The IDF's 7th Armored Brigade breached strategic pathways to the Litani River in southern Lebanon and advanced toward the first line of Lebanese villages after receiving political clearance, neutralizing what commanders describe as Iranian-built subterranean "cities of refuge" constructed by Hezbollah over two decades. The operation exposed the scale of Iran's investment in Lebanon's transformation into a forward military base aimed at Israel's northern border.
The Underground Threat
7th Armored Brigade Commander Col. Shaul Yisraeli said the brigade successfully breached routes to the Litani River while destroying underground infrastructure that Hezbollah had built with Iranian support. He described the mission as one of the most complex engineering tasks of the ground maneuver in southern Lebanon, with bulldozer operators pushing forward until their blades touched the waters of the Litani River. Tank crews then advanced along the newly cleared route.
Yisraeli said the brigade's engineering companies breached crossings at the Litani and the Salouqi simultaneously in an operation he described as unprecedented. He said, "Non-commissioned officers, engineering force foremen - in my eyes, they are as vital as nuclear engineers. They executed engineering maneuvers that were thought to be impossible, creating the conditions for the attack." When the 7th Brigade killed 68 terrorists in recent weeks, he said, the engineering units played a crucial role.
The 7th Brigade was the first to enter combat after the fragile ceasefire with Hezbollah collapsed. Yisraeli said the brigade launched a maneuver toward the first line of Lebanese villages, including Taybe, Markaba, and Rabb El Thalathine, aiming to prevent raids against northern Israeli communities and anti-tank missile fire. The Golani Brigade joined in the second stage.
Iran's Infrastructure Investment
The dramatic phase came with the capture of Hezbollah's "city of refuge" in Qantara. Yisraeli said, "We are talking about an infrastructure built over roughly 20 years, which the Iranians constructed there alongside Hezbollah." The facility included organized rooms, weaponry, firing positions, anti-tank positions facing Misgav Am, and a launch base for raids into Israeli territory. Qantara sits directly above the Wadi Salouqi and a junction connecting to the Litani, effectively commanding the villages of Froun and Ghandouriyeh.
Fighters of the 7th Brigade later faced an unprecedented attack involving hundreds of suicide drones. In the third stage of fighting, the brigade's battalions joined forces with the Golani Brigade to capture all terrain overlooking the Litani and the Beaufort ridge, conducting raids toward Ghandouriyeh to locate and destroy terror infrastructure above and below ground. Yisraeli said, "The ground was burning," and added that the brigade completed the capture of this area only in the last two weeks, leaving dozens of terrorists dead.
An additional tank company, operating alongside the Commando Brigade, attacked Hezbollah infrastructure north of Beaufort, including structures dug deep into the ground from which anti-tank missile launchers were aimed at the Metula area and the Galilee Panhandle. Yisraeli said, "In the initial attacks, dozens of anti-tank missiles were fired at us." He added, "The enemy was deployed in highly established, widespread ambushes across the terrain."
The Drone Threat
Explosive drones had become a central threat, which Yisraeli called a "new threat that we deal with every day, using tactics and drills." He said, "I hope this serves as a wake-up call for the state to invest in what the IDF has requested for many years regarding a solution to the drone threat. Now is the moment to snap out of it and move this forward. I am confident that we will gradually establish superiority over this threat as well."
Ahead of the maneuver toward Wadi Salouqi, Yisraeli said the brigade studied the complications encountered during the Battle of Salouqi in the Second Lebanon War. He said the mission's purpose nearly 20 years ago had not been sufficiently clear, but this time the volume of munitions fired at the forces was larger and more varied. The brigade gathered advance intelligence using drones, which located Hezbollah explosive charges, booby traps, and anti-tank launchers aimed at bottleneck crossings. This intelligence allowed platoon and tank commanders to see the routes and their vulnerabilities.
Robots were deployed afterward. When Hezbollah operatives opened fire, Air Force forces identified them and struck with high precision. Yisraeli said, "The third component involved advance raids by Egoz fighters in that area," describing this as "neutralizing ambush components - dismantling the adversary's system: charges, anti-tank missiles, and lookouts, on the way to Hezbollah's cities of refuge."
Standardized Terror Infrastructure
The 7th Brigade's ground maneuver exposed Hezbollah's "cities of refuge." Yisraeli said some were dug deep into the earth to grant immunity from airstrikes and that engineering mapping showed the same contractor built all of them. The rooms, corridors, launch sites, and anti-tank missile firing slits were all built to the same standard. He said locating the cities of refuge in Qantara and Beaufort was faster than in Gaza because the tunnels in Lebanon were larger. He said, "They are larger, and once you locate the edge of the thread, it is easier to complete their mapping and lead to their destruction or neutralization."
Yisraeli said, "It is important to say that we arrived highly prepared for the cities of refuge, with more accurate intelligence. Qantara is an example. It is longer, and we did not reach it during Operation Northern Arrows in September 2024. We wanted to, but we didn't reach it. And now there was an opportunity to deepen the achievement and the maneuver. Each of these cities of refuge is 1.2 kilometers long, and the other is 700 meters. Dozens of rooms dug deep into the ground, packed with weapons. Operatives emerged from there; we engaged them and killed them."
