers abolished presidential term limits the following year. Legislative dominance there reinforced personal power. In Brazil, conservative influence is spread among politicians and institutions with their own resources. Coordination is harder, but the right stays influential even if it loses the presidency.
The comparison with Trumpism has limits, too. Donald Trump consolidated authority within the Republican Party, while Brazilian conservatives must coordinate across several parties and autonomous regional leaders. Economic interests complicate a common program. Trump’s 2024 Republican platform called for baseline import tariffs and reduced dependence on China, and Milei favors radical market reform. Brazil’s coalition includes exporters who see things differently: China bought 30.7% of Brazil’s exports between January and August this year, and confrontation with Beijing would hurt constituencies a conservative president needs.
The runoff will determine how conservative strength interacts with executive power. Flávio would have more room to advance a shared agenda while facing demands from competing right-wing groups. Lula could block or dilute parts of that agenda, but reelection wouldn’t restore the left’s influence across Congress and the states. Whoever wins will govern, starting in January, in a political environment where the right can shape government inside or outside a coalition.
Why This Matters: The October 25 runoff is about more than one person’s name on the presidential sash. With 260 lower-house seats on the right and another 81 in the center-right, the next government’s room to act depends on bargains struck with a conservative majority. For voters who count on public programs and oversight institutions, that means priorities can be negotiated down regardless of who wins. A Lula victory may slow the right’s agenda, but the analysis finds it wouldn’t restore the left’s influence across Congress and the states. A Flávio Bolsonaro victory would align the presidency with that strength. Either way, people most dependent on what government delivers will feel the outcome of those congressional deals, which is why the balance of power beyond the presidency deserves as much scrutiny as the runoff itself.