US President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met in Washington on Tuesday, July 28, for their first face-to-face talks since the United States and Israel began their current war with Iran. The details stayed sealed. That’s how these things go: leaders talk, populations absorb the consequences, and the public gets the usual fog while diplomats redraw the map over everyone’s heads.
The State's Monopoly
The meeting came days before Israeli and Lebanese representatives were scheduled to return to Rome. An Israeli official confirmed that the next round would begin on August 4, following previous US-mediated discussions over border arrangements, Israeli withdrawals and proposed “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon. The language is tidy. The reality is a chain of state-managed bargaining sessions over land, movement and armed control, with Washington sitting in the middle as the familiar broker of other people’s futures.
The diplomatic activity extends beyond Lebanon. Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa said in an interview broadcast on July 26 that Damascus was working with several countries to reach a security agreement with Israel. According to al-Sharaa, a successful arrangement could create a path toward comprehensive peace without requiring Syria to relinquish its claim to the Golan Heights. That’s the old script in a new suit: security arrangement, peace, sovereignty, claims, all the vocabulary of states trying to stabilize their own authority while ordinary people remain the terrain.
Joshua Landis, professor in Middle East Studies and co-director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma, said al-Sharaa could conceivably accept continued Israeli control over the Golan Heights as part of an agreement, but not the loss of additional territory occupied following the collapse of Bashar Assad’s government. “He can sign a deal which gives the Golan Heights to Israel,” Landis said. “But not a deal that gives the extra territory that's been taken recently in southern Syria.” He added, “Syria is too weak. Israel is too strong, and Israel's made its position very clear, which is ‘we're staying in this situation,’ and I can't see Israel backing off of that.”
A former Bahraini diplomat, who requested anonymity, said the Syrian overture reflects military weakness, the search for sanctions relief and the need to restore international legitimacy. “Faced with incomplete territorial control near the Golan, an urgent need for international reintegration, and sanctions relief from Washington, I believe Damascus is pragmatically forced to treat Israel as an unavoidable reality,” the former diplomat said. He said Syria’s approach aims for “a functional security arrangement-ideally restoring the pre-1974 disengagement lines and pushing back Israeli incursions from Al-Sheikh Mount [widely known as Mount Hermon]-while explicitly reaffirming sovereignty over the Golan Heights to preserve domestic and Arab legitimacy.”
Who Gets Managed
On the same day, Israeli President Isaac Herzog spoke by telephone with Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. The two discussed bilateral relations, the Abraham Accords and recent regional developments. The call, initiated and publicized by Bahrain according to an Israeli report, was characterized by experts interviewed for the article as apparently the leaders’ first publicly disclosed call since the October 7 attacks. The pageantry of normalization keeps moving, even as the region’s people are told to accept whatever arrangement the latest round of statecraft produces.
These moves have coincided with new uncertainty surrounding Saudi Arabia. Washington and Riyadh signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement on July 22, but Trump subsequently said he would not allow it to proceed unless Saudi Arabia normalized relations with Israel and joined the Abraham Accords. Saudi Arabia has maintained that formal normalization requires a credible path toward Palestinian statehood. So the bargain is simple enough: nuclear cooperation, diplomatic recognition, and another round of leverage traded among governments while the public is left to watch the choreography.
Dr. Nir Boms, a research fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University, said Israel and Syria have overlapping long-term interests, including security arrangements and the approach to Hezbollah, despite the continuing territorial dispute and uncertainty surrounding al-Sharaa’s political trajectory. “I think there is pragmatism involved in the Syrian policy. And I think Sharaa understands that at this point, there is a real challenge coming from Israel in the south,” he said. Boms said the two sides share an interest in limiting radical armed actors in southern Syria and restricting weapons-smuggling networks connected to Hezbollah. “In the context of the long-term strategic interests, I think Israel and Syria share the aspiration that we're going to limit the presence of radical forces in the Syrian south and in Syria overall,” he said. “He needs to help stop smuggling lines that also influence the dynamics with Hezbollah. And some of that is happening in the Triangle area and in Israel-Lebanon-Syria proximity.” He added that a security arrangement could help al-Sharaa consolidate authority over Syrian territory.
That last line says plenty. Security arrangements don’t just manage borders. They consolidate authority. They harden the state, whichever flag it flies.
The NGO Mirage
Chama Mechtaly, a policy adviser pioneering the bottom-up movement of the Abraham Accords and founder and executive director of the Emma Lazarus Institute for Liberty and Tolerance, described the Syrian development more optimistically, though she warned that regional integration could provoke armed opposition. “The diplomatic movement is real,” Mechtaly said. “The Lebanese framework is a step in the right direction. Syria appears to be moving closer to a security arrangement, potentially in the near term,” she said, adding that normalization can also trigger hostility from proxy groups, which see greater regional integration as a threat to their influence.
The same disagreement extends to Lebanon, where negotiations are continuing despite disputes over Hezbollah’s weapons, the Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon and the sequencing of any withdrawal. Boms said Lebanon faces a choice between restoring its authority and continuing to accommodate Hezbollah as a separate military structure. “I think Lebanon understands that there is a choice that needs to be made and that it's either Lebanon, or Hezbollah. And in some ways, you can't have them both,” he said. He added, “You need to create a Shia power framework that is divorced from Hezbollah. And I don't think that's impossible.”
