Starlink, Ukraine & the Cost of Tech Dependence

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, attacks quickly threatened the country’s phone and internet networks. Cyber operations, electronic warfare and physical strikes put Ukrainians at risk of losing contact with one another and the outside world. Thousands of Starlink terminals, connected to satellites in low Earth orbit, helped keep communications running. SpaceX, the American aerospace company founded by Elon Musk, operates the network. It wasn’t built for war, yet it became part of Ukraine’s wartime infrastructure. That is exactly what worries writers Phar Kim Beng and Vic Li Yu Wai.

The value of Starlink is easy to see. A terminal connecting a rural school to the internet can also serve emergency responders, military logistics or units spread across distant positions during a crisis. Civilian technology can do military work. The writers argue that dependable digital connectivity is now central to national defence. Modern forces rely on networks linking sensors, intelligence, command systems and fighting units. When those connections fail, even a technologically advanced army can break apart.

The Risk of Relying on One Provider

The deeper problem is who controls the switch. Private companies can become strategically indispensable without facing the political accountability required of elected governments. Choices about coverage, access restrictions, technical support and operating conditions can have military and diplomatic consequences. The writers ask how much strategic autonomy a country really has when its security infrastructure depends heavily on a foreign commercial provider. Their answer isn’t to reject foreign technology. Instead, they say, countries should avoid strategic vulnerability through dependence.

That vulnerability became visible this month. Reuters reported on October 14, 2026, that restrictions on Starlink-related military services disrupted Ukrainian drone operations. Ukrainian officials said some systems lost connectivity when moving above roughly 160 kilometres per hour, and several military missions were cancelled as a result. The article distinguishes commercial Starlink from Starshield, its military-grade version. On October 16, Reuters reported, citing officials familiar with the decision, that the order to limit Starshield came from inside the White House. The exact chain of responsibility hasn’t been publicly established.

Ukrainian personnel said the restrictions disrupted communications with headquarters and slowed battlefield information. The episode shows how decisions made thousands of kilometres away can change a capability a country depends on. Technological superiority, the writers note, doesn’t guarantee strategic independence. It’s a sobering lesson for anyone who assumes a tool will always be available when it’s needed most.

Southeast Asia’s Maritime Exposure

Ukraine’s threat is largely continental; Southeast Asia faces a mix of mainland and sea frontiers. The South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca and the Sulu Sea matter to regional security and international commerce. Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines must guard extensive maritime territories. Vietnam faces persistent strategic pressure in the South China Sea, while Singapore depends heavily on uninterrupted digital and commercial connectivity.

Resilient satellite communications could support maritime domain awareness, emergency response, coastguard operations and monitoring remote territories. Security needs in Sabah and Sarawak show why dependable communications across scattered areas matter. Satellite links could strengthen surveillance and coordination around the Sulu and Celebes seas. The writers insist that those capabilities shouldn’t depend on one foreign provider.

Automation, AI and the Question of Control

The article also connects artificial intelligence, automation and satellite communications. Ukraine has shown how inexpensive unmanned systems, backed by digital networks, can challenge far more expensive military platforms. As artificial intelligence takes a larger role in military operations, autonomous systems will still need reliable links for supervision, coordination, software updates and intelligence transmission. Whoever controls communications infrastructure may influence the technologies that run on it. The writers urge ASEAN to treat artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, satellite connectivity and national defence as one connected strategic ecosystem.

Their proposed remedy isn’t to build a rival to Starlink’s large and costly constellation. They call instead for interoperable architectures combining terrestrial networks, submarine cables, satellite services and secure national infrastructure. Potential partners include the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, India and Europe. But dependence on any single provider can create political leverage and disrupt operations. The writers say ASEAN’s traditional hedging may not be enough if a few external hands control critical technology. They call for multiple technological, economic and security relationships while preserving independent decision-making.

They also call for investment in domestic expertise, regional research cooperation, cybersecurity and protection of critical digital infrastructure. Universities, including the International Islamic University Malaysia, could study artificial intelligence governance and the geopolitical effects of emerging technology. ASEAN could develop regional principles for commercial satellite services during crises, covering service continuity, transparency, contractual safeguards and private providers’ responsibilities. Such rules would matter most to people who rely on these networks when conditions are worst.

The writers say military power depends not only on soldiers, ships, aircraft and missiles, but also on communications resilience, data security and the independence of systems supporting national defence. Starlink showed how commercial innovation could help a country resist aggression. The restrictions showed how dependence can leave a country exposed to decisions it cannot control. ASEAN, they argue, should welcome innovation without becoming captive to it. During a crisis, staying connected may matter as much as defending national territory.

Why This Matters: Ukraine’s experience shows how a communications tool can become leverage when one private provider and a foreign government hold the controls. Ukrainian drone units lost connectivity, missions were cancelled and battlefield information slowed after a decision Reuters reported had come from the White House, although the exact chain of responsibility remains unclear to the public. For governments, this raises a question of democratic accountability: who answers for choices that shape a nation’s ability to defend itself and its people? In Southeast Asian states with long coastlines, scattered islands and remote communities, the stakes also reach emergency response, fishing communities, coastguard work and the safety of people far from the capital. The writers call for interoperable systems, shared regional principles and public investment in domestic expertise, pointing toward essential infrastructure that serves public needs rather than one company’s or one foreign capital’s priorities. Whether ASEAN states act on that argument will shape how well their citizens are protected when the next crisis arrives.