
Iranian strikes damaged Amazon Web Services data centers and infrastructure in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in March, disrupting cloud services and creating power and connectivity problems. Reuters reported that the damage contributed to service disruptions and a lengthy recovery. The infrastructure belonged to private owners, but its failure affected services used across finance, health care, communications and government.
Private Infrastructure, Public Dependence
In April, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps publicly claimed it had targeted an Amazon cloud-computing facility in Bahrain. The opinion article says Iran had identified American commercial computing infrastructure as a target; it wasn’t a commercial facility caught in crossfire.
The article describes data centers, cloud-computing systems and telecommunications networks as privately owned assets whose consequences reach beyond their owners. Military operations depend on commercial technology and cloud computing. Financial institutions use digital infrastructure to handle transactions and operations, while hospitals, communications networks, logistics companies and energy providers rely on interconnected systems.
Artificial intelligence increasingly matters to the economy and national defense, the article says, and it requires large amounts of computing capacity and data. The article cites federal law’s broad definition of critical infrastructure: physical or virtual systems and assets whose incapacity or destruction could have a debilitating effect on national security, national economic security, public health or safety.
The article argues that a data center supporting military logistics, financial markets, telecommunications or advanced AI could carry national-security consequences comparable to those of a traditional defense facility. It says the Trump administration has recognized how important data centers are to the internet, cloud computing, AI, and U.S. economic and national security.
A Proposed State Protection Framework
The article proposes that Congress create a narrow designation for exceptionally important American-owned or American-controlled digital infrastructure. It calls for rigorous standards covering ownership and control, cybersecurity, physical security, supply-chain integrity, redundancy and cooperation with U.S. national-security agencies.
Under the proposal, the government could identify a relatively small number of facilities whose destruction or prolonged incapacitation would seriously threaten U.S. national or economic security. Those could include facilities supporting military operations, financial markets, critical communications, government systems or strategically important AI capabilities.
The article stresses that designation wouldn’t make a facility U.S. territory. A data center in Bahrain wouldn’t become sovereign American territory just because the government designated it a protected strategic asset. Instead, the framework could establish consequences for deliberate attacks on strategically important infrastructure and, the article says, help deter them.
Possible responses include sanctions, asset freezes, diplomatic measures, defensive cyber operations and, depending on circumstances and attribution, additional measures authorized by Congress. The article says the goal shouldn’t be automatic escalation to military conflict. It should make consequences clear enough to discourage attacks. These are proposed government powers, not actions the article says have already been taken in response to the strikes.
Companies and the Limits of the Proposal
According to the article, President Donald Trump’s June 2026 National Security Presidential Memorandum on artificial intelligence directed the national-security enterprise to accelerate AI adoption and strengthen partnerships with private industry. The article warns that an adversary could attack the data center where AI computing occurs, disrupt its electricity, compromise communications infrastructure or target its supply chain.
The article says Russia has demonstrated willingness to use cyber operations and infrastructure attacks as instruments of state power; China has invested heavily in cyber capabilities and studied vulnerabilities created by U.S. reliance on interconnected systems; and Iran has shown willingness to use cyber and other asymmetric capabilities against U.S. interests.
It urges Congress to establish a framework for identifying digital infrastructure whose intentional destruction would warrant a significant U.S. response. It also urges the administration to work with allies on reciprocal protections for strategically important infrastructure overseas. Companies operating designated facilities should meet high standards for cybersecurity, physical security, redundancy and resilience, the article says. It doesn’t specify profits, wages or worker responses; its proposed safeguards center on company-operated infrastructure and national-security oversight.
Kate Monroe is identified as a Marine Corps veteran, CEO of Vetcomm and author of “The Race to Save America.” The article concludes that attacks on American interests could start with lost computing capacity, a disrupted communications network or the failure of a system on which millions rely—not troops crossing a border or missiles striking a military installation.