Hezbollah organized southern Lebanon as a multi-layered combat system, with one line meant to strike the Israeli home front, another serving as a staging ground for the Radwan Force before a raid into the Galilee, another designed to delay the IDF's ground maneuver, and another used for storing weapons, ammunition, or housing reserve fighters. The systems were built through Iranian-Lebanese cooperation above and below ground and incorporated fortifications designed to be immune to Israeli Air Force strikes. Yisraeli said, "It must be noted that we found additional fortified infrastructure directly on the riverbeds." He added, "More localized fortified infrastructure, segments of about 80 to 100 meters. This is essentially the second line. Atop them sits a system of ambushes consisting of anti-tank cells and drones." In some cases, he said, there is a subterranean component of more than 200 meters, allowing Hezbollah fighters to withstand airstrikes, emerge, harass IDF forces, and retreat back underground.
Adapting to New Threats
Yisraeli said Hezbollah's use of suicide drones would continue to intensify, with explosives becoming heavier and operational ranges expanding. He said, "We must not obscure reality. Drones have become a significant component that absolutely requires us to change our operational patterns. This is a very significant matter. We have already managed to analyze them and provide a response through tactical operational behavior, but there is certainly still a long way to go." He said, "Unlike an anti-tank missile, where the technological solutions are more complex, in this case, I think we can already envision the solution. There is physics involved in development processes. They will take us some time, and until then, we will have to work with what we have. Part of the solution is low-tech, like nets. We are improving all the time. The way we maneuver is changing, too." He added, "On a strategic level, from a long-term perspective, I actually think this threat is simpler to counter. We have industrial technologies. We can take the time to develop them."
Yisraeli also discussed the tank's role in modern warfare, saying, "First of all, the tank has long ceased to be just a tank. It is a multi-sensor system. It is a large, armored vehicle that brings energy inward to locate and destroy the enemy. In the future, many systems will be operated from it - meaning, we are almost there already. Our drones? Operated from the tank." He said, "You shorten the process and enable opening new sectors much faster, closing the loop between collection and attack. There are many incidental sensors mounted on the tank. By virtue of its sheer presence, it incidentally generates both C4I capabilities and target acquisition. And it must be said, it can bring both kinetics and directed-energy weapons into the battlefield, which is why it remains a highly, highly functional tool in combat."
Defensive Gaps Exposed
A Hezbollah terrorist recently infiltrated all of the IDF's defensive lines in southern Lebanon, reached the Moshav of Margaliot by crossing the fence, and opened fire with a pistol at forces until he was neutralized. Yisraeli said, "I think that beyond the basic aspects of any incident where a terrorist infiltrates, we need to examine our defense system - all the forces, and the way we deploy them." He added, "We are currently more occupied with the attack and maneuvering forward" and said, "We saw what happens when a thousand terrorists descend upon communities on October 7th, God forbid. We absolutely need to ensure we do not forget about defense. First and foremost, the defense of the communities. This is certainly an event that flashes a red light for us, but I say realistically, isolated terrorists from Gaza and Lebanon - I think that is an issue we will handle. It is the IDF's job to stop it. That is what intelligence collection is for. There is a defensive system that needs to provide a solution for this."
Yisraeli said there was logic in reducing the tenures of battalion commanders and that he had recommended such a change to his corps commander and division commander. He said, "We do not know if we are at the beginning, the middle, or the end of the war. I tell this to the guys: reality surpasses all imagination, and we must pause to adapt ourselves to a reality that has completely changed."
Toward the end of the interview, he said, "The wives of the battalion commanders" were his greatest heroes. He said, "Ultimately, our battalion commanders are the demographic bearing the most complex burden - cognitive, professional, and also physical. Continuous combat. Their wives are raising young children. The brigade commanders? Their children are older. It is easier for brigade commanders to handle this situation. And my greatest heroes are the wives of the battalion commanders. I don't know how to promise them solutions. I know how to empathize, and I know how to appreciate them, and that is what the entire nation of Israel needs to do."
He said the IDF needed to better plan its operational pattern during prolonged war and added, "I am certain the Chief of Staff understands this, too, and will guide things in that direction. As you said, it is an important issue. Meaning, even if you are fighting continuously, there is great importance to the predictability of the frameworks to continue building the force, ensuring there is a fixed operational pattern, even if it is a difficult one."
Diplomatic Complications
A separate report said that as JD Vance arrived for talks in Switzerland, Iran was sending mixed messages and seeking to consolidate its influence in Lebanon. The report said the past few days had demonstrated the challenge posed by the Israeli military's continued presence across southern Lebanon. On Saturday afternoon, U.S. Vice President JD Vance expressed optimism about the talks with Iran.
Why This Matters:
The IDF's discovery of Iranian-built infrastructure throughout southern Lebanon reveals the strategic challenge Israel faces on its northern border — not a spontaneous resistance movement but a decades-long Iranian investment in forward military positions designed to threaten Israeli communities. The scale and standardization of the underground facilities, built by the same contractor with Iranian funding, demonstrates Tehran's commitment to maintaining Hezbollah as a capable proxy force regardless of diplomatic negotiations. The continued presence of IDF forces in southern Lebanon complicates U.S.-Iran diplomacy in Switzerland, but the military finds underscore why Israel cannot withdraw without credible guarantees that Hezbollah will not rebuild its attack infrastructure. The drone threat Yisraeli describes represents an evolving tactical challenge that requires both immediate operational adaptation and long-term technological investment. The infiltration incident at Margaliot, while contained, highlights the persistent security dilemma Israel faces even during offensive operations — the need to simultaneously defend communities while dismantling terrorist infrastructure. Iran's mixed messages during the Switzerland talks reflect its interest in preserving its Lebanese investment while managing diplomatic pressure, a pattern that makes any negotiated settlement dependent on verification mechanisms Israel can trust.