Lithuania's defence minister, Robertas Kaunas, said Russia is considering staging a false-flag attack against critical infrastructure in the Baltics using Ukrainian drones, a warning that lands squarely inside the machinery of state power and military escalation. He said the most realistic current scenario is a potential false-flag operation using a fake Ukrainian drone. The target, in other words, is not just a transformer or a terminal. It's the political story that keeps NATO's backing for Ukraine intact.
The State's Script
Kaunas told a press briefing, “We are talking about a potential false-flag operation where a fake Ukrainian drone could be used. That’s the most realistic current scenario.” He said parts of Ukrainian drones launched against military and energy targets inside Russia could be used, and that Russia is capable of assembling them into a functional device that could be used in a false-flag operation. The language is technical. The purpose is blunt. A state that can recycle wreckage into a staged incident can also recycle fear into consent.
He said there is no indication such an operation is imminent, but that Russia is actively planning scenarios. That warning followed recent reports in Lithuanian media that the country's military intelligence believes Russia is weighing attacks on critical infrastructure across the Baltic region using Ukrainian-made drones. The apparatus of intelligence, defence ministries and media briefings does what it always does: translates uncertainty into a security narrative, then hands that narrative to the public as necessity.
Lithuania, a country of less than 3 million people, has stepped up security around key energy infrastructure, including the Klaipėda liquefied natural gas terminal, the LitPol Link electricity interconnector with Poland near Alytus, a major transformer substation in Alytus district and the Kruonis pumped-storage hydroelectric plant. The list reads like a map of modern dependence. Energy terminals, interconnectors, substations, plants. The state protects the circuits that keep capital and daily life moving, while ordinary people are told this is what safety looks like.
Fortress Europe, Grid Edition
The article says Russia is considering staging a false-flag attack against critical infrastructure in the Baltics to undermine NATO support for Kyiv. Ukraine has repeatedly launched long-range drone attacks against targets inside Russia. While many reach their intended targets, others are intercepted or crash, leaving wreckage in Russian hands. That wreckage now sits inside a wider contest between states, each one treating infrastructure as a lever and civilians as background noise.
Lithuania has experienced several drone incursions in recent years. Earlier this year, Lithuanian authorities concluded that drones which crashed on its territory were Ukrainian aircraft that had been diverted from their intended routes by Russian electronic systems while carrying out strikes inside Russia. Last year, two Russian drones also crossed into Lithuanian airspace from Belarus before crashing. Borders, in this version of Europe, don't stop violence. They just sort it, label it and feed it into the next round of militarised panic.
Power Protects Itself
Kaunas said an intentional strike against critical infrastructure would represent a significant escalation. He said the Kremlin needs it because Russian society is beginning to question why there are fuel shortages, why warehouses are burning and why Ukrainian drones are flying over Russia. “In order to preserve its grip on power and maintain the image of victory, the Russian regime is looking for alternative ways to escalate the situation,” Kaunas said.
That line cuts to the bone. States do not merely defend territory. They defend their own grip on power, their own stories of victory, their own right to keep the machine running. Kaunas said one of Moscow's objectives would be to sow divisions within the alliance and reduce Western military support for Kyiv. “But I can assure you that will not happen,” he said. The assurance belongs to the alliance managers, not to the people who live under the consequences of their decisions.
What emerges here is a familiar European arrangement: defence ministries warning of sabotage, intelligence services feeding the cycle, energy infrastructure hardened for the next crisis, and NATO presented as the only possible shield. The public gets the bill. The states keep the script.