Netanyahu Doctrine Puts Preemptive Defense at Center

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented a national security doctrine on October 18 that prioritizes preemptive strikes, stronger home-front defenses, regional partnerships and “buffer zones” along Israel’s borders. A map released with the doctrine placed Iran, Hezbollah and the Houthis in an “Axis of Resistance” opposing regional groupings that included Israel.

Preemption and Regional Blocs

The Prime Minister’s Office said the “War of Redemption necessitated an upgrade of fundamental principles within the traditional national security doctrine,” including “giving priority to prevention and offense over containment and defense” and launching preemptive strikes “to thwart evolving threats.” The statement also called for stronger home-front defenses and for cementing Israel’s status as a regional power.

The office said the conflict had created “opportunities” for new alliances “in our region and beyond.” The accompanying map showed Israel and the United Arab Emirates in a “Hexagon Alliance” with Greece, Ethiopia and parts of India. It also depicted southwestern Sudan, controlled by the Rapid Support Forces, as friendly to Israel and the UAE.

United Nations experts and media reports have described extensive Emirati support for the RSF, led by former Janjaweed leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and widely accused of committing genocide in Darfur. The UAE has officially denied backing the RSF.

A separate “Sunni Diamond Alliance” on the map included Egypt, Turkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The latter three signed the Mecca mutual defence pact in August. Jordan, whose peace treaty with Israel dates to 1994, appeared as friendly to that alliance rather than aligned with Israel.

The map also marked the government in eastern Libya, controlled by Khalifa Haftar, as aligned with Israel. Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council appeared as a UAE-backed separatist movement, though it dissolved in January 2026 and re-emerged as the Transitional Council of South Arabia. Israel became the first country to recognize Somaliland earlier in 2026. Multiple media reports say Israel and the UAE have expanded their military presence there.

Alliances and Election Politics

The map divided the Middle East and parts of Africa into competing blocs that included states, unrecognized entities and non-state actors. Germany’s Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Institute originally published it in May. Netanyahu had previously proposed a “hexagon of alliances” involving Israel, India, Greece, Cyprus and unnamed Arab, African and Asian partners against what he called “radical” regional alliances.

That grouping hasn’t become a formal alliance. Commentators in Israel and the international press have described it as a branding exercise rather than a binding military pact, noting that countries such as India prioritize non-alignment and pragmatic trade. Greece and Ethiopia appeared as friendly states; Middle East Eye reported that Ethiopia is on the verge of a full-scale war with Eritrea, where Israel has long sought a Red Sea military base.

Netanyahu presented the doctrine as voters approached the October 27 parliamentary elections. Al Jazeera reported that analysts saw political calculations in the presentation. Netanyahu faced criticism over his conduct in office, an ongoing corruption trial, his handling of the October 7, 2023 attacks and the wars that followed. U.S. President Donald Trump endorsed Netanyahu on Sunday.

Netanyahu said Israel could face a less supportive U.S. administration after Trump’s presidency ends. “In two years, a president... who is extremely hostile to Israel could come to power [in the United States],” he said, arguing that Israel must “expand our network of alliances and develop capabilities that make us a valuable asset” to other countries.

West Bank Security and Regional Risks

Mohanad Hage Ali, deputy director for research at the Malcolm H Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, said the doctrine centered on competing regional blocs and buffer zones. He said the framework “incubates and nurtures existential fears,” which could make voters feel they need a decisive leader. Hage Ali also warned that expanding military control could lead to “more conflict and more ethnic cleansing” under the guise of security buffers. He said the map could give Hezbollah and other Iranian allies material for their propaganda.

Gadi Eisenkot, one of Netanyahu’s main election challengers, called the doctrine “two hollow pages, full of slogans that have nothing to do with a security concept.” Former Prime Minister Yair Lapid described it as “superficial.” Middle East Eye said the presentation could prove awkward for regional partners and reinforce suspicions among Arab states.

A separate opinion article by Ami Ayalon, Gilead Sher and Orni Petruschka argued that Israel’s next government should decide explicitly what it intends to do with the West Bank. In February 2026, the government authorized resuming land-registration procedures in Area C, allocated an initial NIS 244 million for 2026-30 and created new positions to carry out the process. Hundreds of former senior members of Israel’s security and governmental establishments petitioned the High Court of Justice, arguing that the measures and other administrative changes amounted to de facto annexation. The government described them as steps short of annexation related to security, land administration and strengthening Israeli control.

The authors said Israeli security officials have long considered coordination with the Palestinian Authority important for preventing terrorism and disrupting attacks. They warned that policies weakening the PA could increase the risk of its collapse and create a vacuum that armed fundamentalist organizations might exploit. Israel could then face greater responsibility for security and civilian administration across the West Bank, including maintaining security among a large Palestinian population and protecting Israeli communities. They also identified financial and administrative burdens, possible further violence and the risk of disputes with international institutions and governments over international law and the Oslo agreements.