Israel and Azerbaijan signed an artificial intelligence memorandum in February 2026, covering supercomputing infrastructure and joint research. This agreement underscores a quiet partnership built over more than 30 years, based on reciprocal interests. Diplomatic relations began in 1992, 34 years ago, when Israel recognized Azerbaijan and opened an embassy in Baku. Azerbaijan, a Shi’ite-majority country, established a trade office in Tel Aviv five years ago and opened an embassy in 2023, three years ago, marking a significant diplomatic step.
Oil forms the central pillar of this strategic relationship. Last year, in 2025, Israel’s imports of Azerbaijani crude surged by 31% to approximately 94,000 barrels a day. This made Azerbaijan the source for 46.4% of Israel’s total oil imports, significantly more than Russia's roughly 28%. The crude oil travels through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz, which denies Iran direct leverage to disrupt this vital supply route.
Countering the Iranian Axis
The security dimension of this partnership remains sensitive and largely opaque. Reports have alleged the presence of Israeli special forces and intelligence personnel in southern Azerbaijan, close to the Iranian border. These areas are reportedly used for intelligence collection, drone operations, and potential rescue teams for pilots. Other unverified accounts have linked a strike on an Iranian official to activity launched from Azerbaijani territory. Baku has consistently denied these claims as baseless, while Israel has maintained its policy of declining comment.
The Caspian Sea has become an increasingly critical arena following Israel's strike on Iran’s Bandar Anzali naval base on March 18 this year. That attack reportedly destroyed a ship, four missile boats, and military infrastructure. While the force destroyed did not pose a major direct threat to Israel, its weakening indirectly benefited Azerbaijan by removing a potential threat to its oil installations and Caspian shipping lanes. This action helped protect the region producing crude destined for Israel and impacted a maritime route used by Russia and Iran for trade and, according to Western reports, military equipment movement.
However, closeness to Israel carries inherent risks for Baku. On March 5 this year, drones arriving from the direction of Iran struck Nakhchivan International Airport, wounding four civilians. This incident was widely interpreted as a limited warning over Azerbaijani-Israeli cooperation. President Ilham Aliyev responded by summoning the Iranian ambassador, recalling Azerbaijan’s ambassador, and raising military readiness along the border.
Arms sales have also been central to the partnership. Between 2016 and 2020, six to ten years ago, Israel supplied 69% of Azerbaijan’s major weapons imports. These included reconnaissance drones, loitering munitions, LORA missiles, and Barak air defense systems. Israel derives a greater strategic benefit during wartime, securing a major oil source beyond Hormuz and maintaining a relationship with a country bordering Iran.
Turkey's Regional Ambitions
Meanwhile, Turkish-Israeli relations have deteriorated, moving from political disagreement toward military competition. Israel justified its August 18 strike on the Abu Al-Duhur Air Base in Syria, roughly 70 kilometers from the Turkish border, by stating that Damascus was preparing to allow Turkish forces to deploy there. Israeli warnings, officials said, had not been taken seriously. Syrian and Turkish authorities denied any plan to establish a permanent base, claiming Turkish officers had visited for training and military cooperation. Despite these denials, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz issued a direct warning to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan against “dangerous adventures in Syria” and testing Israel’s determination to defend itself.
Ankara has maintained a trade embargo on Israel since 2024, two years ago. On the eve of the Gaza war, bilateral trade stood at roughly $7 billion annually. Turkey halted direct trade and closed its ports to Israeli vessels, while President Erdogan’s language toward the Israeli government reached unprecedented levels of hostility. Syria is now described as a far more dangerous arena for potential military confrontation.
The dispute in Syria is not merely over positions but over two conflicting strategic projects. Turkey seeks a unified Syrian state strong enough to control its borders, prevent the emergence of an armed Kurdish entity, and remain politically, economically, and militarily linked to Ankara. It is actively training the Syrian army and rebuilding its institutions, aiming to transform its wartime influence into a long-term partnership with Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government. Israel, conversely, demands a Syria that poses no military threat, a demilitarized south, and continuing freedom for its aircraft to strike perceived security threats. From Israel’s perspective, replacing Iranian influence with Turkish military influence is not necessarily an improvement. Turkey is a large NATO member with a substantial army, a defense industry, a network of alliances, and the capacity to help rebuild Syrian power, posing a new and complex challenge.
Strategic Realignment
The historical example of Anwar Sadat offers a lesson in strategic adaptation. Sadat possessed a rare ability to read international transformations and make decisions that best served Egypt’s interests. In 1972, 54 years ago, he boldly reduced the Soviet presence in Egypt and expelled a large number of Soviet advisers, even as the Soviet Union was a global superpower. Following the October War of 1973, 53 years ago, Sadat pursued a political settlement with Israel, culminating in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the restoration of Sinai. He repositioned Egypt from the Soviet sphere toward a strategic relationship with the US, demonstrating that state interests must remain the primary compass in a world of shifting alliances.