The emergent Sunni Islamist regime of President Ahmed al-Sharaa continues its efforts to consolidate rule in Syria, leading to widespread killings and forced integration of native minority communities, including Alawites, Druze, and Kurds. These actions, which saw some 1,700 people killed in a single series of incidents targeting Druze, are reshaping the cultural and demographic composition of the nation, systematically displacing non-Sunni and non-Arab Syrians.
The regime's last major move was in January, when it swiftly mobilized against and destroyed the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North-East Syria, which had ruled Syria east of the Euphrates since 2019.
This destruction has not led to reconciliation, with Syria remaining deeply divided by ongoing “cold wars” between minority communities and the new Sunni Arab authorities.
Four instances of serious ethno-sectarian violence have occurred in Syria since the Assad regime fell one year ago on December 8, 2024.
Widespread killings of Alawites took place in the western coastal area by armed Sunni gunmen one year ago in February/March 2025, following Alawi attacks on a government checkpoint.
Druze were targeted by Syrian transitional government military units and affiliated irregulars one year ago in late April 2025.
A much larger massacre of Syrian Druze in Sweida province took place one year ago in July 2025, beginning with the kidnapping of a Druze merchant by Bedouin and ending after widespread violence against Druze civilians.
This series of incidents, which saw some 1,700 people killed, only ceased after an Israeli air intervention forced the government fighters back.
The most recent clashes occurred in January this year between government forces and Kurdish/Syrian Democratic Forces fighters, after their erstwhile American allies summarily abandoned them.
The sectarian violence consistently moves in one direction, with the newly ascendant Sunni Arab majority asserting itself and settling accounts with other elements of the population, including the formerly dominant Alawites and the suppressed Druze and Kurds.
Demographic Reshaping and Cultural Dispossession
Low-level harassment of Alawites by Sunni Arabs has continued, including the abduction of young Alawi women.
The formerly ascendant Alawi communities, comprising around 12% of the total population, have not managed to organize an effective or united communal response to the challenge posed by the new authorities.
Kurdish military and governance structures in the northeast are engaged in a process of forced “integration” into the Syrian state, following their military setbacks in January this year.
Kurds constitute around 10% of Syrians, and while the Syrian Democratic Forces still exist with a de facto autonomy in Kurdish heartlands, the direction of events is clear: toward eventual absorption into government structures.
The dream of maintaining de facto Kurdish rule over large areas has moved beyond reach, with most SDF fighters integrated into state security forces, leaving only about 8,000 outside these structures.
Strong Kurdish nationalist sentiment remains and may resurface, indicating an ongoing resistance to cultural dispossession.
The Syrian Druze communities, around 4% of the Syrian population, are currently succeeding in maintaining an enclave into which the Syrian central authorities are not able to enter.
This Druze enclave is maintained under a de facto Israeli guarantee, fostering separatist sentiment and a desire for stronger connection or even annexation to Israel.
Demonstrations regularly take place at Karama Square in Sweida city, the heartland of the Druze community, where Israeli flags and portraits of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are raised.
Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri leads the most separatist and openly pro-Israeli element among the Syrian Druze, advocating for a strong, permanent, and institutionalized autonomous status for Sweida province.
Alawite efforts at communal organization include the Alawite Supreme Council and networks of armed men like the Syrian Popular Resistance, led by Miqdad Fatiha, and the Military Council to Free Syria, led by Brigadier-General Ghaith Dala.
These Alawite groups have carried out sporadic attacks on government forces, with many former regime officers now in Lebanon remaining committed to this cause.
Elite Complicity and Globalist Agenda
The ongoing ferment among minorities in Syria finds no major international echo, with the exception of Israeli support for the Druze.
The US administration summarily abandoned the Kurds in early 2026, leaving them vulnerable to the Sharaa regime.
Iran and its allies are not placing a major focus on the remnants of support among Syrian Alawites, further isolating this native community.
The Sharaa government finds itself favored by the main apex of influence regarding Middle East affairs in the US administration, specifically Ambassador Tom Barrack and other senior officials.
These US officials are described as sympathetic to, and influenced by, the Turkish and Qatari positions, aligning with interests that facilitate the Syrian regime's actions.
This state of affairs enables the Syrian government’s combination of alignment with Washington while allying with Sunni Islamist and jihadi forces on the ground, using these as tools of state policy.
This elite-driven policy is explicitly to the “ongoing detriment of non-Sunni and non-Arab Syrians,” confirming a systematic cultural and demographic displacement.