Defense Minister Israel Katz told military reporters on June 29 that Israel is developing space lasers to carry out attacks above the Earth. That was about three and a half months ago. “One of the central goals which the prime minister and I set is that we are recruiting the best minds,” Katz said, since “as of today, no country has the ability to mount attacks in space. We must be the leading country in the world with this capability.”
Here’s Katz’s pitch: “If we achieve this, it will ensure the advantage of deterrence, of the ability to attack, destroy, and all of the other matters, versus our enemies with large resources.” Katz had never specifically mentioned space lasers before; his remarks expanded on an earlier June statement committing Israel to become the leading player in space attack capabilities.
The State’s Monopoly, Now in Orbit
Katz isn’t alone in the sky. In September, about one month ago, two top US military officials made public for the first time that America already has offensive weapons deployed in space. The US, China and Russia all have anti-satellite weapons. China unofficially demonstrated old space weapons in 2007, 19 years ago, while Russia and China have both demonstrated newer weapons since 2021.
What the Americans put up there remains a guessing game. Options include directed-energy weapons, kinetic missiles, or platforms for disrupting or disabling satellites without destroying them, known as rendezvous and proximity operations. Experts so far lean toward that last option, which has existed in some form since the US used multiple space vehicles to repair one another in the 1960s. They may favor it to avoid the debris kinetic weapons cause. A nuclear method is assumed not to be the focus, because the consequences in space would affect attacker and defender alike. Even planners of orbital war have noticed some weapons can’t be aimed at only one side.
The US says it hopes to make major advancements in stationing anti-missile physical interceptors in space by 2028. Lasers in space or on aircraft, though, remain a distant solution requiring more complex physics and engineering.
Who Benefits
Israel’s military establishment is already crowding the field. In April, Unit 9900 officer Lt.-Col. “S” and space war expert Tal Inbar discussed Israeli efforts to defend its space assets. On June 24, IDF Brig.-Gen. Yael Grosman said: “There are threats from space. We work with the Defense Ministry with a lot of power; with the broader defense establishment, we can all bring forward achievements.”
Contractors are in the room, too. Israel is already a leading country in developing Iron Beam as a land-based laser, and The Jerusalem Post saw and heard about work on presumed future fighter-jet-based lasers during a visit to Elbit. Foreign reports say lasers might destroy enemy satellites and burn up debris. Some have speculated Israel could use the Arrow 3 missile system against satellites, given it already strikes ballistic missiles in space.
The target is plain enough. Katz seemed to be referring to Iran; during the 2026 war, Israel struck multiple Iranian space war-related facilities, including those working on capabilities to attack satellites. Russia, China and Iran have all worked on ways to attack, damage, jam, or drag satellites. Katz’s remarks didn’t make clear whether he also wanted to deter Russia and China from assisting Iran. The logic runs in a tight loop: if Iran or other enemies advanced past Israel in space, they could attack Israeli satellites and reduce its surveillance capabilities. That means surveillance of the people below.
Bragging Rights
The Jerusalem Post’s own reading of the announcement is revealing. Katz’s June statement was less about immediate attack, defense or deterrence. It was either bragging to the Israeli public about a distant future achievement or psychological warfare against Iran, to the extent the Islamic Republic might believe it can work with Moscow and Beijing to go after Israel’s satellite advantage.
So the pitch is theater, aimed at two audiences: citizens asked to admire a weapon that doesn’t exist yet, and a rival state meant to flinch. Either way, people on the ground never get a vote on whether the sky becomes a front. They get the briefing, the deterrence language, and the bill.
Nothing in the record Katz cited involves anyone but states, militaries and the firms that supply them: the best minds, recruited. The debris problem is acknowledged. The question of who lives under all of it isn’t.