Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps continues to censor internet activity within the country, imposing surveillance measures that security sources say have made the digital environment far more restrictive than before the January 8 internet blackout and the violent crackdown on protesters that followed. Over the past four weeks, internet access has gradually been restored, but users say the online environment bears little resemblance to what existed before the restrictions.
The Security Apparatus Behind the Controls
A source familiar with Iran's communications sector told The Media Line that the government had reopened the internet under conditions imposed by the Supreme National Security Council on the Supreme Council of Cyberspace. The source said one of the main conditions was that the quality of access to, and control over, the global internet be altered in such a way that it becomes far more manageable and controllable. The source also said VPNs were being heavily monitored and tracked, and that bypassing censorship had become considerably more difficult than before.
According to the source, surveillance and monitoring aimed at updating blocklists had intensified on an hour-by-hour basis. The source said virtually all solutions and workarounds proposed by internet platforms and activists were monitored continuously and in real time, making the lifespan of such solutions very limited. Users said commonly available VPN services still fail to provide reliable access to Instagram, which has remained restricted since the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising in 2022. CITNA reported that 68% of active Instagram users had not returned to the platform following the restoration of internet access.
The report said more than 75 million internet users in Iran were still contending with heavily restricted online access. Niko, a young protester in Tehran, said the Islamic regime had imposed extensive controls on internet access, making online content and social media significantly less accessible than before the internet blackout. Niko said that while the Islamic Republic claimed it had restored internet access, it had reduced speeds to the point that even VPNs that were functioning reasonably well a few months ago were practically unusable. Niko said, "At the same time, if you used government-approved applications while your VPN was active, you could be immediately identified, and they could cut off your access. The money you paid for the VPN would effectively be wasted."
Starlink and the Regime's Response
The source said the only viable solution would be the widespread availability of Starlink to millions of people. In that scenario, the creation of house-to-house networks and broader access would make it significantly more difficult for the government to monitor and track Starlink usage. The source said estimates suggested that around half a million people across the country, primarily in northern Tehran, had access to Starlink. The source also said that any carelessness by users when accessing domestic websites could expose them to identification and tracking, and that security agencies had established various traps to target Starlink applicants, increasing distrust of Starlink providers.
In recent weeks, raids by members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the police and the Ministry of Intelligence on private homes to confiscate Starlink equipment had intensified, in some cases resulting in violent confrontations resulting in injury or even death. Tara Dachek, a human rights activist based in Canada, said many people cannot access Starlink because of its rising cost, while bringing the equipment into the country has become more difficult and now carries harsher penalties.
The Tiered Internet System
Dachek also referred to Iran's so-called tiered internet system, under which users are divided into several categories with sharply different levels of access. One group, she explained, enjoys unrestricted access to the entire internet. These are generally the same individuals who monitor the internet, track activists, create fake and counterintelligence networks, infiltrate opposition circles and foster divisions among opponents. They are often affiliated with intelligence institutions. The second group consists of regime agents and officials who occupy the next tier and have access to most internet content except for certain blacklisted pornographic websites. They are responsible for propaganda activities and routine government operations. The third group faces greater restrictions but can still access platforms such as X. These are insiders who benefit from what is often described as a form of white internet. At the lowest level, she said, are ordinary citizens, who account for the vast majority of users. They have access to almost no content other than approved material and Islamic Republic applications, where surveillance and monitoring can be carried out with relative ease.
According to Dachek, the central issue is precisely this classification system: determining which voices inside the country are allowed to be heard and which must be silenced. Dachek said the internet situation in Iran was no longer merely about censorship. She said, "The scope of filtering has expanded to such an extent that communications that were previously possible can no longer be achieved."
Repression and Documentation
Following an 88-day shutdown that outside monitors described as one of the longest nationwide blackouts ever recorded, the return of connectivity allowed more images and testimony to emerge online, documenting the January crackdown and the broader civilian toll of the conflict. However, the Islamic Republic's numerous security agencies also used the reopening of the internet to hunt down opponents and individuals communicating with journalists abroad or sending images and information to outside media. The report said some of the newly surfaced videos from the January massacre circulating on social media were deeply disturbing.
Well-known and popular figures such as rapper Toomaj Salehi, Iranian Nobel Peace Prize laureate Narges Mohammadi and numerous civil rights activists, including Sepideh Qolian, have faced extensive threats. Some users who posted content on Instagram that could be interpreted as criticism of the war have recently published images of judicial summonses ordering them to appear before Revolutionary Prosecutors' Offices for questioning and prosecution. While Iranian officials have acknowledged the economic costs of internet restrictions, communication with human rights and civil society activists inside the country remains severely restricted. Many have been subjected to threats and intimidation designed to force them into silence. The internet is not officially shut down, but repression and suffocation have become even more severe than before the January crackdown, according to some sources.
Social Impact and Political Warning
Beyond repression and political control, internet shutdowns in Iran have contributed to rising levels of depression among young people. In research presented by the author at the Global Communication Association conference in Casablanca last year, findings showed that internet filtering in Iran contributes to increased depression and hopelessness among young people. While digital freedom remains a central demand for many Iranians, shutdowns can also create risks for the authorities by intensifying public anger and pushing political grievances from online spaces into public protest. This is the same fear referenced on Sunday by President Masoud Pezeshkian, who warned that if people reach the limits of their endurance, they will once again flood the streets.
In her most recent message, sent while the Islamic Republic and the United States had once again been involved in hostilities despite a ceasefire, Niko said, "If they cut the internet again, our situation will become even worse. The next step for the Islamic Republic will probably be to take away our mobile phones."
Why This Matters:
Iran's tiered internet system reveals the security architecture of a regime that maintains power through surveillance and information control. The IRGC's intensified monitoring of VPNs, its violent raids to confiscate Starlink equipment, and its real-time tracking of workarounds demonstrate a state apparatus that views digital freedom as an existential threat. The 88-day blackout and subsequent restoration under tighter controls show how authoritarian regimes adapt to technological challenges by creating parallel systems that separate regime insiders from ordinary citizens. The fact that half a million Iranians have turned to Starlink despite the risks, and that security agencies have established traps to target applicants, illustrates the regime's fear of losing its information monopoly. President Pezeshkian's warning that people will flood the streets if they reach the limits of their endurance acknowledges the strategic risk the regime faces: that digital repression may drive political grievances from online spaces into public protest, creating the very instability the security apparatus seeks to prevent. The Iranian model of internet control offers a case study in how authoritarian states use technology not just to censor but to categorize populations and preemptively suppress dissent.