Japan’s Taiwan Security Push Raises Stakes for 2028

Taiwan’s 2028 presidential election could shape how Beijing, Tokyo and Washington wield power across East Asia, according to an analysis by Paul N. Goldstein. The contest goes beyond military readiness: it’s also about who defines Taiwan’s political future and the region’s security order.

Goldstein, president and CEO of PTB Global Advisors and an adjunct senior fellow at Pacific Forum, wrote that the election may matter more than any single military benchmark. Pacific Forum first published the article and later republished it with permission. Many Western analysts focus on 2027 and People’s Liberation Army modernization milestones, while Goldstein’s analysis puts Beijing’s political calculations at the center.

A security order built from above

Sanae Takaichi’s election signals a major shift in Japanese strategic thinking since Shinzo Abe’s second tenure as prime minister from 2012 to 2020, the article says. Takaichi backs higher defense spending, expanded military capabilities and stronger Indo-Pacific partnerships. Her security agenda treats Taiwan’s security and Japan’s security as inseparable.

Takaichi has argued that conflict in the Taiwan Strait would threaten Japanese trade routes, energy supplies and national security. Her position builds on Abe’s assertion that a Taiwan contingency would become a Japanese contingency. Taiwan’s governing Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, views Takaichi’s approach as strengthening deterrence and bringing Taiwan into a broader democratic security network.

Beijing describes the same developments as evidence of a more assertive Japanese security posture. It also says Japan hasn’t adequately addressed its wartime legacy. At the Xiangshan Forum in September 2026, former Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama criticized Takaichi’s Taiwan-related comments, saying they had worsened China-Japan relations and raised questions in Beijing about Japan’s commitment to the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué and the one China policy.

Political pressure, military pressure

Taiwan’s Deep Blue current within the Kuomintang, or KMT, offers the strongest opposition to Takaichi’s approach. Ma Ying-jeou, Hung Hsiu-chu and Chang Ya-chung emphasize Chinese cultural identity, expanded cross-Strait dialogue and eventual reconciliation with Beijing. They argue Taiwan shouldn’t become the front line in a wider confrontation between China and a coalition of regional democracies. Takaichi’s supporters say stronger regional partnerships can prevent coercion and preserve peace.

Cheng Li-wun’s rise as KMT chair has added another variable. Former CIA and National Security Council China specialist Jonathan Czin argues that Beijing increasingly sees political pathways as offering greater opportunities than immediate military confrontation. Cheng’s emphasis on dialogue and renewed engagement has raised expectations in Beijing that Taiwan’s political direction might become more favorable. Support for explicitly pro-Beijing policies remains limited in Taiwan, however, and divisions within the KMT remain significant.

A KMT victory in 2028 could validate Beijing’s strategy of patience, political pressure and economic engagement. A fourth consecutive DPP victory could convince Xi Jinping that coercion and persuasion haven’t moved Taiwan closer politically to the mainland. A DPP win wouldn’t necessarily lead to an invasion, the article says; increased gray-zone pressure, including maritime restrictions, inspections, transportation disruptions and economic coercion, would be more likely.

At the 2025 Honolulu Defense Forum, Admiral Samuel Paparo warned that China’s military activities around Taiwan are “not exercises; they are rehearsals” for forced unification. The article identifies a prolonged coercion campaign that gradually raises the risk of a broader crisis as a possible principal danger. Restrictions and disruption would hit people and communities first, while governments decide how far to escalate.

Washington and Beijing set the frame

A former U.S. naval attaché in Beijing, who regularly travels to China and meets Chinese officials, offered a different view: Washington and Beijing may be moving toward managed coexistence resembling strategic stability after normalization in the late 1970s and early 1980s. He says President Trump hasn’t fundamentally changed longstanding U.S. policy and remains broadly within earlier understandings between Washington and Beijing.

Under that possibility, Japan’s place in any emerging U.S.-China understanding becomes a central question. Takaichi has made Taiwan’s security a core Japanese national security interest, complicating any future U.S.-China condominium. Czin warns that Xi’s patience depends heavily on the belief that developments after 2028 could improve China’s position. The analysis leaves the region’s political future suspended between dialogue, deterrence and pressure—with Taiwan’s election testing whether powerful states can manage their competition without making ordinary people pay through a widening crisis.