The Houthi movement has seized control of the Greater and Lesser Hanish islands in the southern Red Sea, along with the strategic port city of Mocha. This advance, which also saw the overrunning of Perim Island and the Zuqar islands, places Houthi forces at the narrowest point of the coastline, just 20 km from the African coast. The group's actions have brought the Bab el-Mandeb Strait under their effective control, fundamentally altering the dynamics of maritime traffic in the region.
Asserting Regional Control
This strategic consolidation means the Iran-supported Shi’ite militiamen and the broader Iran-led regional alliance now exert effective control over maritime traffic moving through the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea. Houthi statements accompanying their advance indicated an intent to target Saudi shipping on the strait, rather than imposing a general naval blockade. This move was closely followed by an Iraqi Shi’ite militia drone attack on the Saudi East-West pipeline on September 10, this year. The pipeline, which allowed Riyadh to transport oil to the Red Sea and bypass the Strait of Hormuz, is expected to be out of service for three to five weeks.
The coordinated action between Iraqi Shi’ite militias and the Houthis aims to extend the Iran-led alliance’s capacity to impose rules on maritime traffic from Hormuz to the Red Sea. This strategic focus on Saudi Arabia appears designed to avoid triggering direct US retaliation, which a more general effort to blockade Bab el-Mandeb might provoke. These recent events underscore the Iran-led regional bloc’s continued ability to act in coordination for shared objectives. While Israel has significantly weakened Iran’s clients in the Levant, further south in the Gulf area, Tehran and its allies remain potent forces.
External Support and Local Agency
The Houthis are not a direct franchise or proxy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps; they are described as an authentic and deep-rooted local movement with their own distinct agenda and preferences. They had preferred to avoid direct engagement in the current round of fighting prior to the Saudi attacks, and are now directing their efforts specifically against Riyadh. However, much of their military capacity is directly linked to their relationship with Tehran. Documents recently obtained from Yemeni sources by The Jerusalem Post detail the direct presence of Iranian and other allied personnel on Yemeni soil. These documents reveal the close involvement of Iranian, Iraqi, and Lebanese personnel who are instructing and managing Houthi operations.
The documents list names and identifying information of Iranian, Iraqi, and Lebanese experts in Yemen providing advice and supervision for drones, missiles, and intelligence and security operations. Iranian citizen Haji Murtaza Mokhles and Iraqi Abu Mukhtar Bari Mashour are named as providing expert advice in intelligence and security operations, working closely with Abu Jihad Muhammad Alawi al-Tiri, a senior Houthi official serving as “administrator of the Military Intelligence Center and supervisor of the Presidential Information Center.” In the field of drones, Iranian citizen Hasan bin Hasan Danbous and Iraqi Hasan Iyad al-Ameri, both senior experts, are working with senior Houthi commander Hassan Sharafi. For missiles, Iraqi Muhammad Sayed al-Hakim and Iranian citizen Karar Mumammad al-Musawi are named as collaborating with Abu Bashar Saleh al-Saree, who manages the central information department of the missile forces.
These examples are part of a much longer list, with identifying details, locations, and sometimes telephone numbers included in the documents. The documents also detail smuggling methods enabling the Houthis to acquire vital components and equipment, outlining the roles played by Iran, Russia, and China. Businessmen residing in Houthi-controlled Yemen, including Safwan al-Dabai, Yasser al-Dabai, and Rami al-Hajj al-Alimi, are responsible for importing drone spare parts from China. Following a meeting held under Iranian auspices in Muscat, Oman, two years ago, several Chinese shipping companies, including COSCO Shipping and Sea Legend Shipping, have been paying the Houthis in hard currency for undisturbed passage through the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea.
US Complicity and Shifting Alliances
Further passages in the documents reference a communications system south of Saada city, connected to centers in the mountains of Hajjah, Amran, Sana’a, and the mountains overlooking the west coast. This network, created by Iranian experts, utilizes Iranian-made encryption devices, alongside Russian communication and encryption devices, particularly for Morse messaging. US airstrikes previously destroyed many communication networks and jamming devices. Houthi militias are currently attempting to replace these with Chinese devices, even if temporarily, to allow Iran to smuggle in new devices and restore their communications department to full capacity.
Most electrical and optical infrared sensors used by Houthi militias are Iranian-made systems, smuggled from Iranian ports to Yemeni coasts. Missile components and devices are also smuggled in parts and reassembled upon arrival in Yemen. Chinese thermal cameras, however, are imported through official channels. This evidence points to an integrated de facto alliance where the Houthis, pursuing shared goals but not under direct external command, receive advanced capacities and assistance to achieve their aims. This structure, combined with the religious-ideological commitment of the Shi’ite Islamist fighters, underpins their recent successes.
In contrast, divisions plague the anti-Houthi side. The Saudis acted militarily against the United Arab Emirates-supported South Yemeni element earlier this year, removing them from the field. Riyadh then concluded a pact with Turkey and Pakistan, which appears to have brought some ineffectual Turkey-supported Sunni jihadi fighters to Yemen, but little else. The United States, meanwhile, has sought to avoid escalation and currently remains uninvolved, citing that the Houthis are only targeting a US ally and not general shipping traffic traversing the strait. This inaction effectively grants tacit approval to the Houthi's assertion of control over a critical global chokepoint.