In 2025, Israel’s imports of Azerbaijani crude rose by 31% to around 94,000 barrels a day, and that single number says more about the relationship than any polished diplomatic statement ever could. The oil gave Azerbaijan 46.4% of Israel’s total oil imports, while roughly 28% came from Russia, the second-largest supplier. The crude moved through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast and then on to Ashkelon. The route bypassed the Strait of Hormuz, which meant Iran couldn’t disrupt it directly through its leverage there.
The Quiet Alliance Behind the Trade
The article describes Israel and Azerbaijan as having built a quiet partnership for more than 30 years based on reciprocal interests. Diplomatic relations date to 1992, when Israel recognized Azerbaijan and opened an embassy in Baku. Azerbaijan moved more slowly, opening a trade office in Tel Aviv in 2021 and an embassy in 2023, becoming the first Shi’ite-majority country to maintain a permanent diplomatic mission in Israel. In February 2026, the two countries signed an artificial intelligence memorandum covering supercomputing infrastructure and joint research, but there is still no defense treaty between them. Instead, the relationship rests on separate arrangements in trade, energy, arms and intelligence that can expand or contract according to circumstances. No grand alliance. Just the usual menu of state interests.
Azerbaijan benefits from having a major buyer for its oil and from preserving a corridor connecting the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean, reinforcing its role as an important energy source outside Russian and Iranian routes. The same route also transits Turkish territory at a time when Ankara has maintained a trade embargo on Israel since 2024. The arrangement keeps commerce moving while governments posture for their own audiences. The people underneath get the invoices, the risk, and the fallout.
Security, Secrecy, and the Intelligence Fog
The security dimension is more sensitive and opaque. Reports have alleged the presence of Israeli special forces and intelligence personnel in southern Azerbaijan near the Iranian border, using the area for intelligence collection, drone operations and possible rescue teams for pilots. Other reports have attributed a strike on an Iranian official to activity launched from Azerbaijani territory. Baku has denied these claims as baseless, while Israel has declined to comment. The article says they remain unverified accounts rather than established facts, especially amid a broad information and intelligence war.
The Caspian Sea dimension became more important after Israel struck Iran’s Bandar Anzali naval base on March 18. According to reports, the attack destroyed a ship, four missile boats and military infrastructure. The force destroyed there did not represent a major direct threat to Israel, but in theory it could have threatened Azerbaijani oil installations and Caspian shipping lanes. Its weakening therefore benefited Azerbaijan indirectly and helped protect the region producing the crude destined for Israel. It also affected a maritime route used by Russia and Iran for trade and, according to Western reports, the movement of military equipment.
Closeness to Israel also carries potential costs for Baku. On March 5, drones arriving from the direction of Iran struck Nakhchivan International Airport, wounding four civilians, although Tehran denied responsibility. The incident was interpreted as a limited warning over Azerbaijani-Israeli cooperation. President Ilham Aliyev responded by summoning the Iranian ambassador, recalling Azerbaijan’s ambassador and raising military readiness along the border. Tensions nevertheless subsided quickly: border crossings reopened, the Azerbaijani and Iranian presidents spoke by telephone, and Azerbaijan sent humanitarian assistance to Iran. The state machinery rattled, then reset itself, as usual.
Arms, Borders, and Rival Projects
Arms have also been central to the partnership. Israel supplied 69% of Azerbaijan’s major weapons imports between 2016 and 2020, including reconnaissance drones, loitering munitions, LORA missiles and Barak air defense systems. Purchases later declined after Baku achieved its military objective of regaining Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia and no longer needed imports at the same pace. Even so, Azerbaijan continues to benefit from existing Israeli systems and the maintenance, upgrades and training associated with them.
The article says Israel derives the greater strategic benefit during wartime because it secures a major oil source beyond Hormuz while maintaining a relationship with a country bordering Iran. Azerbaijan gains economically and militarily but carries greater geographic and political risk because of its proximity to Iran and its close ties with Turkey. The most realistic course is therefore the current one: deep cooperation without a declared alliance, openness toward Israel combined with continued dialogue with Iran. That’s not peace. It’s managed dependence with better branding.
The same issue also included commentary on Turkey, Israel and red lines in Syria. Israel justified its August 18 strike on the Abu Al-Duhur Air Base, roughly 70 kilometers from the Turkish border, by claiming that Damascus was preparing to allow Turkish forces to deploy there, and that Israeli warnings had not been taken seriously. Syria and Turkey denied any plan to establish a permanent base, saying Turkish officers had visited the site as part of training and military cooperation. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz nevertheless chose to issue a direct warning to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan against dragging his country into “dangerous adventures in Syria” and testing Israel’s determination to defend itself.
Turkish-Israeli relations moved another step away from political disagreement and toward military competition. The two countries are not at war, and neither appears to have made a decision to go to war, but both are now drawing redlines inside the same geographic space. For years, relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv demonstrated an ability to separate politics from interests. Disputes escalated, accusations were exchanged, and ambassadors were recalled more than once, yet trade continued, and practical cooperation never disappeared entirely. On the eve of the Gaza war, bilateral trade stood at roughly $7 billion annually. Turkey halted direct trade, closed its ports to Israeli vessels, and Erdogan’s language toward the Israeli government reached unprecedented levels of hostility.
Even so, Gaza does not appear to be the arena in which military confrontation between the two states is most likely to begin. Syria is described as far more dangerous because the dispute is not merely over positions but over two conflicting strategic projects. Turkey wants a unified Syrian state strong enough to control its borders, prevent the emergence of an armed Kurdish entity, and remain politically, economically and militarily linked to Ankara. It is helping train the Syrian army and rebuild its institutions, seeking to transform the influence accumulated during years of war into a long-term partnership with Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government.
Israel, by contrast, wants a Syria that poses no military threat, a demilitarized south and continuing freedom for its aircraft to strike whatever it considers dangerous to its security. From Israel’s perspective, replacing Iranian influence with Turkish military influence is not necessarily an improvement. Iran was a familiar and exposed adversary. Turkey is a large NATO member with a substantial army, a defense industry, a network of alliances and the capacity to help rebuild Syrian power.
The article also included a piece on Anwar Sadat. It said Sadat was not a great leader merely because he fought the October War, nor because he later chose peace with Israel, but because he possessed a rare ability to read international transformations and make decisions at the moment they best served Egypt’s interests. In 1972, the Soviet Union was still a superpower engaged in an open struggle with the US for global leadership, yet Sadat took the bold decision to reduce the Soviet presence in Egypt and expel a large number of Soviet advisers. Then came the October War of 1973. Sadat’s objective was not an open-ended war or a propaganda victory. He wanted to break the stalemate, alter the balance of power and open the path toward a political settlement that would restore Egyptian rights.
He went to Jerusalem, entered difficult negotiations that culminated in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and eventually restored the whole of Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty. In parallel, Sadat repositioned Egypt internationally, gradually shifting it from the Soviet sphere toward a strategic relationship with the US. The article said the politician who makes a difference is not merely the one who knows how to fight, but the one who knows when to fight, when to negotiate, when to change direction and when to understand that the world around him has changed. It said Sadat grasped early that international relations are built not on permanent friendships or eternal enmities but on shifting interests, and that the state’s interests must remain the primary compass.
Egypt now faces another international transformation, with the US still the world’s strongest power, China rising economically and politically, and competition between the two intensifying over the shape of the international system in the coming decades. The article said Cairo needs to preserve its strategic relationship with the US while expanding economic and investment partnerships with China, giving itself greater room to maneuver, strengthening its bargaining position and protecting national decision-making from dependence on any external power. The states keep calling that strategy. Everyone else just lives inside it.