Despite increased defense spending by NATO allies, European nations remain heavily dependent on American military technology and production capacity, exposing a critical sovereignty deficit in their ability to defend themselves. This reliance comes as NATO leaders push for a new framework approaching 5% of GDP by 2035, following years of pressure from President Donald Trump and growing alarm over Russia’s war in Ukraine.
European allies and Canada increased defense spending by 20% in 2025 compared with the previous year, according to NATO’s latest annual report. The alliance states that European members and Canada have added hundreds of billions of dollars in defense spending since 2014. Across Europe, governments are buying tanks, air defenses, fighter jets, and artillery systems. These purchases are intended to replenish stockpiles depleted by the fifth year of Russia's war in Ukraine.
Jim Townsend, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy now at CNAS, noted that the 2022 invasion by Putin and President Trump's pressure "woke everyone up." Countries closest to Russia, including Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, have sharply increased military budgets since 2022. Poland now allocates a larger share of its economy to defense than any other NATO member. Germany, once seen as a symbol of Europe’s post-Cold War military decline, launched a major rearmament push. Germany also created a 100 billion euro special fund specifically aimed at rebuilding the Bundeswehr.
The Cost of Managed Decline
The spending surge has simultaneously exposed the limits of the ledger, according to experts. Townsend stated that while spending more is a necessary first step, "you’re not going to see the capability results for a while." The war in Ukraine revealed how quickly a major conflict can drain ammunition stockpiles, strain production lines, and overwhelm peacetime defense industries. A defense budget, while showing political commitment, does not immediately translate into deployable brigades, sufficient ammunition, rapid weapons production, or sustained combat capability.
NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte acknowledged this distinction earlier in 2026, stating, "This is not just about more spending." Rutte called for "smarter investment in the right capabilities" and warned that rising defense budgets must be matched by expanded production capacity. Townsend confirmed that both Europe’s and America’s defense industries atrophied after decades of lower military spending following the Cold War. He added that these industries "lost the scale to be able to surge a lot more production." Governments are now confronting the reality that factories cannot instantly produce the weapons NATO claims it needs, and producers are struggling to meet requirements despite incoming orders. A recent McKinsey analysis warned that "structural constraints could slow the path from spending to military capabilities." This analysis pointed to fragmented procurement systems, industrial bottlenecks, and long production timelines across Europe’s defense sector.
Who Dictates Readiness?
These delays have underscored Europe's continued heavy dependence on American military technology and production capacity. Townsend explicitly stated, "Europe right now is dependent on the United States and U.S. industry to provide a lot of the capabilities they know they need." Among the most challenging capabilities for Europe to rebuild quickly are air defense systems, long-range strike weapons, logistics networks, intelligence capabilities, and deep ammunition stockpiles. Townsend highlighted the urgent need for "Air defense" and "long-range fires," citing systems like Patriot missiles and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System launchers. European governments are scrambling to acquire these systems, but production timelines have stretched longer due to surging demand following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Poland, seeking faster delivery timelines, has turned to South Korea for major weapons purchases. Germany has increased its ammunition production, and some civilian industrial firms have begun reorienting portions of their operations toward defense manufacturing. Townsend concluded that rebuilding Europe’s military capacity will require years and questioned, "Will the Russians take advantage of this gap?"