Houthi forces have seized control of the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait, capturing the Greater and Lesser Hanish islands, the port city of Mocha, Perim Island, and the Zuqar islands. This advance places Iran-supported Shi’ite militiamen at the narrowest point of the coastline, just 20 km. from the African coast, giving them effective control over maritime traffic through the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea. The group expelled forces linked to the Saudi-linked Presidential Leadership Council during its rapid expansion.
This Houthi offensive was immediately followed by an Iraqi Shi’ite militia drone attack on the Saudi East-West pipeline on September 10, 2026. The pipeline, a critical route for Riyadh to transport oil avoiding the Iranian-threatened Strait of Hormuz, is expected to be out of service for three to five weeks. These coordinated actions demonstrate the Iran-led regional alliance’s expanding ability to impose its will on vital global shipping lanes.
Iran's Expanding Jihadist Axis
The coordinated military actions between Iraqi Shi’ite militias and the Houthis are designed to extend the Iran-led alliance’s ability to dictate maritime traffic rules from the Strait of Hormuz to the Red Sea. This strategic focus on Saudi Arabia appears calculated to avoid direct US retaliation, which a broader blockade of Bab el-Mandeb might trigger. While Israel has significantly weakened Iran’s clients in the Levant, Tehran and its allies remain potent and active further south in the Gulf area, showcasing their continued capacity for coordinated action towards shared objectives.
Despite being described as an authentic local movement with its own agenda, the Houthis derive much of their military capacity directly from their relationship with Tehran. Documents recently obtained by The Jerusalem Post from Yemeni sources confirm the direct presence of Iranian and other allied personnel on Yemeni soil. These foreign operatives are closely involved in instructing and managing Houthi operations.
The documents list specific Iranian, Iraqi, and Lebanese experts providing advice and supervision across critical military domains. Haji Murtaza Mokhles, an Iranian citizen, and Abu Mukhtar Bari Mashour, an Iraqi, are giving expert advice in intelligence and security operations. They work closely with Abu Jihad Muhammad Alawi al-Tiri, a senior Houthi official serving as administrator of the Military Intelligence Center and supervisor of the Presidential Information Center.
In the field of drones, Iranian citizen Hasan bin Hasan Danbous and Iraqi Hasan Iyad al-Ameri, both senior experts, are working directly with senior Houthi commander Hassan Sharafi. For missile development, Iraqi Muhammad Sayed al-Hakim and Iranian citizen Karar Mumammad al-Musawi are named as working with Abu Bashar Saleh al-Saree, who manages the central information department of the Houthi missile forces. These examples are part of a much longer list, with identifying details, locations, and sometimes telephone numbers included in the documents.
Western Appeasement Fuels Terror
The documents also detail the sophisticated smuggling methods enabling the Houthis to acquire vital components and equipment, outlining the roles played by Iran, Russia, and China. Businessmen residing in Houthi-controlled Yemen, including Safwan al-Dabai, Yasser al-Dabai, and Rami al-Hajj al-Alimi, are responsible for importing drone spare parts from China. Chinese and Yemeni phone numbers are included in the records.
Following a meeting held under Iranian auspices in Muscat, Oman, two years ago in March 2024, several Chinese shipping companies, including COSCO Shipping and Sea Legend Shipping, have been paying the Houthis in hard currency. This arrangement ensures their ships can pass through the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea undisturbed, effectively legitimizing and funding the Houthi terror enterprise.
Furthermore, a Houthi communications system south of Saada city, connected to centers in Hajjah, Amran, Sana’a, and the west coast mountains, was created by Iranian experts. This network utilizes Iranian-made encryption devices, alongside Russian communication and encryption devices, particularly for Morse messaging. US airstrikes managed to destroy many of these networks and jamming devices, but Houthi militias are now attempting to replace them with Chinese devices temporarily, awaiting Iran’s smuggling of new equipment to restart their jihadi communications department at full capacity.
Most electrical and optical infrared sensors used by Houthi militias are Iranian-made systems, smuggled from Iranian ports like Bandar Abbas and Shahbar to Yemeni ports. Missile components are also smuggled in parts and reassembled upon arrival in Yemen. While thermal cameras are Chinese and imported officially, the overall picture reveals an integrated de facto alliance providing advanced capacities and assistance to the Houthis, driven by the religious-ideological zeal of these Shi’ite Islamist fighters.
This alarming consolidation of Iranian proxy power contrasts sharply with the disunity on the anti-Houthi side. The Saudis militarily removed a UAE-supported South Yemeni element earlier this year and subsequently formed an ineffectual pact with Turkey and Pakistan, which brought little more than some Turkey-supported Sunni jihadi fighters to Yemen. Meanwhile, the United States has chosen to avoid escalation, remaining uninvolved on the grounds that the Houthis are only targeting a US ally and not general shipping traffic. This strategic abandonment leaves a critical global waterway increasingly vulnerable to Iran's expanding terror network.