Uruguay's Left Cheers Lula While Homicides Climb 13%

Homicides in Uruguay hit 312 over the January-September period, up 13% from the same stretch last year and the highest level since the peak in 2018. That happened despite a crime reduction plan the government launched about eight months ago, in March. And the people running the country are busy celebrating an election in a different one.

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's win in Brazil about one month ago has the Latin American left feeling lucky. Uruguay's governing Frente Amplio is practically giddy. The party, which sits farther left than President Yamandú Orsi himself, framed the October vote as part of a wider resistance against the far right. Orsi called Lula a "friend." Two years ago, as president-elect, he made his first overseas trip to Brasília to see the Partido dos Trabalhadores leader.

Who Pays for the Victory Lap

Back home, the numbers tell a colder story. After 20 months in office, Orsi's government is unpopular because the economy shows little sign of growth and crime rates haven't come down. Cifra's latest poll put his approval at a historic low of 24% in October, with 57% disapproving. No president has sunk that low in their second year since 2000.

The people dragging those numbers down aren't abstractions. A Factum survey from mid-September found that public security and economic issues are by far the top concerns for Uruguayans. Among Frente Amplio voters themselves, 55% say security is their top worry and 26% point to the economy. Their own party's base is telling it what hurts.

Orsi's own words in May, after his numbers dived: "Obviously, if there are people who are not very satisfied, it is because something is not going well. You have to know how to correct course."

The Economy Waits on Someone Else's Politics

GDP in Uruguay expanded by 1.8% in 2025 and is estimated to grow by 0.9% this year. EIU forecasts expect activity to accelerate to 2% next year, partly thanks to better agricultural output from more favorable climatic conditions. But a slowdown in Brazil, and potentially in Argentina, where political jitters are building ahead of a contentious election, could dent that. Economic forecasts in Brazil have already turned decidedly negative since the results came in. So much for euphoria.

What They're Calling a Strategy

The Uruguayan left is now studying Lula's win for lessons, with an eye on keeping the Frente Amplio in power for the 2030-35 term. Unlike in Brazil, the incumbent can't run again. Potential candidates include Alejandro Sánchez, the secretary of the presidency; Gabriel Oddone, the economy minister; and Vice President Carolina Cosse. On the right, many expect former President Luis Lacalle Pou of the Partido Nacional to run. He left office a year ago with 53% approval.

The takeaway the left is drawing is about messaging. Lula's victory showed the left adopting the social media tactics long dominated by the right, and polls are getting less accurate as many voters, especially younger ones, decide just before the election. Uruguay's left is well organized, with a powerful union and student movements that can mobilize people onto the streets and make viral videos like the ones that flooded Brazilian social media.

Notice the pitch: the street movements are valued as content and turnout machinery for the next ballot.

Fatigue With the Promise

Interior Minister Carlos Negro acknowledges the challenge of narco-trafficking but rejects calls for mano dura, calling tougher penalties "punitive magical realism." Meanwhile, the latest Latinobarómetro survey found that 45% of Uruguayans would accept a nondemocratic government if it resolved the country's problems. The foreign leader they view most favorably is El Salvador's Nayib Bukele.

That's the bill coming due. People who've watched one government after another cycle through the same ballot box, with security and the cost of living still unsolved, are starting to say they'd trade the whole arrangement for results. The analysis itself warns that even the region's strongest democracies are vulnerable to backsliding if crime remains unresolved, pointing to Costa Rica's adoption of a Bukele-style approach.