Syria's new Sunni Islamist government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa faces mounting internal security challenges as ethnic and sectarian minorities resist integration into the Damascus-controlled state, with at least 1,700 people killed in four major incidents of ethno-sectarian violence since the Assad regime fell one year ago. The country remains deeply divided despite months of relative quiet following the regime's swift destruction of the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North-East Syria in January.
Four serious episodes of violence have erupted since December 8, 2024, when the Assad government collapsed. Widespread killings of Alawites occurred in the western coastal area by armed Sunni gunmen one year ago, following Alawi attacks on a government checkpoint. Druze communities were targeted by Syrian transitional government military units and affiliated irregulars one year ago in late April, followed by a much larger massacre of Syrian Druze in Sweida province one year ago in July. The Sweida violence, which accounted for the bulk of the 1,700 deaths, began with the kidnapping of a Druze merchant by Bedouin and ended only after Israeli air intervention forced government fighters to withdraw. The most recent clashes occurred earlier this year between government forces and Kurdish/Syrian Democratic Forces fighters, after American forces abandoned their former allies.
Minority Resistance Patterns
The sectarian violence flows predominantly in one direction: the newly ascendant Sunni Arab majority asserting itself and settling accounts with other population segments, including the formerly dominant Alawites and the Druze and Kurds, both of whom were suppressed under the old, Alawi-dominated Assad regime. Minority responses are largely determined by geopolitical realities. Where potential or actual external partners exist, minority communities adopt more defiant stances. Where no such alliances appear available, temporary quiescence and adaptation to an unwelcome reality results.
The Syrian Druze communities, comprising around 4% of the population, represent the most notable minority mobilization against Damascus authorities. Geopolitical realities enable the Druze to maintain an enclave into which Syrian central authorities cannot enter, sustained under a de facto Israeli guarantee. Separatist sentiment and desire for stronger connection or even annexation to Israel run strong in this area. Demonstrations regularly occur at Karama Square in Sweida city, the Druze heartland, where Israeli flags and portraits of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are raised.
Druze Leadership Divided
Syrian Druze lack uniformity regarding relations with the central government. Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri leads the most separatist and openly pro-Israeli element, calling not for total separation and annexation by Israel, but for establishment of strong, permanent and institutionalized autonomous status for Sweida province. A rival stream, led by Sheikh Yusuf Jarbou, opposes cooperation with Israel and supports greater cooperation with Damascus authorities. Other elements, such as that of Sheikh Hammoud al-Hinnawi, maintain intermediate positions. All these streams have armed factions supporting them. For now, Sweida remains off-limits to government forces.
Alawite Communities Struggle to Organize
In the western coastal area, the formerly ascendant Alawi communities, around 12% of the total population, have not managed to organize an effective or united communal response to challenges posed by the new authorities. Credible evidence suggests the massacres one year ago in March occurred as overreaction to efforts by armed elements associated with the former regime to attack security forces of Sharaa's Syrian Transitional Government. The response was brutal and indiscriminate, as armed Sunni tribal elements entered the coastal area and began slaughtering civilians. Low-level harassment of Alawites by Sunni Arabs has continued, including abduction of young Alawi women.
Alawi efforts at communal organization take two forms: the association of religious and communal leaders in the framework of the Alawite Supreme Council, and networks of armed men organized by officials of the former regime. These include the Syrian Popular Resistance, led by Miqdad Fatiha and consisting of former members of the Assad regime's army and security forces, and the Military Council to Free Syria, led by Brigadier-General Ghaith Dala. Both groups have carried out sporadic attacks on government forces present in the western coastal area. Many former regime officers are now present in Lebanon and remain committed to this cause. For now, however, it remains a latent threat and relatively minor problem for Damascus authorities.
Kurdish Forces Face Integration
The Kurdish military and governance structures in the northeast are engaged in a process of forced integration into the Syrian state following their military setbacks earlier this year. Kurds constitute around 10% of Syrians. The Syrian Democratic Forces still exists and maintains a kind of de facto autonomy in the Kurdish heartlands of Qamishli, Kobani and Hasakah. The pace is erratic, but the direction seems clear: toward eventual absorption of these forces into government structures, with some allowance at a level not yet finally clear of Kurdish cultural representation and local rule.
Many issues remain unresolved. A certain amount of de facto local administration is likely to remain, but for now, the dream of maintaining de facto Kurdish rule over large areas has moved beyond reach. Most SDF fighters have been integrated into state security forces, with only about 8,000 remaining outside these structures. Strong Kurdish nationalist sentiment remains and may resurface in forms that are difficult to foresee.
International Dynamics
The ongoing ferment among minorities in Syria finds no major international echo, with the exception of Israeli support for the Druze. The US administration summarily abandoned the Kurds in early 2026. Iran and its allies are not placing major focus on the remnants of support among Syrian Alawites. The Sharaa government finds itself favored by the main apex of influence regarding Middle East affairs in the US administration, namely that of Ambassador Tom Barrack and other senior officials sympathetic to and influenced by Turkish and Qatari positions.
Why This Matters:
Syria's internal security challenges reveal the fragility of governance transitions in multi-ethnic states where rule of law institutions remain weak and external powers selectively intervene. The pattern of violence—1,700 dead in four major incidents—demonstrates the costs of sectarian governance and the absence of institutional frameworks that protect minority rights through legal rather than military means. The selective nature of international support, with Israel backing Druze autonomy while the US abandoned Kurdish allies, underscores how geopolitical calculations rather than consistent principles of self-determination drive regional policy. For American interests, the current administration's alignment with Turkish and Qatari positions in favor of a government that employs Sunni Islamist and jihadi forces as tools of state policy raises questions about long-term stability and the protection of religious minorities. The forced integration of Kurdish forces and the ongoing harassment of Alawite communities suggest Syria's transition will remain violent and contested, with implications for regional security and refugee flows that could affect neighboring states and European allies.