Brazil’s conservative parties hold a majority in Congress, positioning the right to shape government even if it loses the presidential runoff on October 25. Right-wing parties won 260 of the 513 lower-house seats; another 81 went to the center-right. The next president will have to negotiate with that conservative majority.
These numbers put national political power beyond the presidency. Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party elected 121 lawmakers, the largest caucus, and is projected to have 28 senators in the next legislature. Those lawmakers may not vote as a disciplined bloc, but their strength gives conservative politicians influence over the next government’s choices.
Congress and the Presidency
Senator Flávio Bolsonaro could bring the presidency into closer alignment with conservative strength elsewhere in government. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva could resist or dilute parts of the right’s agenda if he wins reelection, but the presidency alone doesn’t capture the balance of power. Brazil has long had a conservative Congress, and Lula knows how to bargain with it.
The conditions around those negotiations have changed. Congressional brokers now operate alongside a right with mass loyalties and claims to executive competence, while the electoral cost of helping a left-wing government advance has grown. The contest concerns how power is exercised across Congress and the executive, not simply who occupies the presidency.
Three Sources of Conservative Strength
“Bolsonarismo” sustains an identity beyond individual elections and mobilizes opposition to the left. During grassroots digital activism in the 2022 election, religious framing helped reinforce loyalty and cast institutional oversight as censorship. The movement’s influence doesn’t depend on the Bolsonaro family directing every participant.
The “managerial right” broadens the movement’s appeal. Technocratic São Paulo Governor Tarcísio de Freitas won reelection with 62.65% of valid votes on October 4. His government privatized water company Sabesp, presenting an offer centered on investment and administrative performance. That approach appeals to conservative voters tired of confrontation, though a less combative presentation doesn’t necessarily mean a more moderate agenda.
The “transactional right” connects those constituencies to government. Much of the Centrão, a loose congressional grouping known for negotiating with presidents of different parties, works through local networks and influence over public spending. Its cooperation with Lula doesn’t indicate ideological conversion: participation in government can coexist with the ability to limit government action. The groups compete, and cooperation isn’t automatic. Bolsonarismo supplies mobilization; managerial conservatives appeal beyond its core; congressional brokers turn political strength into agreements.
Coalition Limits and Political Leverage
Examples elsewhere in Latin America show how hard it is to turn an electoral mandate into governing power. Argentina’s Javier Milei urged moderate opposition lawmakers to back his reforms after winning last year’s midterms. Chile’s José Antonio Kast inherited a divided Congress, including an evenly split Senate and a lower house where an anti-establishment party could hold the balance. In both countries, coalition-building remained unfinished after right-wing presidential victories.
El Salvador took a different path. Nayib Bukele’s Nuevas Ideas party won 54 of 60 legislative seats in 2024, and lawmakers abolished presidential term limits the following year. Brazil’s conservative influence is spread among politicians and institutions with their own resources, making coordination more demanding while allowing the right to remain influential even if it loses the presidency.
Economic interests also complicate a common program. Brazil’s conservative coalition includes exporters whose interests differ from proposals for confrontation with China. China bought 30.7% of Brazil’s exports between January and August of this year. Whoever wins on October 25 will face a political environment where the right can shape government inside or outside a coalition, starting in January.