The United States and 14 Latin American and Caribbean governments signed a joint declaration on 22 September 2026 designating 24 criminal organizations as narcoterrorists, but Brazil and Mexico—two of the region's largest democracies—weren't among the signatories. The pact, called the Shield of the Americas, followed a request from President Donald Trump and targets groups including Brazil's Primeiro Comando da Capital, or PCC, and Comando Vermelho.
The declaration foresees asset freezes, immigration and visa restrictions, and criminal liability for anyone who gives the listed groups material support. It's a sweeping framework that binds participating nations to enforcement measures typically reserved for international terrorist organizations.
A Political Shock in Brazil
The move landed as a political shock in Brazil, where the declaration named the PCC and Comando Vermelho but the country itself didn't sign. Brazil was treated as a problem, not a partner, according to reports describing the mood as defensive. The exclusion raises questions about whether unilateral designations can succeed without buy-in from the nations where these criminal networks operate most actively.
Brazil's absence from the pact is especially striking given that both groups named are Brazilian organizations with deep roots in the country's prison system and urban peripheries. The PCC, founded in São Paulo's prisons in the 1990s, has expanded across South America. Comando Vermelho, based in Rio de Janeiro, controls drug trafficking routes and exerts territorial control in favelas where state services often fall short.
Who Signed, Who Didn't
Mexico's absence is equally significant. Like Brazil, Mexico faces powerful transnational criminal organizations and has long resisted U.S. pressure to adopt American security frameworks wholesale. The 14 signatories weren't named in the report, but their participation without the region's two most populous countries suggests a fragmented approach to a problem that doesn't respect borders.
The Trump administration's push for the declaration reflects a return to hard-line drug war rhetoric, emphasizing criminalization and sanctions over the kind of institution-building, economic development, and harm reduction strategies that public health experts and human rights organizations have advocated. Critics of narcoterror designations argue they can undermine local criminal justice systems, militarize police responses, and sweep up civil society organizations or individuals who work in affected communities.
A Day of Loss in Rio
The same day brought news of a cultural loss in Brazil. Rio lost the writer Zuenir Ventura at 95. He wrote "1968: O Ano que Não Terminou" and sat in the Brazilian Academy of Letters, which said his wake would be held in Rio on Wednesday 23 September 2026. Ventura's work chronicled Brazil's military dictatorship and the social movements that resisted it, a reminder of the country's long struggle to balance security demands with democratic freedoms.
Why This Matters:
The Shield of the Americas declaration exposes a rift in hemispheric security cooperation at a moment when transnational crime demands coordinated responses. By designating Brazilian criminal groups without Brazil's participation, the pact risks becoming a symbolic gesture rather than an effective tool. Asset freezes and visa restrictions can disrupt some financial flows, but they won't dismantle organizations that thrive in neighborhoods where the state has failed to provide education, employment, or public safety. Brazil and Mexico's absence signals skepticism about whether American-led enforcement frameworks address root causes like inequality, corruption, and weak institutions. Without the region's largest countries, the declaration may deepen divisions rather than forge the multilateral cooperation needed to protect vulnerable communities from violence and exploitation.