Chinese leader Xi Jinping arrived in the United States on Wednesday evening for his first state visit in 11 years, and the meeting opened with the usual ritual of great-power managers deciding what happens to everyone else. President Trump and Xi were set for high-stakes talks on Taiwan, tech, trade, the wars in Iran and Ukraine, and tensions along the Korean peninsula. Ordinary people get the consequences. The men at the top get the room.
Xi’s trip came after the Beijing summit in May, when the two leaders agreed to build a more stable bilateral relationship. Both countries said they wanted a relationship of "constructive strategic stability," even as negotiations continued over artificial intelligence and trade. That phrase sounds tidy enough. The reality underneath is a contest over leverage, supply chains, and who gets to write the rules for the rest of the world.
Who Holds the Levers
U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said this week that the two countries were still negotiating a possible extension of a rare earths truce that would keep Chinese rare earth products flowing to the United States. China dominates the refining of rare earths and other critical minerals used in products from cellphones to weapons. That means the machinery of modern life, and the machinery of war, both run through a narrow choke point controlled from above.
American officials have complained that China has not upheld its end of the bargain. NPR reporting said mutual distrust scuppered an offer from Beijing to extend the rare earths truce to the end of Trump’s term in January 2029. The language of bargains and truce hides the basic fact: people far from the negotiating table live with the fallout when these arrangements wobble.
Trump and Xi were also expected to discuss AI governance, with China seeking guardrails or controls on artificial intelligence. The same governments that funnel resources into surveillance, weapons, and corporate competition now present themselves as referees for the technology they helped unleash.
Who Pays for the Deal-Making
Xi has repeatedly told Trump that Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its own, is a red line and could put U.S.-China relations in jeopardy if mishandled. Trump told reporters later that he was not interested in a war thousands of miles away. This spring, the Trump administration paused a $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan. Experts said Xi was expected to press Trump to maintain that momentum when they sat down on Thursday.
On Wednesday, as Xi departed for the United States, China’s state news agency published a statement from the country’s cabinet-like State Council criticizing Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te. William Klein, acting deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing until 2021, said the most important issue Chinese leaders raise before high-level visits is Taiwan. The people who will never sit in these meetings are the ones expected to absorb the risk if the red lines snap.
Trump and Xi also agreed in May to create trade and investment boards. Among the discussions was a reciprocal tariff reduction framework on products worth $30 billion or more. China was expected to announce purchases of American agricultural products, and the United States was expected to announce tariff reductions on so-called 4A consumer goods, including footwear and apparel, according to two people in the U.S.-China business community who requested anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly. No details of who would serve on either board had been announced. The boards exist, at least on paper. The people who’ll live with the prices, the shortages, and the job losses still don’t get a seat.
During Trump’s visit to China this spring, the United States said China agreed to buy American beef, soybeans and 200 Boeing jets, but data showed China was already behind schedule on those agricultural purchase promises. That’s the old script: grand announcements, delayed delivery, and the public left to sort out the mess while the powerful call it diplomacy.
Jasmine Ling contributed to the reporting.