China deployed its Coast Guard to waters east of Taiwan beginning June 1, openly conducting law enforcement patrols for the first time in what amounts to a jurisdictional claim over those waters. The operation represents Beijing's latest gray zone tactic to pressure Taiwan without triggering direct military confrontation, even as President Donald Trump prepares for another summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in September.
The waters east of Taiwan had traditionally been regarded as the rear area of Taiwan's defense, a relatively low-pressure zone. Now China appears to be seizing the opportunity to expand the scope of its near-seas governance, forming a more complete maritime encirclement posture around Taiwan. In early July, the China Coast Guard rotated its formations and continued regularized law enforcement patrols, including inspecting vessels and protecting fisheries. The operation doesn't appear temporary.
Summit Diplomacy and Military Pressure
China's military pressure on Taiwan remained generally stable in the first half of 2026, with no major escalation in military aircraft or naval vessel activity. Tensions ran lower than at the end of 2025, in part because the U.S. and Chinese leaders arranged multiple direct meetings in 2026. During the mid-May summit between Xi and Trump from May 13 to 17, daily sorties by Chinese military aircraft detected around Taiwan fell to an average of three, with zero sorties on both May 14 and May 15. The daily average for the first half of 2026 was 7.5 sorties.
After the summit ended, the People's Liberation Army conducted a joint combat readiness patrol on May 19. Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense detected 24 military aircraft that day. At least two more opportunities for the U.S. and Chinese leaders to meet remained in 2026: in September, when Xi is expected to visit the United States, and in November, when China hosts the APEC summit.
Gray Zone Operations
Beijing viewed Trump as a negotiator who respects an adversary's leverage and is willing to pay a high price when the other side's bargaining position is strong. China's primary instrument for attaining that leverage is gray zone operations. Since 2018, when the China Coast Guard was transferred to the People's Armed Police system and placed under the direct command of the Central Military Commission, it has acquired highly militarized capabilities while retaining its law enforcement character.
China has grown accustomed to using coast guard law enforcement as a gray zone tool, enabling it to apply sustained pressure in disputed waters without crossing the threshold of war. In late May, the Philippines and Japan announced the launch of formal negotiations to delimit the maritime boundary of the two countries' exclusive economic zones and continental shelves. Tokyo and Manila's exclusive economic zone claims in these waters overlap, and they also overlap substantially with the waters east of Taiwan. Citing this, China deployed the China Coast Guard to openly conduct law enforcement patrols in these waters for the first time under the banner of independent law enforcement patrols.
From January to May, an average of roughly one Chinese official ship, primarily China Coast Guard vessels, per day was detected operating around Taiwan. In early June, the daily average rose to 5.2, reaching 10 on June 9, yet military aircraft activity didn't increase in tandem. Operating under the name of law enforcement, the coast guard presents a lower external profile than military aircraft circling Taiwan.
Strategic Implications
After then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in 2022, the People's Liberation Army used this pretext to break the long-standing tacit understanding of the Taiwan Strait median line and conduct large-scale encirclement exercises around Taiwan. Since then, operations by China's military aircraft, warships and drones circling Taiwan and entering Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone have shifted from occasional to routine. Gray zone tactics allow China to maintain its peaceful reunification first narrative while advancing control in practice.
For Taiwan, the China Coast Guard's frequent activity in the waters east of Taiwan forces its military and Coast Guard Administration to remain on high alert, yet they can't enter into conflict with these highly militarized police forces. Ultimately, the Chinese military's presence and patrols in the waters east of Taiwan will become routine and an established fact. In theory, this will become the foundation of Beijing's strategy to blockade Taiwan ahead of any conflict.
The China Coast Guard routinely deploys larger-tonnage, advanced vessels armed with autocannons. They've been known to fire high-pressure water cannons at opponents. While the China Coast Guard's escalated activity provides the Philippines and Japan an opportunity to deepen maritime security cooperation, how to move from mechanism-level discussions to actual cooperation remains a question. Both sides need to ensure that they don't proactively escalate a conflict in the vicinity of Taiwan.
U.S. Response and Arms Sales
For the United States, this is a test of the First Island Chain strategy. Against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict with Iran, the U.S. toolkit and resolve remain constrained. The more likely approach is to work behind the scenes to push Tokyo and Manila to strengthen security cooperation and to increase investment in and deployment of security and military infrastructure.
With the September summit approaching, it was unclear whether Washington was prepared to withstand Beijing's diplomatic pressure. Xi demanded during the two leaders' February phone call that the United States handle arms sales to Taiwan prudently, and ahead of the May summit Beijing again warned that announcing arms sales would jeopardize the summit. The White House made concessions both times.
At present, U.S. deliveries of arms sold to Taiwan were still underway, and F-16s and HIMARS may both arrive in Taiwan in stages in the second half of 2026. The unannounced $14 billion arms sale package had become a bargaining chip for Trump in maintaining relations with China. As long as Trump hadn't announced it, Beijing had to remain at the negotiating table and diplomatically accord Trump sufficient respect, even if actual progress in those negotiations was slow.
Beijing didn't expect Trump to cease arms sales to Taiwan forever. From the period after Xi's September visit to the United States through the conclusion of the U.S. midterm elections in November, the second half of the year still offered many junctures at which Trump could announce this $14 billion arms sale package. Before that happened, Beijing was impatient to cement its presence in the waters east of Taiwan because subsequent events may give China the pretext to intercept vessels bound for Taiwan under the guise of quarantine and law enforcement inspection.
Why This Matters:
China's expansion of coast guard operations east of Taiwan demonstrates Beijing's ability to alter the strategic landscape through incremental pressure rather than overt military action. The shift from occasional to routine patrols establishes facts on the ground that become harder to reverse over time, potentially laying groundwork for a future blockade scenario. For U.S. policy, the challenge is balancing summit diplomacy with the need to maintain credible deterrence through arms sales and regional partnerships. The unannounced $14 billion arms package represents leverage in negotiations, but delaying its announcement to preserve diplomatic momentum risks signaling that Beijing's pressure tactics work. Meanwhile, the constrained U.S. security posture due to the Iran conflict limits Washington's ability to respond forcefully, placing greater burden on regional allies Japan and the Philippines to shoulder responsibility for First Island Chain security.