The Trump administration is pushing U.S. military operations from the Caribbean into the jungles of Latin America, seeking to replicate its lethal boat-strike campaign on land after more than 200 people were killed in over 60 maritime strikes. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced last week in Panama that Colombia, Guatemala, and Honduras had agreed to joint anti-cartel operations on their soil, following Ecuador's similar arrangement launched in March 2026.
Hegseth, speaking during a military drill in Panama's jungle, laid out the administration's expansive vision. "It will be like you saw with the strikes on the drug boats. Same effect on land. And so we're working with Ecuador. We're working with Colombia. We're working with partners to bring the fight to the (designated terrorist organizations) on land." He added a sweeping mandate: "Anywhere you traffic drugs or you threaten the American people or our partners, you are a target just like ISIS or al-Qaida."
The move represents the most interventionist U.S. approach to Latin America in decades. Since returning to office in January 2025, the Trump administration has designated 20 criminal groups as foreign terrorist organizations, sent U.S. forces to capture Venezuela's Nicolás Maduro, and involved CIA agents in Mexican drug lab operations. The administration has also killed more than 200 people in the maritime strikes, though critics question whether those targeted were actually narco-terrorists.
Sovereignty and Operational Scope
Hegseth provided few specifics about what joint operations would entail. In Colombia, where Trump-backed Abelardo de la Espriella took office this month, the defense secretary raised the prospect of U.S. forces joining strikes against the National Liberation Army (ELN), Colombia's last major guerrilla group. De la Espriella reportedly requested greater U.S. military involvement, and on Saturday vowed the ELN would "pay a high price" following a drone attack on troops.
Guatemala's government, however, denied reaching any such agreement. President Bernardo Arévalo said joint operations would be illegal without congressional approval, even as his progressive administration has otherwise cooperated with Washington on security matters.
Ecuador offers the clearest window into what expanded operations might look like. The country launched joint raids with the U.S. despite voters overwhelmingly rejecting foreign military bases in a November 2025 referendum. A New York Times investigation found that one March 2026 strike on an alleged drug lab instead destroyed a cattle farm—raising questions about targeting accuracy and civilian risk.
Risks and Resistance
Michael Shifter, a Latin America expert at the Inter-American Dialogue, characterized the expansion as an assertion of power rather than genuine partnership. "What's going on is an attempt to legitimize the increased use of the U.S. military in the region. It projects power, demonstrates military superiority and enables Washington to impose its agenda. This is not cooperation, it's obviously a very asymmetrical relationship."
William LeoGrande, a Latin America specialist at American University, warned that sustained U.S. combat operations alongside local forces would test "deep-rooted sensitivities over national sovereignty and the presence of U.S. troops."
Adam Isacson, a defense analyst with the Washington Office on Latin America, expressed skepticism about whether governments—even conservative ones—would tolerate expanded U.S. military presence. "Ultimately, the United States will have to define what 'joint operations' means in each of these countries. It may discover pretty quickly that this is something most governments—even governments on the right—are quite uncomfortable with."
Mexico stands as a notable exception to the new alliance. Despite being a major source and transit point for fentanyl and other drugs entering the U.S., progressive President Claudia Sheinbaum has resisted mounting pressure for direct U.S. military involvement on Mexican soil, though she has cooperated on other security matters.
The Civilian Casualty Question
Jeremy McDermott, co-director of the Colombia-based investigative organization InSight Crime, warned that military strikes may simply force armed groups to adapt rather than defeat them. "The U.S. bombs an ELN camp in Colombia or in Venezuela, what is the first thing the ELN are going to do? They're going to dismantle all their camps and move into the villages and towns."
Isacson noted the political constraints even right-wing leaders face. "All of these presidents, no matter how far right they are, face pressure to do something about security and to make a show of pursuing the 'bad guys' who are making people feel unsafe. There is broad agreement on that. But they also know there is only so much sovereignty they can cede before public opinion begins turning against them."
Observers question whether a more militarized approach would produce lasting security gains. Some analysts suggest the campaign may partly serve as a demonstration of American power, building on the Maduro capture as the administration seeks to offset foreign policy setbacks elsewhere, including in the Middle East.
Why This Matters:
The expansion of U.S. military operations across Latin America raises fundamental questions about the sustainability and effectiveness of military-first counternarcotics strategy. The administration's track record—including the destruction of a cattle farm in an alleged drug lab strike—suggests operational challenges that could undermine both the mission and regional relationships. Even conservative Latin American leaders face domestic pressure over sovereignty, meaning the administration may encounter resistance from its own ideological allies. The strategy also risks displacing rather than defeating criminal organizations, potentially forcing them into civilian areas and increasing collateral damage. Whether governments will tolerate sustained U.S. military presence, and whether voters in the region will accept the erosion of sovereignty that such operations require, remains uncertain. The administration's success will depend not just on military capability but on whether partner governments can sustain public support for foreign military involvement on their soil.