Ethiopia’s plans to build three additional hydropower dams on the Blue Nile have reopened a dispute that never really left the river, less than a year after Addis Ababa formally inaugurated the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in September 2025. The people who live under these water regimes get the usual gift from statecraft: threats, legal language, and military posturing dressed up as national necessity.
Water as a State Weapon
Egypt depends on the Nile for nearly all its freshwater, and the Blue Nile supplies approximately 85% of the water reaching the country. That dependence sits at the center of the current standoff. On July 13, Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty rejected reports of additional unilateral construction on the Blue Nile and said Egypt reserved “the right to legitimate self-defense in accordance with the rules of international law.” An unnamed Egyptian government official told the state-run Middle East News Agency on Aug. 16 that Cairo had “several means at its disposal” to protect its Nile interests and would not permit any country to control the river’s flow to downstream states.
Addis Ababa answers with the same grammar of sovereignty, just with a different flag. Dr. Gashaw Ayferam Endaylalu, a senior researcher specializing in Nile hydropolitics and hydropower development at Ethiopia’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, said Ethiopia considers development of the river a sovereign right and an economic necessity. “From the Ethiopian perspective, Ethiopia has a sovereign right to utilize the water resource of the Nile,” he said. He added, “Ethiopia has a legal right, a sovereign right, to utilize its water resource for development purposes,” and said, “Because Ethiopia is an agrarian-based economy, food security is the main problem for Ethiopia. Water scarcity is the main problem for Ethiopia. Energy scarcity or energy poverty is also the main problem.”
The Treaty Maze
The disagreement is not just about dams. It’s about which legal and political framework gets to police the river. The Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement entered into force in October 2024 after Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda ratified it, with South Sudan supplying the sixth ratification required for the treaty to take effect. The agreement sets out principles including equitable and reasonable water use, avoidance of significant harm, data exchange and notification of planned measures, and it envisages a permanent Nile River Basin Commission. Egypt and Sudan did not ratify the agreement and are not bound by it.
Gashaw said Cairo’s reliance on the language of historical and existing water rights lies at the center of the disagreement. “Those things [the claims of historical and existing water rights] are not acceptable since Ethiopia has also historical and territorial claims connected to the Nile,” he said. He described the Nile as “a development issue and a sovereignty issue,” rather than a matter that should be considered exclusively through a national-security framework. The paperwork keeps multiplying. The river keeps being treated like a border checkpoint.
Regional Rivalries, Familiar Methods
The argument has spilled far beyond the riverbank. Egypt signed a security agreement with Somalia in 2024 and subsequently sent military aid to Mogadishu during a period of acute tension between Somalia and Ethiopia over Addis Ababa’s attempt to obtain access to the sea through Somaliland. Turkey mediated the dispute throughout 2024, culminating in the Ankara Declaration on Dec. 11. Ethiopia and Somalia affirmed each other’s sovereignty and agreed to negotiate Ethiopian commercial access to the sea under Somali authority. The countries restored diplomatic relations in January 2025 and opened technical negotiations the following month, although no final sea-access agreement has been announced.
Gashaw described those developments as part of an Egyptian effort to build pressure around Ethiopia. “Diplomatic and military encirclement is one of the strategies Egypt is using to isolate Ethiopia,” he said. “Egypt is trying to create an alliance with Ethiopia's neighbors, and Ethiopia is doing the same by diversifying partnerships as well.” Egypt has also expanded military cooperation with Eritrea and secured contracts to develop Djibouti’s ports and later participate in their management, The National reported on Aug. 17.
Israel formally recognized Somaliland in December 2025, a decision sharply opposed by Somalia and Turkey. Ankara, already one of Mogadishu’s most important security partners, has expanded its presence through military cooperation, energy agreements, planned offshore drilling and preparations for a spaceport in Somalia. Gashaw described Israel and Turkey as increasingly important competitors in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. “Israel is also projecting power from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean. So the main competition in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden is between Israel and Turkey,” he said. He argued that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland was partly intended to establish a presence overlooking the Gulf of Aden.
The Horn is also being pulled into growing competition among Gulf states. Reuters reported on Feb. 14 that the Saudi-UAE rivalry, initially centered on Yemen, had spread across the Red Sea into Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Libya. The UAE has built influence across Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti through multibillion-dollar investments, diplomatic relationships and military support. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has increasingly aligned with Egypt, Turkey and Qatar. Ethiopia maintains relations with competing powers, including the UAE and Turkey, while Egypt works with countries that may oppose one another elsewhere.
Gashaw described Ethiopia as pursuing a “multi-vector foreign policy” based on engaging competing regional powers while avoiding membership in a formal alliance directed against Egypt. He said, “I don't think there will be a conventional open war between Ethiopia and Egypt for different reasons,” and added, “Instead … maybe there might be [a] proxy war or proxy competition.” He predicted “geopolitical competition between the two countries” across Africa and said they would compete for influence over both the Red Sea and the Nile.
The International Mediation Loop
Dr. Walid Kazziha, a political scientist at the American University in Cairo, described the latest phase as serious but still largely contained within diplomatic and legal channels. He said, “The Egyptian reaction is … limited to making statements [and] focusing on the legal violations that the Ethiopian action may involve under international law. There are no direct military tones to the Egyptian reaction.” Kazziha said Egypt may eventually seek intervention from President Donald Trump’s administration to restrain Ethiopia’s ambitions. “Trump has in the past sent comforting signals to Sissi, but has not taken any serious steps toward mediation,” he said.
The United States has intervened before. During President Trump’s first administration, Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan held negotiations in Washington with the US Treasury and World Bank over the filling and operation of the GERD. The talks produced a draft agreement that Egypt initialed in 2020, but Ethiopia did not sign it. Kazziha described the current confrontation as “a war of words” that could invite American intervention before it becomes more serious.
Gashaw put the whole arrangement in colder terms. “So, I don't think conflict will dominate cooperation, even [as] I don't think cooperation will dominate conflict,” he said, “Rather, conflict, competition, and cooperation will coexist in the Nile River Basin.” That’s the state system in one sentence: no clean break, no clean peace, just permanent bargaining over who gets to command the water, the ports, the alliances and the people trapped underneath them.