American technology companies are powering a global fraud epidemic that cost Americans nearly $200 billion in losses in 2024, yet most face no legal consequences and lack sufficient business incentives to stop the abuse of their own platforms and tools.
The investigation by The Associated Press and "FRONTLINE" found that infrastructure from U.S. companies—from artificial intelligence models to internet service providers to satellite internet services—forms the backbone of an industrialized scam operation centered in Myanmar. One trafficked worker, Safeer Mohammed Koorimannil, impersonated a Singaporean woman named Ella and targeted roughly 50,000 victims from at least 17 countries in a single month, working across dozens of profiles simultaneously while supervised by armed guards with electric batons.
The Technology Enabling Fraud at Scale
Scammers have weaponized American AI models, chiefly ChatGPT and Gemini, to build specialized software platforms that automate romance fraud across more than 100 languages. Two software suites identified by investigators—Kongtian Intelligent Customer Acquisition (KT) and Global Social Traffic Navigation (007TG)—use OpenAI and Google technology to generate convincing fake characters, translate messages in real time, and track worker performance with brutal efficiency. Scammers who purchased these tools generated tens of millions of dollars in illicit profits, according to blockchain analysis.
The infrastructure exploited to commit fraud extends far upstream from the social media platforms victims see. A sophisticated global internet backbone connects scam compounds in Myanmar to victims worldwide. American companies including Cogent Communications, AT&T, DigitalOcean, and Oracle all carried traffic from these criminal operations. One in five signals from devices at four scam compounds linked to sanctioned Myanmar entities was carried by a U.S.-registered company, according to an analysis of more than 200,000 device connections.
Elon Musk's Starlink satellite internet service emerged as the dominant provider in Myanmar, including to known scam centers, despite congressional pressure and a widely publicized crackdown. By June 2025, Starlink held a 14% market share in Myanmar. When the company cut services to more than 2,500 units near scam compounds in October, it lost nearly half its users and its market share plunged from 15% to 6.5%. But by February, Starlink rebounded to become the number one provider again, commanding a nearly 20% market share today.
Why Companies Lack Incentive to Act
Cybersecurity experts point to a fundamental market failure. Sascha Meinrath, the Palmer chair in telecommunications at Penn State University, explained the problem plainly: "If there's no disincentive to continuing this, if there's no cost to actually facilitating scamming, then why would I spend a dollar to prevent scamming? This is the problem. It's identifiable, it's addressable — at least somewhat — but it costs something. And right now the cost of facilitating scamming is zero."
The AP found no evidence that these companies were doing anything illegal themselves. But the investigation raised serious questions about how vigorously they enforce their own terms of service, which explicitly prohibit fraud. OpenAI said it identified and banned three accounts based on information AP shared. Google and OpenAI both claim to have robust programs in place to disrupt scammers. Oracle said it was "diligently working with law enforcement" on materials AP provided. UpCloud, a Finnish cloud services provider with U.S. servers, said AP's inquiry prompted an internal review of its risk assessment processes.
Starlink declined to respond to detailed requests for comment. Internet service providers argued they cannot see the content their networks carry and said they respond to valid abuse reports and cooperate with law enforcement.
Government Response Remains Voluntary
In November, District of Columbia U.S. Attorney Jeanine Pirro created the Scam Center Strike Force to target scam compounds. In a four-day exercise in May, the Strike Force worked with Meta, SpaceX, Google, and others to disrupt more than 1.4 million social media and email accounts, interrupt malicious IP address traffic, seize satellite internet terminals, and decommission servers linked to Southeast Asian scam networks. Pirro said in an email, "We will not allow criminal organizations to weaponize our own infrastructure against us or devastate the life savings of hardworking families. Our message is clear: we will find you, we will stop you, and we will protect the American people."
Yet in Washington, lawmakers and government officials have been asking American tech companies to cooperate on a voluntary basis. Outside the United States, that approach is shifting. The United Kingdom, the European Union, Australia, and Singapore have introduced new regulations requiring companies to do more to prevent scams or face financial penalties.
The Human Cost
The scale of the operation is staggering. Myanmar has become a haven for industrial-scale scam compounds that have drafted some 300,000 people from dozens of countries, often against their will, according to the United Nations. At least 25 new scam compounds have been built deep inside Myanmar since the high-profile crackdown along the Thai border last fall. By January, at least seven devices used at the high-profile KK Park compound had migrated to a new operation some 30 kilometers to the northwest, near Hpakalu. Scammers from at least 13 of the new outposts used Starlink IP addresses to get online between early March and the end of May.
An Ethiopian engineer named Ebisa worked at Deko Park, a major scam compound, collecting WhatsApp numbers of vulnerable men. He was constantly punished—beaten, shocked, detained, and forced to exercise for hours—for failing to meet impossible performance goals. When he tried to evade a beating, security guards beat him so severely he was blinded in one eye. He escaped in December 2025 and sought medical care in Thailand, but doctors later informed him from his home in Ethiopia that they could not save his eye. "It's been a tough reality to face," he said.
A Nigerian worker named Obinna Okeadu never made it home. On October 28, 2025, after an unsuccessful overnight shift, he and his roommate were called out for punishment. Back in their dorm room, Okeadu began trembling uncontrollably and collapsed. He was taken away, presumably to a hospital. The next day, his computer disappeared and his name was deleted from work chats. Three co-workers, a human rights activist, and his family back in Nigeria all reported he never returned.
Chris Colocousis, a divorced man in his 60s, lost $400,000 to a romance scammer named "Eliza" who contacted him on Facebook. On January 25, 2025, he laid out $80,000 in cash on his table, as instructed by a customer service representative at his crypto trading app. A young man in a Jeep with New York plates arrived at his doorstep, collected the money in a plastic shopping bag, and left with a smile. "See you next time," the man said. "Maybe. OK. Bye-bye." Colocousis said he is still so shaken he sometimes has trouble leaving his house. "The greed is --," he said. "I'm all for capitalism, but when it's totally ruining people's lives, people that have worked their whole life towards a goal so that they don't have to work anymore, only to have it just ripped out of their chest — you know, something's wrong."
Why This Matters:
This investigation exposes a critical gap in the regulatory and business framework governing American technology companies. The infrastructure enabling $200 billion in annual fraud losses exists because companies face no meaningful cost for facilitating criminal activity. While OpenAI and Google have responded with some account suspensions, and the Scam Center Strike Force has disrupted millions of fraudulent accounts, the underlying problem persists: without legal requirements or financial penalties, companies lack sufficient incentive to police their own platforms aggressively. Starlink's ability to cut services to scam compounds—demonstrated by its October service reductions—proves the technical capability exists. Yet the company's rapid rebound to market dominance suggests that scam revenue remains too valuable to abandon. International jurisdictions are moving toward mandatory compliance through regulation and penalties. The question for U.S. policymakers is whether voluntary cooperation from tech companies will prove sufficient, or whether American regulatory frameworks need to align with those of the UK, EU, Australia, and Singapore to protect citizens from industrialized fraud networks that exploit American technology as a core business input.