Xi Elevates Purge Chief to Rebuild Military Command

Xi Jinping promoted Zhang Shengmin, the official who led a sweeping corruption crackdown in China’s military, to the Communist Party’s elite Politburo last week as he rebuilds a command structure depleted by purges. The appointment places the enforcer of discipline inside the party’s top decision-making body—and gives him a role in choosing who gets to command the armed forces.

A command built on loyalty

Zhang’s promotion was the first made outside a party congress in three decades. Earlier this year, he became the only official besides Xi left on the powerful Central Military Commission. He is now the Politburo’s only military member.

The move comes as Xi prepares to mark the People’s Liberation Army’s centenary in August 2027 and has vowed to make the armed forces more combat-ready by then. With a twice-a-decade leadership reshuffle due next year, Zhang is positioned to help select and vet candidates for the military command. That authority comes with a trapdoor: he could be held responsible if officials he recommends are later found corrupt.

Zhang sacked scores of generals in the world’s largest standing army. The purge continued last week, when the party expelled 16 military figures and several defense-industry executives. Other officers were absent from a major Communist Party meeting in Beijing, prompting speculation about their downfall. In this chain of command, careers can be erased from above, while the people tasked with enforcing the purge remain exposed to the same political machinery.

Discipline from the top down

Zhang’s rise suggests political reliability currently takes priority over battlefield experience in the People’s Liberation Army command. China has not fought a war since its 1979 conflict with Vietnam. In 2022, Xi broke retirement norms to keep combat veteran Zhang Youxia on the Politburo at age 72, a move seen as rewarding his fighting experience. Zhang Youxia, whose father had fought alongside Xi’s, was investigated in January.

There have so far been few signs that the purges have slowed military operations or weapons development. China demonstrated its second-strike capability in July by testing a submarine-launched ballistic missile into the Pacific. Commercial satellite imagery also indicated that China launched two new types of submarines this year at the Jiangnan and Huludao shipyards. Xi may fill vacancies from theater commands, where generals have training experience, though not necessarily active combat experience.

Zhang’s record reaches beyond removing senior officers. A native of Shaanxi province, Xi’s ancestral home, he enlisted at 19 in 1978, served three years in an artillery unit, and briefly worked as a platoon commander before moving into political work. A 2008 article described him as an accomplished calligrapher. In a 1989 book, he argued that growing democratic sentiment in the ranks clashed with top-down indoctrination. He later urged senior officers to limit friendships and recognize that social interactions could carry political consequences.

During a 2012 posting with the Second Artillery Corps, the predecessor of today’s Rocket Force, Zhang introduced 16 measures to regulate what party cadres say and advocated strict discipline. “A stern rebuke and calling someone out on the spot are actually the most direct, the most effective and the most responsible way to handle an issue,” he said.

The enforcer’s precarious position

The party accused Miao Hua, who as head of the Central Military Commission’s Political Work Department helped steer promotions, of “damaging the military’s political ecology,” a party phrase for trading promotions or building personal patronage networks. He was expelled from the party last year. Zhang’s approach echoes Xi’s campaign against banquets and social circles where officials cultivate networks.

Zhang will be 69 by next year’s party congress, beyond the customary retirement age for a new term on the decision-making body, although Xi has made exceptions. Yang Zi, a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, said it was necessary to bring a senior military officer into the Politburo and Zhang was the only option. “Whether he will stay on really depends,” Yang said.

Joseph Torigian, provost associate professor at the School of International Service at American University in Washington, said Zhang had to choose the right people while officials kept talking about people with “two faces.” Neil Thomas, a fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, said Xi “would likely prioritize cracking down on perceived disloyalty over going into battle with generals he does not fully trust.”

Torigian described the task facing Zhang before the reshuffle this way: “You have to manage the top leader, but you also have to manage the top leader’s relationship with people who don’t like you.” Then he gave the enforcer’s job its plainest name: “For the hatchet man, it’s never easy.”