The emergent Sunni Islamist regime of President Ahmed al-Sharaa continues its efforts to broaden and consolidate its rule in Syria, marked by ongoing "cold wars" between minority communities and the new Sunni Arab authorities. This consolidation has been achieved through systematic violence, including the destruction of the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North-East Syria in January, which had governed east of the Euphrates since 2019. The regime's actions have led to widespread killings and suppression, particularly targeting the formerly dominant Alawites, the Druze, and the Kurds.
Four instances of serious ethno-sectarian violence have occurred in Syria since the Assad regime fell one year ago on December 8, 2024. Widespread killings of Alawites took place in the western coastal area by armed Sunni gunmen one year ago in February/March 2025, following Alawi attacks on a government checkpoint. Druze were targeted by Syrian transitional government military units and affiliated irregulars one year ago in late April 2025. A much larger massacre of Syrian Druze in Sweida province, in which some 1,700 people were killed, occurred one year ago in July 2025. This series of incidents began with the kidnapping of a Druze merchant by Bedouin and concluded after widespread violence against Druze civilians with an Israeli air intervention that forced the government fighters back. The most recent clashes took place in January this year between government forces and Kurdish/Syrian Democratic Forces fighters, after the latter were abandoned by their erstwhile American allies.
State Violence and Communal Suppression
The sectarian violence consistently flows in one direction, with the newly ascendant Sunni Arab majority asserting itself and settling accounts with other elements of the population. The formerly dominant Alawites, comprising around 12% of the total population, have not managed to organize an effective or united communal response. Credible evidence suggests the massacres of one year ago in March 2025 were an overreaction to efforts by armed elements associated with the former regime to attack the security forces of Sharaa’s Syrian Transitional Government. The response was brutal and indiscriminate, as armed Sunni tribal elements entered the coastal area and began to slaughter civilians. Low-level harassment of Alawites by Sunni Arabs has continued, including the abduction of young Alawi women. Alawi efforts at communal organization include the Alawite Supreme Council and networks of armed men, such as the Syrian Popular Resistance led by Miqdad Fatiha, and the Military Council to Free Syria led by Brigadier-General Ghaith Dala, both of which have carried out sporadic attacks on government forces.
The Syrian Druze communities, around 4% of the Syrian population, represent the most notable minority mobilization against the authorities in Damascus. Geopolitical realities allow the Druze to maintain an enclave that Syrian central authorities cannot enter, sustained under a de facto Israeli guarantee. Separatist sentiment and the desire for a stronger connection or even annexation to Israel are strong in this area, with demonstrations regularly taking place at Karama Square in Sweida city, where Israeli flags and portraits of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are raised. While Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri leads a separatist, openly pro-Israeli faction advocating for strong autonomous status, Sheikh Yusuf Jarbou opposes cooperation with Israel and supports greater cooperation with Damascus. Other elements, like Sheikh Hammoud al-Hinnawi, maintain an intermediate position, and all these streams have armed factions. For now, Sweida remains off-limits to government forces.
Imperial Interests and Abandonment
The Kurdish military and governance structures in the northeast, representing around 10% of Syrians, are undergoing forced “integration” into the Syrian state following their military setbacks in January this year. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) still maintain a de facto autonomy in Kurdish heartlands like Qamishli, Kobani, and Hasakah, but the direction is clear: toward eventual absorption into government structures, with limited allowances for Kurdish cultural representation and local rule. Most SDF fighters have been integrated into state security forces, with only about 8,000 remaining outside. Strong Kurdish nationalist sentiment persists, with potential for future resurgence.
The ongoing ferment among these minorities finds no major international echo, with the exception of Israeli support for the Druze. The US administration summarily abandoned the Kurds in early this year. Iran and its allies are not prioritizing support for Syrian Alawites. The Sharaa government is favored by the main apex of influence regarding Middle East affairs in the US administration, specifically Ambassador Tom Barrack and other senior officials sympathetic to Turkish and Qatari positions. This alignment allows the Syrian government to combine cooperation with Washington while simultaneously allying with Sunni Islamist and jihadi forces on the ground, using these as tools of state policy. This strategy continues to the ongoing detriment of non-Sunni and non-Arab Syrians, ensuring the concentration of power and resources in the hands of the ascendant regime and its imperial backers.