Ukraine's air defences have collapsed after Patriot missile supplies ran out this year, exposing a catastrophic failure by NATO members to invest in industrial capacity despite years of warning signs. Intercept rates have plummeted from more than 70% to zero, leaving Russian missiles to strike critical infrastructure night after night with impunity, according to Jack Watling, senior research fellow for applied military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute.
Vladimir Putin described Russia's latest generation of ballistic missiles as "Invincible" eight years ago. Four years ago, he unleashed that arsenal to strike across Ukraine, hitting command centres, critical infrastructure and airfields. Ukraine received Patriot air defence systems from its international partners three years ago, and the US-supplied missile interceptor proved effective against Russian strikes — until the stockpiles dried up.
The Production Gap
Countering ballistic missiles isn't simple or cheap. To intercept a tactical ballistic missile such as Russia's Iskander, a defensive system needs to track a target descending from the high atmosphere at more than five times the speed of sound while it manoeuvres through the air rather than following a predictable ballistic trajectory. The defensive system must communicate precise location data to the intercepting missile so it can adjust course while climbing against gravity. Building the radars, data links and interceptors for that task involves huge amounts of research and development, and across NATO most states have been happy for Washington to invest over decades to make the Patriot up to the job.
The US and licensed manufacturers in Germany and Japan are able to produce about 840 Patriot interceptors a year. About 240 of those are older, larger PAC-2 interceptors, which climb until they're close to the target and then explode, meaning they must carry the weight of a warhead to the target. The remaining 600 are PAC-3s, which are smaller and fly directly into the target. The latter approach is more effective but requires even more precise navigation, while the former can be used against other target types.
Russia produces about 750 Iskander missiles a year and is looking to increase production. In addition, Russia uses air-launched Kinzhal ballistic missiles and repurposed air-defence missiles to conduct strikes, along with its arsenal of cruise missiles and drones. To have a high probability of success, it's generally recommended to fire two to three interceptors against each ballistic missile. When the launchers' limited coverage is factored in, and given that Ukraine is a vast country, Kyiv would ideally have three to four times the annual global production capacity of Patriot missiles to protect itself. Countries supporting Ukraine have therefore had to give their own stockpiles to Kyiv.
The Iran Factor
Even before the US decision to attack Iran, western allies were nervous about depleting their own stocks by giving Patriot missiles to Ukraine, knowing it would take a long time for them to be resupplied. The US attack on Iran, which prompted Tehran to fire ballistic missiles across the Middle East, created an acute global shortage. Where Russia usually fires fewer than 10 ballistic missiles in a single attack, Iran has launched upwards of 170 a day during the current and last year's war. A portion of Iran's missiles were also advanced, and in one instance it took 17 Patriot interceptors to defeat a missile. Iran has many more missiles in storage.
Ukraine isn't going to receive enough Patriots between now and the winter to save its critical national infrastructure, regardless of whether some countries make the political gesture of releasing a few more from their stockpiles. Kyiv must plan for a winter with severely disrupted power and disperse and fortify life-support systems such as water, sanitation, power and heating.
Kyiv's Alternative Plans
Kyiv is trying to convince the US to activate Starlink satellite navigation modules over Russian territory to enable its drones to hunt for the Russian missile launchers. As the US recently found in Iran, pulling off this kind of mission over a large area is extremely difficult. Another line of effort in Kyiv is to attack the production of Russia's ballistic missiles. Those factories are well defended and to succeed, Ukraine's partners will need to expand the funding and industrial capacity behind Ukraine's nascent cruise-missile industry, or reopen questions of providing weapons systems such as Germany's Taurus, which Berlin didn't provide to Ukraine for fear of military escalation.
The real lesson is that NATO members have abjectly failed in defence planning. The numbers in this equation have been known since at least four years ago and yet the investments to expand Patriot production, or mature alternative systems such as the Franco-Italian SAMP-T, haven't been made. That level of complacency is devastating for Ukraine today, but it also risks Europe being bereft of defences in the future. It remains remarkable that Europe, watching the consequences unfold on its very borders, has remained so idle.
Why This Matters:
This isn't just Ukraine's crisis — it's a warning about Europe's defence industrial base. NATO members have known the missile production equation for years but chose not to invest in expanding capacity or developing alternatives. The result is a continent dependent on American stockpiles it can't replenish and vulnerable to the same ballistic missile threats Ukraine faces today. Europe's failure to act while watching Russian strikes destroy Ukrainian infrastructure reveals a dangerous assumption: that deterrence doesn't require industrial capacity. That assumption has left Ukraine defenceless this winter and Europe exposed tomorrow. The Franco-Italian SAMP-T alternative exists but hasn't been scaled. Germany's Taurus remains unused. The gap between rhetoric about supporting Ukraine and the fiscal commitment to build the weapons that support requires is now measured in destroyed power stations and frozen civilians.