Patriot missile supplies for Ukraine have run out this year, leaving Kyiv's critical infrastructure exposed to relentless Russian strikes. Intercepts have plummeted from over 70% to none, allowing Russia to hit Ukraine's vital systems night after night with impunity, as reported by Jack Watling in The Guardian. This devastating outcome, Watling notes, was long foretold, yet Europe remains largely idle.
Europe's Empty Arsenals
Vladimir Putin declared Russia’s latest generation of ballistic missiles "Invincible" in 2018. Four years ago, in 2022, Russia unleashed this arsenal across Ukraine, targeting command centres, critical infrastructure, and airfields. Ukraine received Patriot air defence systems from its international partners in 2023, and these US-supplied interceptors initially proved an effective shield against Russian attacks.
Countering ballistic missiles isn't simple or cheap. A defensive system must be remarkably sophisticated to intercept tactical ballistic missiles like Russia’s Iskander, which descend from the high atmosphere at more than five times the speed of sound and maneuver unpredictably. Such systems require immense research and development for radars, data links, and interceptors. For decades, most NATO states have been content for Washington to bear the burden of making the Patriot system effective.
The US and its licensed manufacturers in Germany and Japan collectively produce approximately 840 Patriot interceptors annually. Of these, about 240 are older, larger PAC-2 interceptors, while 600 are smaller, more precise PAC-3s. Russia, by contrast, produces around 750 Iskander missiles each year and aims to increase this output. Russia also employs air-launched Kinzhal ballistic missiles, repurposed air-defence missiles, cruise missiles, and drones in its attacks.
To achieve a high probability of success, it's generally recommended to fire two to three interceptors against each ballistic missile. Considering the launchers’ limited coverage and Ukraine’s vast territory, Kyiv would ideally need three to four times the annual global production capacity of Patriot missiles for adequate protection. This stark reality has forced countries supporting Ukraine to deplete their own national stockpiles.
The Cost of Dependence
Even before the US attack on Iran, Western allies were already nervous about depleting their own stocks by transferring Patriot missiles to Ukraine, knowing resupply would take a long time. The US attack on Iran, which prompted Tehran to fire ballistic missiles across the Middle East, created an acute global shortage. Where Russia typically fires fewer than 10 ballistic missiles in a single attack, Iran has launched upwards of 170 a day during the current and last year’s conflict. Some of Iran’s missiles were advanced, with one instance requiring 17 Patriot interceptors to defeat it. Iran holds many more missiles in storage.
Ukraine won't receive enough Patriots between now and the winter to save its critical national infrastructure, regardless of any political gestures from countries releasing a few more from their stockpiles. Kyiv must now plan for a winter with severely disrupted power, dispersing and fortifying essential life-support systems like water, sanitation, power, and heating.
Kyiv is trying to convince the US to activate Starlink satellite navigation modules over Russian territory to enable its drones to hunt for Russian missile launchers, a mission the US recently found extremely difficult over a large area in Iran. Another effort involves attacking Russia’s ballistic missile production. These factories are well defended, and success would require Ukraine’s partners to expand funding and industrial capacity for Ukraine’s nascent cruise-missile industry, or revisit providing weapons systems like Germany’s Taurus, which Berlin withheld from Ukraine due to fears of military escalation.
A Vulnerable Continent
Jack Watling concludes that NATO members have "abjectly failed in defence planning." The numbers in this equation were known "at least 4 years ago," before 2022, yet investments to expand Patriot production or mature alternative systems like the Franco-Italian SAMP-T were not made. This level of complacency is devastating for Ukraine today, and it risks Europe being "bereft of defences in the future." It remains remarkable, Watling states, that Europe, watching these consequences unfold on its very borders, has remained so idle. This failure to secure Europe's own defence industrial base leaves its citizens vulnerable and its borders exposed, while the Brussels elite prioritises other agendas. The working and middle classes across Europe will bear the brunt of this strategic neglect. The continent's ability to control its own destiny, and its borders, is clearly compromised. It's a stark reminder that true national sovereignty requires self-sufficiency in defence, not reliance on others. The current trajectory makes Europe weaker, not stronger. The question of who decides Europe's future, and how its people are protected, grows more urgent by the day. The security of our nations, and the continuity of our cultures, depends on it.