Israel's imports of Azerbaijani crude oil surged by 31% in 2025, reaching approximately 94,000 barrels a day. This significant increase made Azerbaijan the primary supplier of Israel's oil, accounting for 46.4% of its total imports last year. The crude travels through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz, a route that insulates Israel's energy supply from potential Iranian disruption.
The quiet partnership between Israel and Azerbaijan, spanning more than 30 years, is built on reciprocal interests beyond energy. Diplomatic relations began in 1992 when Israel recognized Azerbaijan and established an embassy in Baku. Azerbaijan reciprocated more slowly, opening a trade office in Tel Aviv five years ago and an embassy three years ago, becoming the first Shi’ite-majority country to maintain a permanent diplomatic mission in Israel. This year, in February, the two countries signed an artificial intelligence memorandum covering supercomputing infrastructure and joint research, though a formal defense treaty remains absent.
Fueling the Occupation
The security dimension of this relationship is less transparent. Reports have alleged the presence of Israeli special forces and intelligence personnel in southern Azerbaijan, near the Iranian border. These accounts suggest the area is used for intelligence collection, drone operations, and possible rescue teams for pilots. Furthermore, other reports have attributed a strike on an Iranian official to activity launched from Azerbaijani territory. Baku has denied these claims as baseless, while Israel has declined to comment, leaving these accounts unverified amid a broader information and intelligence war.
The Caspian Sea dimension gained importance after Israel struck Iran’s Bandar Anzali naval base on March 18 this year. This attack reportedly destroyed a ship, four missile boats, and military infrastructure. While the force destroyed did not pose a major direct threat to Israel, its weakening indirectly benefited Azerbaijan by protecting oil installations and Caspian shipping lanes that produce crude destined for Israel. This also impacted a maritime route used by Russia and Iran for trade and, according to Western reports, the movement of military equipment.
Arms have also been central to this partnership. Between six and ten years ago, Israel supplied 69% of Azerbaijan’s major weapons imports, including reconnaissance drones, loitering munitions, LORA missiles, and Barak air defense systems. Although purchases later declined after Baku achieved its military objective of regaining Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan continues to benefit from existing Israeli systems, along with associated maintenance, upgrades, and training. Israel derives a greater strategic benefit during wartime, securing a major oil source beyond Hormuz and maintaining a relationship with a country bordering Iran. Azerbaijan gains economically and militarily but faces greater geographic and political risk due to its proximity to Iran. On March 5 this year, drones arriving from the direction of Iran struck Nakhchivan International Airport, wounding four civilians, an incident interpreted as a limited warning over Azerbaijani-Israeli cooperation.
Asserting Regional Hegemony
Beyond its energy and security alliances, Israel continues to assert its military dominance across the region. On August 18 this year, Israel justified a strike on the Abu Al-Duhur Air Base in Syria, roughly 70 kilometers from the Turkish border. Israeli officials claimed Damascus was preparing to allow Turkish forces to deploy there, and that Israeli warnings had not been taken seriously. Syria and Turkey, however, denied any plan to establish a permanent base, stating that Turkish officers had visited the site as part of training and military cooperation. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz nevertheless issued a direct warning to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan against “dangerous adventures in Syria” and testing Israel’s determination to defend itself.
Turkish-Israeli relations have shifted further from political disagreement towards military competition. While neither country appears to have decided to go to war, both are now drawing redlines within the same geographic space. Before the Gaza war, bilateral trade stood at approximately $7 billion annually. Turkey halted direct trade and closed its ports to Israeli vessels two years ago, with President Erdogan's language towards the Israeli government reaching unprecedented hostility. Syria, however, is described as a far more dangerous arena for potential military confrontation, not merely over positions but over two conflicting strategic projects.
Turkey seeks a unified Syrian state strong enough to control its borders, prevent the emergence of an armed Kurdish entity, and remain politically, economically, and militarily linked to Ankara. It is actively helping train the Syrian army and rebuild its institutions, aiming to transform its influence into a long-term partnership with Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government. Israel, by contrast, demands a Syria that poses no military threat, a demilitarized south, and continuing freedom for its aircraft to strike whatever it considers dangerous to its security. From Israel’s perspective, replacing Iranian influence with Turkish military influence is not necessarily an improvement, as Turkey is a large NATO member with a substantial army and the capacity to help rebuild Syrian power.
Reclaiming Sovereignty
The historical context of regional power dynamics also includes Egypt's efforts to reclaim its sovereignty from Israeli occupation. Fifty-three years ago, the October War of 1973 aimed to break a stalemate, alter the balance of power, and open a path toward a political settlement that would restore Egyptian rights. Following this, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat engaged in difficult negotiations that culminated in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, which eventually restored the whole of Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty. Fifty-four years ago, in 1972, Sadat had already taken the decision to reduce the Soviet presence in Egypt and expel a large number of Soviet advisers, repositioning Egypt internationally from the Soviet sphere toward a strategic relationship with the United States. Egypt now faces another international transformation, seeking to preserve its strategic relationship with the US while expanding economic and investment partnerships with China to strengthen its bargaining position and protect national decision-making from external dependence.