Landis rejected the likelihood that the Lebanese state could carry out such a process under current conditions. “Hezbollah is not going to be defeated. The Lebanese army is in no position to take them on,” he said. “The politicians in Lebanon are not interested in pushing a military confrontation internally.” He said the talks are mainly a way to deescalate tensions. “So, I think this is a lot of talk in order to try to deescalate things, but that's it,” he said. He was also doubtful that the existing roadmap would produce a complete Israeli withdrawal. “There is a roadmap for Israeli withdrawal, but the chances of that roadmap ever being carried out seem very slim because it requires defeating Hezbollah,” he said. “And who's going to do that? It seems like an impossibility.”
The former Bahraini diplomat said the negotiations risk becoming “short-lived diplomatic bubbles” without a broader regional understanding. He said Hezbollah, which he said retains significant popular support and military infrastructure, remains prepared for a prolonged war of attrition in coordination with Tehran. “The Lebanese government currently lacks both consensus in the south and the military capacity to enforce disarmament, rendering any diplomatic agreement fragile without a broader regional settlement,” he said. He said it is only a matter of time before the next escalation.
Mechtaly said, “We therefore have to watch Hezbollah and the Houthis closely.” She said the success of diplomacy will depend not only on agreements between governments but also on whether states are prepared to confront the networks that can obstruct implementation.
Herzog’s conversation with Bahrain’s king added another dimension to the picture. Bahrain joined the Abraham Accords in 2020 and has maintained formal relations with Israel despite the regional fallout from October 7 and the subsequent wars. The former Bahraini diplomat said the call showed that Manama continues to view its relationship with Washington and Israel as central to its security. “Despite enduring sustained missile and drone pressure from Iran and its regional allies, Bahrain appears to remain firmly anchored within the US-Israel defense umbrella,” he said. “Implicitly, this signal reflects Manama’s firm belief that the US-Israel coalition maintains the capacity-but lacks the strategic appetite-to fully deter Iran,” he added. He warned that continued reliance on external deterrence could become politically and strategically unsustainable if the campaign against Iran failed to produce a clear result. “Should US deterrence fail to produce a decisive strategic outcome, even frontline states may eventually, and unfortunately, be forced to complement this posture with pragmatic regional adaptation.”
Mechtaly said the call reflected the institutional relationships built among the original Abraham Accords countries. “The original Abraham Accords countries have already accumulated something that cannot be manufactured overnight: trust, relational capital, institutional cooperation, and a record of standing by the relationship during moments of enormous pressure,” she said. She distinguished between governments that treat normalization as a long-term strategic commitment and those that use its symbols for tactical advantage. “For some states, normalization is the product of a genuine strategic investment in regional security, economic integration, and the recovery of state sovereignty from militias and transnational ideological movements,” she said. “For others, the language and imagery of normalization are being used tactically, as public relations, as narrative warfare, and as insulation from scrutiny in Washington.”
Boms said there have been more developments on trade with Israel and the Gulf and that the dynamics are coming back, though he warned against reading that as a full restoration of Israel’s regional position. “I'm not arguing that Israel is gaining its legitimacy right now … irrespective of other things,” he said. “But there is a window of opportunity. Israel will be asked to also do its part.”
Saudi Arabia remains the central test for any broader diplomatic breakthrough. Boms said, “Saudi Arabia is not going to join the Abraham Accords.” He said the Saudis would like to show they can move forward and create a breakthrough on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that would be their path to rapprochement. Landis said, “Saudi Arabia has made it very clear that they're not going to move ahead on Abraham Accords unless there's a pathway for Palestinian statehood,” and added, “And I don't see that happening.” The former Bahraini diplomat said Saudi Arabia’s status as custodian of Islam’s two holiest sites gives it a different set of calculations. “Saudi Arabia’s stature as the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques in Islam represents its ultimate soft power and geopolitical weight across the Islamic world,” he said. “I believe that surrendering this leverage easily through formal normalization without an explicit, irreversible path to Palestinian statehood carries a reputational cost that far outweighs the incremental security benefits of the Accords,” he said. He said Riyadh can deepen intelligence, economic and technological cooperation with Israel behind the scenes without formal embassies.
Mechtaly said, “The most important development, however, is that the region can no longer be understood as one or two fixed blocs,” and added, “We are witnessing the death of the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council], and the death of the Arab world as ideologically bound units. Every state has its own interests, vulnerabilities, and theory of survival.” The former Bahraini diplomat said Oman and Qatar continue to favor engagement and mediation, Saudi Arabia is trying to preserve both US security ties and diplomatic channels with Tehran, and the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait have leaned more heavily on Western-backed defense structures. He said, “The current confrontation demonstrates the structural limits of relying solely on military deterrence or containment to secure vital maritime corridors and regional stability.” He added that if Washington’s campaign fails to achieve a decisive outcome against Iranian asymmetric capabilities, Gulf states will be compelled to pursue “a new, pragmatic security framework that accommodates Iran as a permanent regional stakeholder.”
Landis said, “I see it as a forever war that's going to stumble forward,” and added, “And the Lebanon situation is a forever war which is going to stumble forward, and it's going to suck Israel in. Israel will stay there, and it'll sort of be a low simmer.” Boms said, “America is not going to be able to, does not have the will to … lead the policing or the solutions for the region overall, and the region needs to do this itself,” adding that this could create “real opportunities.” The article said the outcome may depend on unresolved questions about Iran’s military capabilities, Hezbollah’s weapons, Syria’s territorial integrity, Palestinian statehood and the willingness of Arab governments to absorb the domestic costs of closer relations with Israel.