Starlink, Starshield and ASEAN's Dependence Risk

Starlink, the satellite internet constellation operated by SpaceX, the American aerospace company founded by Elon Musk, has become part of Ukraine's wartime communications infrastructure. The episode reveals the value and the risks of relying on privately controlled technology, according to analysis by Phar Kim Beng and Vic Li Yu Wai.

Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022 threatened Ukraine's telecommunications with attacks, cyber operations and electronic warfare. When damaged or disrupted terrestrial infrastructure left people without reliable connections, thousands of Starlink terminals linked to satellites in low Earth orbit helped keep communication lines open. The network wasn't built for the battlefield. Its military adaptation shows how civilian technology can serve defence and emergency needs.

A terminal bringing internet to a rural school can also support emergency responders, military logistics or communications among dispersed units. That's the point of its dual character. Civilian capacity can become national capacity almost overnight.

The Dependence Problem

The writers argue that reliable digital connectivity has become essential to national defence. Modern forces depend on networks linking sensors, intelligence, command systems and operational units. Break those links, and even technologically advanced forces can fragment.

Private companies can become strategically indispensable, yet they don't answer to voters. Decisions about coverage, access restrictions, technical support and operating conditions can carry military and diplomatic consequences. The authors ask how much strategic autonomy a country retains when its security infrastructure leans heavily on a foreign commercial provider. Their answer isn't to reject foreign technology. The challenge, they write, is avoiding strategic vulnerability through dependence.

Restrictions and the Starshield Order

Reuters reported on October 14, 2026, that restrictions on Starlink-related military services disrupted Ukrainian drone operations. Ukrainian officials said some systems experienced connectivity problems when moving above roughly 160 kilometres per hour, and several military missions were consequently cancelled. The article distinguishes commercial Starlink from Starshield, its military-grade counterpart.

Reuters reported on October 16, citing officials familiar with the decision, that the White House issued the order to limit Starshield. The precise chain of responsibility, however, hasn't been publicly established. Ukrainian personnel said the restrictions affected communications with headquarters and slowed battlefield information transmission.

The writers say the episode showed how decisions made thousands of kilometres away can change access to a key capability. Technological superiority, they note, doesn't guarantee strategic independence.

Southeast Asia's Maritime Exposure

Ukraine faces a predominantly continental threat. Southeast Asia has different geography, and the writers argue that difference matters. The South China Sea, Strait of Malacca and Sulu Sea, along with surrounding maritime approaches, are central to regional security and international commerce.

Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines must protect extensive maritime territories. Vietnam faces persistent strategic pressure in the South China Sea. Singapore depends heavily on uninterrupted digital and commercial connectivity. Resilient satellite links could support maritime domain awareness, emergency response, coastguard operations and monitoring of remote territories.

Malaysia's requirements in Sabah and Sarawak show why reliable communications matter across scattered areas. Satellite links could strengthen surveillance and coordination around the Sulu and Celebes seas. Those capabilities, the writers insist, shouldn't rest on one foreign provider.

Artificial Intelligence and Unmanned Systems

The authors link artificial intelligence, automation and satellite communications. Ukraine has shown how inexpensive unmanned systems supported by digital networks can challenge far more expensive military platforms. As artificial intelligence becomes embedded in military operations, autonomous and semi-autonomous systems will still need dependable communications for supervision, coordination, software updates and intelligence transmission.

Whoever controls the communications infrastructure, the writers suggest, may influence the technologies connected to it. They urge the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, known as Asean, to treat artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, satellite connectivity and national defence as one interconnected strategic system.

Building Resilience Without Copying Starlink

The article proposes interoperable architectures combining terrestrial networks, submarine cables, satellite services and secure national infrastructure. It doesn't call for reproducing Starlink's large and costly constellation. Potential partners include the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, India and Europe. Reliance on any single provider, the writers warn, can create political leverage and operational disruption.

Asean's traditional diplomatic hedging may not be enough if critical technology remains concentrated among a few external actors. The writers use "polytropous" to describe pursuing several technological, economic and security relationships without surrendering independent decision-making.

They call for investment in indigenous expertise, regional research cooperation, cybersecurity and protection of critical digital infrastructure. Universities, including the International Islamic University Malaysia, could study artificial intelligence governance, national security and the geopolitical effects of emerging technology. Asean could also write regional principles for commercial satellite services during crises, covering service continuity, transparency, contractual safeguards and private providers' responsibilities.

The Asean Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, with its emphasis on cooperation, inclusiveness and regional stability, provides a diplomatic foundation. The authors say that foundation now needs practical technological capability behind it.

Why This Matters:

The writers measure military power by communications resilience, data security and the independence of systems supporting national defence—not only by soldiers, ships, aircraft and missiles. Starlink showed how commercial innovation can help a country resist aggression. The restrictions showed how dependence can expose a country to decisions it has little control over. For Asean, the lesson is to welcome innovation without becoming captive to it. Partnerships should be built without undermining sovereignty. Digital sovereignty, the authors conclude, is increasingly inseparable from strategic sovereignty, and staying connected during a crisis may matter as much as defending national territory.