China's military pressure on Taiwan stayed generally stable in the first half of 2026, but Beijing moved to expand the China Coast Guard's presence in waters east of Taiwan, turning a law-enforcement force into a sharper instrument of control. The shift came as the U.S. and Chinese leaders arranged multiple direct meetings in 2026, including the mid-May 2026 summit between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump from May 13 to 17.
During that summit, daily sorties by Chinese military aircraft detected around Taiwan fell to an average of three. There were zero sorties on May 14 and May 15. Then, after the summit ended, the People's Liberation Army conducted a joint combat readiness patrol on May 19, and Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense detected 24 military aircraft that day. The pattern was plain enough. Pressure eased when the bosses met, then resumed when the talking stopped.
Who Gets Put on Alert
Taiwan's military and Coast Guard Administration now have to stay on high alert because of the China Coast Guard's frequent activity in the waters east of Taiwan, even though they cannot enter into conflict with these highly militarized police forces. That is the trap. The force wears a law-enforcement badge, but since 2018 it has sat under the direct command of the Central Military Commission after being transferred to the People's Armed Police system, and it has acquired highly militarized capabilities while keeping its law-enforcement character.
China has grown accustomed to using coast guard law enforcement as a gray zone tool, letting it apply sustained pressure in disputed waters without crossing the threshold of war. In late May 2026, the Philippines and Japan announced formal negotiations to delimit the maritime boundary of the two countries' exclusive economic zones and continental shelves. Their claims overlap in these waters, and they also overlap substantially with the waters east of Taiwan. Citing that, China deployed the China Coast Guard beginning June 1 to openly conduct law enforcement patrols there for the first time under the banner of independent law enforcement patrols.
What Beijing Calls 'Law Enforcement'
The operation did not look temporary. In early July, the China Coast Guard rotated its formations and continued regularized law enforcement patrols, including inspecting vessels and protecting fisheries. The waters east of Taiwan had traditionally been regarded as the rear area of Taiwan's defense, or a relatively low-pressure zone. Now China appears to be using the opening to expand the scope of its near-seas governance and form a more complete maritime encirclement posture around Taiwan.
Coast guard patrols in the waters east of Taiwan amount to asserting a jurisdictional claim over those waters. From January to May, an average of roughly one Chinese official ship, primarily China Coast Guard vessels, per day was detected operating around Taiwan. In early June, the daily average rose to 5.2, reaching 10 on June 9, yet military aircraft activity did not increase in tandem. The coast guard's lower external profile makes it a cleaner tool for pressure than military aircraft circling Taiwan, even if the effect is the same: more control, less room to breathe.
After then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in 2022, the People's Liberation Army used that pretext to break the long-standing tacit understanding of the Taiwan Strait median line and conduct large-scale encirclement exercises around Taiwan. Since then, operations by China's military aircraft, warships and drones circling Taiwan and entering Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone have shifted from occasional to routine. Gray zone tactics let China keep its peaceful reunification first narrative while advancing control in practice.
The Bargaining Table and the Bargaining Chip
At least two more opportunities remained in 2026 for the U.S. and Chinese leaders to meet: in September, when Xi is expected to visit the United States, and in November, when China hosts the APEC summit. Some suggested the two leaders would also come together at the G20 summit in December, although Xi has not attended every G20 summit in person in recent years. Beijing, however, was not expected to let its military pressure on Taiwan stand still.
China viewed Trump as a negotiator who respects an adversary's leverage and is willing to pay a high price when the other side's bargaining position is strong, and China's primary instrument for attaining that leverage is gray zone operations. Xi demanded during the two leaders' February phone call that the United States handle arms sales to Taiwan prudently, and ahead of the May summit Beijing again warned that announcing arms sales would jeopardize the summit. The White House made concessions both times.
At present, U.S. deliveries of arms sold to Taiwan were still underway, and F-16s and HIMARS may both arrive in Taiwan in stages in the second half of 2026. The unannounced $14 billion arms sale package had become a bargaining chip for Trump in maintaining relations with China. As long as Trump had not announced it, Beijing had to remain at the negotiating table and diplomatically accord Trump sufficient respect, even if actual progress in those negotiations was slow.
Beijing did not expect Trump to stop arms sales to Taiwan forever. From the period after Xi's September visit to the United States through the conclusion of the U.S. midterm elections in November, the second half of the year still offered many junctures at which Trump could announce this $14 billion arms sale package. Before that happened, Beijing was impatient to cement its presence in the waters east of Taiwan because later events may give China the pretext to intercept vessels bound for Taiwan under the guise of quarantine and law enforcement inspection.