
American technology companies are knowingly or negligently powering a global fraud epidemic that costs Americans nearly $200 billion annually, according to an AP/"FRONTLINE" investigation that exposes how the nation's infrastructure—from satellite internet to artificial intelligence—has become the backbone of industrialized scamming.
The investigation reveals a stark regulatory gap. While social media platforms draw public scrutiny, the real machinery of fraud runs much deeper: through satellite internet providers, AI companies, and internet service providers that possess the technical capacity to stop scammers but lack legal or business incentives to do so. The pattern is clear, and it's deliberate neglect dressed up as technical limitation.
How American AI Powers Industrial Fraud
OpenAI's ChatGPT and Google's Gemini are being weaponized at scale in Southeast Asia. The AP identified two suites of scam software relying heavily on these American AI tools, which scammers use to operate across dozens of languages, generate automated replies, develop credible personas, and track employee performance—essentially industrializing human deception. Blockchain analysis by TRM Labs shows that scammers using these tools have taken in tens of millions of dollars.
When confronted, both companies offered the same response: they've banned some accounts and claim robust protections exist. OpenAI said it banned three accounts after AP shared evidence. Google and OpenAI both stated they have programs in place to disrupt scammers. But here's the gap between claim and reality: these tools remain accessible, profitable, and only addressed reactively after journalists expose the abuse.
US Internet Providers: The Unregulated Backbone
One in five signals from devices at scam compounds linked to sanctioned entities in Myanmar traveled through U.S.-registered internet service providers, according to AP's analysis of over 200,000 device connections. Cogent Communications, Oracle, AT&T, and DigitalOcean all carried this traffic. No other non-regional country came close.
These companies invoke the same defense: they can't see the content flowing through their networks. Privacy by design, they call it. But that framing obscures a choice. These companies could invest in detection and prevention. They simply don't, because there's no penalty for facilitating fraud. As Sascha Meinrath, the Palmer chair in telecommunications at Penn State University, put it: "If there's no disincentive to continuing this, if there's no cost to actually facilitating scamming, then why would I spend a dollar to prevent scamming? This is the problem. It's identifiable, it's addressable—at least somewhat—but it costs something. And right now the cost of facilitating scamming is zero."
Oracle told AP it's "diligently working with law enforcement." UpCloud said AP's inquiry prompted an internal review. These are the gestures of companies responding to exposure, not evidence of systemic prevention.
Starlink's Unfinished Reckoning
Elon Musk's Starlink remains the number one internet service provider in Myanmar, including to scam centers, despite Congressional scrutiny and a publicized crackdown last fall when the company said it disconnected 2,500 kits near scam compounds. But scammers didn't disappear. They adapted. Satellite imagery and device data show at least 25 new scam sites have been constructed inside Myanmar since the crackdown, and at least 13 of them are using Starlink to get online.
Starlink declined to answer detailed questions about this proliferation, instead issuing a statement that it cooperates with law enforcement and is committed to being "a force for good." The company participated in a May crackdown with the Department of Justice's Scam Center Strike Force. Yet the evidence suggests that voluntary cooperation, without binding legal obligations or financial penalties, amounts to theater.
The Regulatory Void
The contrast between the United States and other democracies is damning. The United Kingdom, European Union, Australia, and Singapore have all introduced regulations requiring companies to prevent scams or face financial penalties. In Washington, lawmakers and government officials have asked American tech companies to cooperate on a voluntary basis.
U.S. Attorney Jeanine Pirro, who leads the new Scam Center Strike Force, stated the obvious: "The amazing part of this tragedy is that the criminals use our own infrastructure to commit the crime. When fraud is detected, industry must be ready, willing and able to stop it." But "must" and "should" aren't the same as legal obligation. Without binding requirements and real consequences, American companies will continue to calculate that the cost of inaction is cheaper than the cost of prevention.
Why This Matters:
The $200 billion annual cost of scams isn't an abstract number—it represents stolen retirement savings, depleted emergency funds, and shattered lives. The investigation demonstrates that this isn't inevitable crime that technology companies can't control. It's the result of a regulatory choice. Other democracies have decided that companies profiting from digital infrastructure bear responsibility for what flows through it. The United States has decided otherwise, allowing American companies to claim technical helplessness while knowingly facilitating industrial-scale fraud. This isn't just a market failure; it's a policy failure that treats the vulnerability of American consumers as an acceptable cost of doing business. Until Congress and regulators impose the same standards other nations have adopted—mandatory abuse prevention or financial penalties—American infrastructure will remain the world's most reliable tool for scammers.