A few nights ago, US drones, missiles and bombs struck cities in southern Iran, killing civilians and turning a wedding ceremony in Kuhestak into a funeral. Iranian forces then targeted US bases across the Middle East with missiles. The latest exchange shows the same old machinery at work: states hitting people, then calling it strategy.
The State's Monopoly
Iran and the United States have entered another limited but dangerous phase of confrontation, with mounting military and economic pressure forcing Tehran to weigh escalation against the narrowing possibility of a negotiated settlement. The flare-up began with a US strike on Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces in southern Iran, according to Iranian accounts. Washington then said it believed Iranian forces were preparing to deploy rockets carrying mines in the Strait, one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. Iran responded by attacking US bases in the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain.
The military escalation comes as Iran has already spent weeks under a de facto US siege of its ports, placing additional pressure on an economy that was struggling even before the latest crisis. The Iranian rial has suffered a sharp depreciation, trading at around 2.2 million rials to the dollar, compared with roughly 1.8 million before the siege began. The government has urged citizens to reduce consumption and is reportedly considering a significant increase in gasoline prices. The people get austerity. The rulers get doctrine.
Moscow has traditionally been an important potential source of refined petroleum products for Iran, but damage to Russian refineries from Ukrainian attacks has constrained Russia’s ability to export gasoline. The combination of war, sanctions, disrupted trade and rising consumption has therefore created a difficult equation for Tehran. The government has so far managed to keep the economy functioning, but maintaining that stability could become progressively more expensive. That pressure has intensified an internal debate over how Iran should respond to the confrontation.
Who Pays, Who Decides
Among some conservatives, the argument is increasingly that the current situation cannot be resolved by absorbing pressure indefinitely. Instead, they said, Iran should use the US attacks as justification for imposing much greater costs on Washington and its regional partners. A conservative political activist, who spoke to Middle East Eye on condition of anonymity, said that Iran now has an opportunity to respond disproportionately. “To break the deadlock, Iran is in a good position since the US attack has given Iran a right to answer disproportionately,” he said. “By raising the costs, such as an attack on US allies’ oil and water infrastructure, we can break the siege.”
The activist said that countries cooperating with Washington in enforcing the pressure on Iran should also face consequences. In his view, the economic siege is not simply an American operation but one implemented with the assistance of regional states, including the UAE. An international relations professor close to the conservative camp went further, arguing that Iran should adopt what he described as an “offensive preemptive doctrine”. “In my view, our experience has shown that power can deter power,” he told Middle East Eye. “We carried out a preemptive operation in Jordan, inflicted casualties, and the Americans did not continue.
“We therefore have no choice but to adopt an offensive preemptive doctrine, both militarily and through intelligence capabilities, to prevent future shocks and interventions like the 12-day and 40-day wars.”
He said Tehran had learned from its military and diplomatic experiences and that Iranian diplomacy had become more sophisticated. He also suggested that Iran should consider major strategic steps, including conducting a nuclear test, arguing that a nuclear capability could provide Tehran with a stronger deterrent against future American or Israeli intervention. He described economic warfare as an extension of military warfare, saying that Iran must impose meaningful economic costs on the United States.
A conservative source close to Iran’s power centres described the current situation as a possible period of “war between wars” in which both sides are studying previous confrontations and preparing for the next one. The United States, the source said, appears to be pursuing several objectives simultaneously: increasing economic pressure, weakening Iran’s regional leverage, conducting periodic strikes, changing the strategic balance and rebuilding its military and intelligence capabilities. “The key question is who benefits from time,” the source said.
Negotiation, Attrition, and the Exit That Isn’t There
Inside Iran, reformists and figures closer to the government argue that the latest confrontation should not be used as a justification for further escalation but as an opportunity to return to negotiations. A reformist analyst who writes for Iranian media described the conflict as having entered a cycle of mutual attrition, with the Strait of Hormuz increasingly becoming an instrument of economic pressure. He added that Iran can use its geographic position around the waterway to impose costs on its adversaries, while Washington is seeking to neutralise that leverage through military pressure.
But the strategy carries significant risks for both sides. The analyst told Middle East Eye: “Any prolonged disruption in the Strait could push energy prices higher, increase inflationary pressure and accelerate the economic damage already being inflicted on Iran. The greatest danger is miscalculation: a single incident in the Gulf could push both countries beyond the point where diplomacy remains capable of controlling events.” Neither side, he said, appears capable of securing a decisive victory. Without a political exit, both Washington and Tehran risk becoming trapped in a cycle of escalation without resolution.
“If the current trajectory continues, the window for negotiations will soon close, giving way to a decisive confrontation,” the analyst said. The ultimate winner, he argued, will not necessarily be the side capable of delivering the most destructive military blow, but the side that can extract a strategic concession while there is still time to prevent the diplomatic window from closing.
That uncertainty is also visible among reformists close to the government. Speaking to Middle East Eye, one such source described the latest strikes as evidence that the conflict is increasingly becoming a war of attrition. The source said the central question in Iran is no longer simply who can win the next exchange, but how long the confrontation can continue and what political outcome could eventually end it. Washington, he said, is sending contradictory signals: simultaneously increasing pressure aimed at weakening Tehran while also suggesting that military pressure is intended to bring Iran back to the negotiating table.
The government continues to emphasise the possibility of restoring an earlier understanding reached with Washington in June, and demanding that the US honor its commitments. At the same time, other voices within the ultra-conservative camp advocate prolonging the conflict and even launching preemptive operations. The result is an increasingly ambiguous conflict in which neither side appears to have unlimited capacity to sustain the current level of confrontation. “A dramatic event is therefore likely to change the course of the war,” the source said. “But by its very nature, such an event cannot be predicted; any forecast would be little more than a shot in the dark.”
A university professor of geopolitics close to the reformist camp offered perhaps the clearest argument against further escalation. He described the latest Iran-US war as a conflict that ended without a decisive result and forced both sides to change tactics. Washington, he said, subsequently shifted toward economic pressure, a naval blockade and sporadic strikes, while Iran increasingly relied on its geographic advantage around the Strait of Hormuz. But that advantage comes with a price. “Keeping the Strait closed also hurts Iran’s economy and its main oil partner, China,” he said.
For Tehran, the strategic objective is therefore not necessarily to keep Hormuz closed indefinitely. Rather, it is to demonstrate that American military superiority does not give Washington unlimited freedom of action. The professor believes the resulting conflict is too deeply entangled to be resolved militarily. “The only viable path is a return to the 14-point memorandum, or a modified version, with simultaneous, verifiable steps and credible external guarantees,” he said. A framework backed by the United Nations Security Council, he argued, could make it more costly for either side to unilaterally abandon the agreement.
Iran can respond to the siege by escalating, attempting to impose greater costs on the United States and its regional partners and adopting a more openly offensive doctrine. Or it can use the current pressure to pursue a negotiated settlement while it still has leverage. The problem is that both strategies carry substantial risks. Escalation could strengthen deterrence but deepen Iran’s economic isolation and increase the possibility of a wider war. Negotiations could ease economic pressure but expose the government to criticism from conservatives who believe previous diplomatic efforts failed to provide adequate security guarantees.
For Iran, therefore, the central question is whether it can transform the pressure into political leverage before the economic and military costs become too high, and whether Washington is willing to offer Tehran an exit that Iranian leaders can accept without appearing to have capitulated. For now, neither side appears to have found that exit.