Parties identified with the right won 260 of 513 lower-house seats in Brazil's election, while another 81 went to the center-right. That's a conservative majority, and whoever wins the October 25 presidential runoff will have to face it.
Bolsonaro's Liberal Party elected 121 lawmakers, the chamber's largest caucus, and it's projected to hold 28 senators in the next legislature. Those lawmakers may not vote as a disciplined bloc. But the next president, left or right, will have to negotiate with them.
A Conservative Majority, Not Just a Candidate
Senator Flávio Bolsonaro could bring the presidency into closer alignment with conservative strength elsewhere in government. If President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva wins reelection, he could resist or dilute parts of the right's agenda. Yet the presidency alone doesn't capture the balance of power.
Brazil has long had a conservative Congress, and Lula knows how to bargain with it. What's changed is the environment around those talks. Congressional brokers now operate alongside a right with mass loyalties and claims to executive competence. Helping a left-wing government advance now carries a higher electoral cost.
Fernanda Magnotta, a senior fellow at the Brazilian Center for International Relations, identifies three overlapping sources of conservative strength.
Three Engines of the Right
The first is "Bolsonarismo," an identity that outlasts any single election and mobilizes opposition to the left. During the grassroots digital activism of the 2022 election, religious framing helped reinforce loyalty and cast institutional oversight as censorship.
The second is the "managerial right," which broadens the movement's appeal. Technocratic São Paulo Governor Tarcísio de Freitas won reelection with 62.65% of valid votes on October 4. His government privatized water company Sabesp, offering voters an approach built on investment and administrative performance. It speaks to conservatives tired of confrontation, though a less combative presentation doesn't necessarily mean a more moderate agenda.
The third is the "transactional right." Much of the Centrão, a loose congressional grouping known for negotiating with presidents of different parties, works through local networks and influence over public spending. Its cooperation with Lula doesn't signal ideological conversion. Participation in government can coexist with the power to limit what government does.
The three groups compete, and cooperation isn't automatic. Bolsonarismo supplies mobilization; managerial conservatives reach beyond the core; congressional brokers turn political strength into agreements. The Bolsonaro family doesn't need to command every participant for the broader coalition to shape political calculations.
Lessons From Neighbors
Elsewhere in Latin America, turning an electoral mandate into governing power has proved difficult. Argentina's Javier Milei built support around economic rupture, then urged moderate opposition lawmakers to back his reforms after winning last year's midterms. Chile's José Antonio Kast campaigned on crime and immigration but inherited a divided Congress, with an evenly split Senate and a lower house where an anti-establishment party could hold the balance. In both countries, coalition-building remained unfinished after right-wing presidential victories.
El Salvador took a different road. Nayib Bukele's Nuevas Ideas party won 54 of 60 legislative seats in 2024, and lawmakers abolished presidential term limits the following year. Legislative dominance there reinforced personal power. In Brazil, conservative influence is spread among politicians and institutions with resources of their own. That makes coordination harder, but it lets the right stay influential even if it loses the presidency.
Trade Realities Check the Comparison With Trump
Trumpism offers a comparison with limits. President Donald Trump consolidated authority within the Republican Party, while Brazilian conservatives must coordinate across several parties and autonomous regional leaders. Economic interests complicate a common program, too. Trump's 2024 Republican platform called for baseline import tariffs and reduced dependence on China. Milei favors radical market reform.
Brazil's coalition includes exporters whose interests require a different calculation. China bought 30.7% of Brazil's exports between January and August of this year, and confrontation with Beijing would hurt constituencies a conservative president needs.
Lula could block or dilute parts of the right's agenda, but reelection wouldn't restore the left's influence across Congress and the states. Flávio would have more room to advance a shared agenda, while facing demands from competing right-wing groups. Whoever wins on October 25 will govern in a political environment where the right can shape policy from inside or outside a coalition, starting in January.
Why This Matters:
For investors, exporters and anyone watching Brazil's fiscal direction, the runoff is only part of the story. A conservative majority in Congress means spending, regulation and trade policy will be negotiated with lawmakers who answer to local networks and constituents, not just to a president. São Paulo's Sabesp deal shows the kind of investment-centered governance that appeals to voters. China's 30.7% share of Brazilian exports shows why market interests may restrain ideological impulses. From a center-right view, durable policy depends on coalition-building and institutional checks, not on any single office. The president will matter. Congress may matter more than many expect.