A defense technology investor warns that autonomous systems are fundamentally reshaping modern warfare—and Israel risks ceding strategic advantage if it fails to dominate the emerging software layer that makes physical AI operationally viable.
In a Jerusalem Post opinion piece published today, the argument centers on a stark reality: drones are already making targeting decisions over contested airspace, and the nations that master reliable autonomous systems first will possess military advantages that traditional defense spending cannot offset.
The Technology Reshaping Conflict
Physical AI—defined as intelligence embedded in machines that move, perceive and act in the real world—encompasses autonomous drones, ground robots navigating urban terrain, and naval systems conducting persistent surveillance without crews. The output is motion, force and presence, making it fundamentally a national security issue rather than merely a technology story.
Israel already demonstrates proof of concept. The IDF has operated as one of the world's most demanding operational test environments for autonomous systems for years. Elbit's Hermes drones have flown in contested airspace for over a decade. Rafael's autonomous weapon stations guard Israel's borders. Iron Dome's targeting logic, operating under real engagement timelines with zero margin for error, represents an early form of physical AI that has already saved Israeli lives. These systems have been used, tested under fire and iterated in real conditions—a operational pedigree most nations cannot claim.
The piece emphasizes that history has created a generation of Israeli engineers who have built systems that had to work when it mattered. Unit 8200 and the broader intelligence community have produced AI and sensing talent that understands operational constraints most engineers in the world have never encountered. When those personnel leave military service and start companies, they carry that irreplaceable experience with them—a pipeline described as one of Israel's most underappreciated strategic assets.
The Proving Ground and the Competition
The war in Ukraine has served as a live proving ground for physical AI at scale. Ukraine's use of FPV drones coordinated by AI-assisted targeting demonstrates that autonomous systems can be battlefield-decisive even when deployed asymmetrically by a smaller, outgunned force. Russia adapted, and Iran-supplied Shahed drones pushed autonomous loitering munitions into mainstream military doctrine overnight.
The critical question being asked in Tel Aviv, Washington and Beijing is not whether autonomous systems matter, but how fast they can be fielded, how many can be deployed and how reliably they perform.
Israel's October 7 experience added urgency to this calculus, driving rethinking of border sensing, autonomous alert systems and the human-machine teaming required to respond faster than any purely manual system allows.
The United States is moving with unusual urgency. The Pentagon's Replicator initiative is explicit about deploying thousands of autonomous platforms—attritable and expendable—at scale. Companies like Anduril and Shield AI are building the integrating software that makes autonomous systems operationally viable. DARPA has been laying the scientific foundation for autonomous ground vehicles and collaborative combat aircraft for years. The money following these companies reflects a consensus that physical AI is where the next decade of military advantage gets decided.
The Software Gap and Strategic Window
The U.S. trajectory matters for Israel on two fronts: interoperability, because Israeli systems must work alongside American platforms in any serious conflict scenario, and competition, because American companies are moving fast into markets where Israeli firms have historically held an edge.
Hardware exists. Talent exists. But the software stack that makes physical AI scalable and reliable remains underdeveloped. The gaps include autonomy software that functions in GPS-denied environments, simulation platforms for testing before deployment and sensor fusion systems that work in degraded conditions.
The next layer of Israeli defense-tech companies must emerge in this space, developing smarter drones and systems that can operate in communications blackouts, make sound decisions at the edge and be validated to standards that both the IDF and NATO partners will require.
The piece concludes that Israel has the operational history, engineering talent and threat environment to be a genuine leader in reliable autonomous systems. However, the window to build that position is open and will not stay open indefinitely.
Why This Matters:
From a center-right national security perspective, this analysis highlights a critical juncture where private enterprise, military innovation, and fiscal efficiency intersect. Israel's historical advantage has rested on converting operational necessity into technological superiority—a market-driven process where survival demands excellence. The challenge now is whether Israeli companies can scale software solutions faster than well-funded American competitors, or whether government must intervene to preserve strategic autonomy. The piece suggests the answer lies in unleashing the private sector's talent pipeline rather than centralized government development. Additionally, the interoperability requirement with American systems reflects the reality that no nation can afford strategic isolation; however, ceding the software layer to foreign companies carries long-term risks to operational independence. The window for action is finite, and the cost of delay—measured in military vulnerability and lost market share—increases with each quarter American competitors gain ground.