Alma Center assessments cited by Sarit Zehavi say Hezbollah still has as many as approximately 15,000 rockets and missiles and is expanding its drone capabilities. The organization is also recruiting and training operatives, restoring weapons systems and smuggling weapons from Syria, even after its military model suffered severe damage.
Writing about the pager operation’s impact, Zehavi said Hezbollah’s plan to invade the Galilee had been neutralized, its ground forces in southern Lebanon had collapsed, and its firepower array no longer existed on the scale originally planned. But the militia hasn’t disappeared. In 2026, it sustained several months of rocket and drone launches into Israeli territory, on a smaller scale than in 2024.
The Damage to Hezbollah’s Forces
The pager operation injured thousands of Hezbollah operatives through the use of pagers and other communications devices. Three days later, Israel eliminated Ibrahim Aqil along with 14 commanders from Radwan Force brigades, striking the force’s chain of command, the article said.
Zehavi wrote that the operation and the subsequent blow to the Radwan Force damaged Hezbollah’s morale and operational functioning. The losses also affected skilled personnel and capabilities that the organization had developed over many years for its firepower and invasion plans. Those blows later made it easier for the IDF to operate against infrastructure that Hezbollah had prepared for an invasion of Israel in southern Lebanon.
The operation had psychological as well as operational effects, according to Zehavi. She wrote that it restored Israel’s standing as a security power able to conduct operations that had seemed unimaginable or impossible. After October 7, the operation showed the region that Israel had recovered and could penetrate enemies’ most sensitive systems, strengthening Israel’s deterrence.
The article said the operation also helped restore Israelis’ trust in their security establishment after the October 7 massacre in the south and the disappointment of northern residents who had faced fire for 11 months. Zehavi said the operation restored a sense of capability among Israelis and, to some extent, opened the door to further daring operations, including the elimination of Hezbollah’s leadership and operations in Iran.
Reconstruction and the Regional Picture
Hezbollah is making considerable efforts to rebuild its military, the article said. Those efforts include recruiting and training new operatives, updating operational plans, gathering intelligence, and restoring weapons systems. Smuggling from Syria continues, including rockets, advanced anti-tank missiles, UAVs and other components. Hezbollah is also working to manufacture and repair weapons inside Lebanon.
The Lebanese government and the Lebanese Armed Forces have repeatedly failed to fulfill their commitment to disarm Hezbollah, according to the article. Its rocket and drone launches in 2026 show that the organization retains the capacity to keep attacking Israeli territory, although at a smaller scale than in 2024.
Zehavi described the pager operation, the elimination of Hezbollah’s leadership and the blow to the Radwan Force as part of a chain of events that changed the Middle East. She also cited the revolution in Syria and Israeli strikes against Iran. In her account, the weakening of Hezbollah created an opening for Ahmed al-Sharaa’s revolution: al-Sharaa had been waiting in Idlib for an opportune moment and acted after realizing that Hezbollah, described as Basher Assad’s principal ally in the region, had been weakened.
Zehavi identified preventing the reconstruction of the Shi’ite axis and preventing its replacement by a radical Sunni axis comprising Syria, Qatar and Turkey as challenges. She asked how actors interested in arrangements with Israel could be strengthened while those seeking to destroy it continued to be weakened.
The article said the international system has a significant role in whether terrorist organizations survive, rebuild and grow stronger. Zehavi called for a consistent and sustained policy of uprooting terrorist organizations in Gaza, Lebanon and toward Iran, and said the Israeli government should lead the effort with local actors such as the Lebanese government and international actors such as the United States. The pager operation took many years to plan and was a one-time event; “we must not count on pulling another ‘rabbit out of the hat.’”