Deutsche Bank’s Italian unit used derivative transactions and shadow bookkeeping to conceal as much as €800 million in mortgage-lending losses, while executives who left later received millions in severance, according to internal documents and an investigation described in a Financial Times report. The bank didn’t fire employees involved, and it decided not to claw back €5.25 million in deferred compensation.
The hidden reserve
Managers in Italy created a local reserve called “tesoretto” — Italian for “little treasure box” — to conceal failures to meet profit targets. Staff used doctored loan-loss provisions to build the buffer, which the Aetos investigation said was “not envisaged by the Group”. The local finance department managed it, and the division drew on it to meet profit targets in 2011, 2014 and 2016. “For the avoidance of doubt, tesoretto is not an accounting term,” the report said.
The investigation found that Deutsche Bank SpA entered €900 million in derivative positions with “no economic rationale”. The accounting problem followed a 2007 change in Italian law that allowed households to repay fixed-rate mortgages early without extra costs. The Italian unit failed to adjust its pricing and risk models, even though early repayment had been standard practice in Germany and other countries since the mid-1990s.
During the Eurozone debt crisis, interest rates fell sharply and many clients refinanced high-interest mortgages early. Deutsche’s internal models didn’t account for those repayments, and the bank paid for unnecessary hedges. The investigation attributed persistent errors to a lack of “both personnel competencies and fundamental understanding of the core business model and processes”.
Milan also stopped sharing lending data with headquarters, distorting risk calculations. For several years, mortgage data didn’t reach central risk systems, leaving €2.8 billion of lending and €1.4 billion of early repayments unrecorded. The subsidiary underpaid €235 million in internal funding costs; Deutsche eventually waived the debt.
Regulators, warnings and payouts
A whistleblower flagged accounting manipulation to senior colleagues in Italy in 2013. Deutsche didn’t launch an investigation until early 2018, after Rob Vogtle, a veteran banker and member of Deutsche Bank SpA’s supervisory board, raised concerns. In 2020, Deutsche disclosed a €522 million financial hit to the European Central Bank. Including unrealised losses, the “potential total loss” was €779 million.
KPMG audited the Italian arm during the period of misconduct, missed the tesoretto scheme and later advised Deutsche that the accounts didn’t need to be restated. Hansrudi Lenz, a retired professor of accounting at Würzburg university, said the conduct identified by Aetos was “of course” at odds with basic accounting rules. The investigation concluded that “local and group results were obfuscated by arbitrary adjustment”. Lenz said the conduct showed “a failure of operational risk management and internal control systems, extending beyond financial reporting”.
Flavio Valeri, who headed the Italian unit for 12 years, was among five employees given a collective written warning, alongside Italian chief financial officer Carmine Di Martino and local head of private banking Mario Cincotto. The three were cleared of personal misconduct but reprimanded for “shortcomings in the performance of their own managerial functions”. Valeri and Di Martino left in 2020; Cincotto resigned in 2021 for reasons unrelated to Project Aetos.
Managers who left were expected to receive about €8.1 million in severance. Deutsche said it had taken “remediation and accountability measures” but gave no further details. The bank said it didn’t dismiss employees because it found no “deliberate misconduct or collusion” and concluded they hadn’t acted “dishonestly or fraudulently”. The Aetos report said it was “unavoidable to consider a culpability of negligence or incompetence”.
The bank’s account of the affair
Deutsche told the Financial Times that it had “thoroughly examined historical matters” and that “relevant stakeholders were informed appropriately”. It said the matter had been reported to supervisors and the auditor, but that “on group level, no further disclosure was necessary because the matter was not a material driver of group or segmental performance”. It also said all relevant past transactions had been reflected in its financial statements.
The affair raised questions about chief executive Christian Sewing, who had headed Deutsche’s internal audit unit and was co-head of the retail bank when the Aetos investigation began. An audit group under his watch identified some risk-management problems in 2014, but potential changes weren’t implemented. In March 2018, Sewing replied to a proposed scope for the investigation: “The text reads like a presumption of guilt. I’m furious.” He was appointed chief executive the following month.
The linked report about the UK Treasury opposing a flagship plan to tackle youth unemployment could not be fetched. Its details aren’t included here.
- deutsche bank
- italy
- mortgage losses
- accounting scandal
- project aetos
- european central bank
- kpmg
- risk management