The Houthis have seized control of the Greater and Lesser Hanish islands in the southern Red Sea and captured the strategic port city of Mocha, expelling forces linked to the Saudi-linked Presidential Leadership Council. The Iran-backed militia has also overrun Perim Island and the Zuqar islands, bringing the group to effectively control the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Houthi forces now sit at the narrowest point of the coastline, just 20 km from the African coast.
The Iran-supported Shi'ite militiamen and the wider Iran-led regional alliance now have effective control over maritime traffic making its way through the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea. In statements made as they advanced, the Houthis said they intend to target Saudi shipping on the strait rather than impose a general naval blockade. The advance was accompanied by an Iraqi Shi'ite militia drone attack on the Saudi East-West pipeline this year. The pipeline had served as a means for Riyadh to transport oil to the Red Sea, thereby avoiding the Strait of Hormuz, which is subject to Iranian attacks. It's expected to be out of service for three to five weeks.
Coordinated Action Extends Tehran's Reach
The coordinated action between the Iraqi Shi'ite militias and the Houthis is intended to extend the Iran-led alliance's ability to impose rules on maritime traffic from Hormuz to the Red Sea. The focus on Saudi Arabia avoids inviting US retaliation, which a more general effort to blockade Bab el-Mandeb might trigger. The events of the last days demonstrate the Iran-led regional bloc's continued ability to act in coordination for shared objectives. While Israel has pummeled and drastically weakened, though not destroyed, Iran's clients in the Levant, further south in the Gulf area, Tehran and its allies remain very much in business.
The Houthis aren't a direct franchise or proxy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Like Hamas, they're described as an authentic and deep-rooted local movement with their own agenda and preferences. They preferred to avoid direct engagement in the current round of fighting prior to the Saudi attacks and are now directing their efforts specifically against Riyadh. At the same time, much of their military capacity derives directly from their relationship with Tehran.
Iranian Personnel on the Ground
According to documents recently obtained by The Jerusalem Post from Yemeni sources, the military activities of the Houthis are enabled by the direct presence of Iranian and other allied personnel on Yemeni soil and the close involvement of Iranian and allied Iraqi and Lebanese personnel who are instructing and managing the Houthis. The documents list the names and identifying information of Iranian, Iraqi and Lebanese experts in Yemen who are providing expert advice and supervision regarding drones, missiles and intelligence and security operations.
The documents name the Iranian citizen Haji Murtaza Mokhles and the Iraqi Abu Mukhtar Bari Mashour, who are giving expert advice in intelligence and security operations. They're working closely with Abu Jihad Muhammad Alawi al-Tiri, a senior Houthi official from the village of Bayt Baws, located 8 km south of Sana'a. He's described as a senior official of the "Houthi Security and Intelligence Service," serving as "administrator of the Military Intelligence Center and supervisor of the Presidential Information Center."
In the field of drones, the documents reference the Iranian citizen Hasan bin Hasan Danbous and the Iraqi Hasan Iyad al-Ameri, both senior experts in this field, as working with the senior Houthi commander Hassan Sharafi in development in this area. Regarding missiles, the Iraqi Muhammad Sayed al-Hakim and the Iranian citizen Karar Mumammad al-Musawi are named as working with Abu Bashar Saleh al-Saree, who is named as managing the central information department of the missile forces.
Smuggling Networks Span Russia and China
These examples are part of a much longer list. Identifying details, location and sometimes telephone numbers of the officials are in the documents. The documents include details regarding the smuggling methods that enable the Houthis to bring vital components and equipment into Yemen, and the roles played by Iran, Russia and China.
The documents name businessmen residing in the Houthi-controlled part of Yemen who are responsible for importing spare parts for drones from China to Houthi-controlled Yemen, including Safwan al-Dabai, Yasser al-Dabai and Rami al-Hajj al-Alimi, along with several others. Yemeni, and in one case Chinese, phone numbers are included.
According to the documents, following a meeting held under Iranian auspices in Muscat, Oman, two years ago, several Chinese shipping companies have been paying the Houthis in hard currency so their ships can pass through the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea undisturbed. The list of companies includes COSCO Shipping and Sea Legend Shipping.
In two further passages, the documents reference a communications system south of Saada city and connected to centers in the mountains of Hajjah, Amran, Sana'a and the mountains overlooking the west coast. The documents say: "This network was created by experts from Iran and uses Iranian-made encryption devices, in addition to the use of Russian communication and encryption devices, especially in the Morse messaging system…
"US airstrikes were able to destroy many communication networks and jamming devices, and the Houthi militias are currently trying to replace them with Chinese devices, even if temporarily, so that Iran can then smuggle devices to Yemen and restart the jihadi communications department with all its capacity."
The documents also say: "most of the electrical and optical infrared sensors used by the Houthi militias are Iranian-made systems that were smuggled from the Iranian ports of Bandar Abbas and Shahbar to the port of Saleef, Hodeidah, and the coasts of Al-Mahra governorate (the process is still ongoing), where the components of the missiles, and the devices, are also smuggled in the form of parts that are reassembled when they arrive in Yemen. As for the thermal cameras – the Houthis use Chinese thermal cameras, imported through official means."
Divisions Weaken the Opposition
This evidence showcases an integrated de facto alliance in which the Houthis, in the service of shared goals but not under the direction of any other element, are provided with advanced capacities and assistance, enabling them to better pursue their aims. This structure, in addition to the religious-ideological zeal of the Shi'ite Islamist fighters, underlies the successes of recent days.
Divisions plague the anti-Houthi side. The Saudis acted militarily against the United Arab Emirates-supported South Yemeni element earlier this year, removing them from the field. They then concluded a pact with Turkey and Pakistan, which seems to have brought some ineffectual Turkey-supported Sunni jihadi fighters to Yemen, and little else. The United States, meanwhile, has been looking for a way to avoid escalation and for now seems to be staying uninvolved, on the grounds that the Houthis are only targeting a US ally and not the general shipping traffic that traverses the strait.
Why This Matters:
The Houthi seizure of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait demonstrates Iran's expanding ability to threaten global commerce through proxy forces operating far from Iranian territory. Tehran now possesses leverage over maritime traffic at two of the world's most critical chokepoints — Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb — giving it unprecedented capacity to disrupt energy supplies and international trade. The coordinated drone strike on Saudi infrastructure this year reveals the operational sophistication of Iran's proxy network, which can synchronize attacks across multiple theaters to achieve strategic objectives. The documented presence of Iranian, Iraqi and Lebanese military advisers on Yemeni soil, along with smuggling networks involving Russian and Chinese technology, shows how authoritarian powers are enabling Iran's regional ambitions. The US decision to avoid military involvement because the Houthis are only targeting a regional ally sets a dangerous precedent, signaling that proxy aggression against American partners won't trigger consequences. Saudi Arabia's inability to defend its own shipping lanes, combined with internal divisions among anti-Houthi forces, suggests the balance of power in the southern Red Sea has shifted decisively in Tehran's favor.