Pakistan said on Thursday that no military response by Islamabad was currently being discussed under its joint defence agreement with Saudi Arabia and Turkey after attacks by Yemen's Houthis on Saudi Arabia. The arrangement, signed last month in Mecca, says an armed attack on any one of the three countries would be treated as an attack on all of them. That’s the state system in miniature: one pact, three governments, and ordinary people left to absorb the consequences when the machinery starts moving.
Foreign ministry spokesperson Sajjad Haider Khan told reporters at a weekly media briefing that Pakistan would act under the agreement if and when the circumstances required it. “There is no such thing under discussion right now,” Khan said. He added that Pakistan may act when the “time comes.” The language is tidy. The threat is not. It’s a standing promise of collective force, waiting for the right trigger.
The Pact and the Pressure
Pakistan has condemned the Houthi attacks and warned Iran to rein in its Yemeni allies, while Islamabad has also been mediating between the United States and Iran. That’s a familiar diplomatic routine: states denounce violence, threaten escalation, and then present themselves as the adults in the room while keeping the fuse lit. Khan said there were no plans to expand the Mecca alliance as regional tensions continued to disrupt energy supplies. The alliance may not be expanding, but the logic behind it is already doing the work.
Yemen's Houthi fighters have advanced rapidly along the Red Sea coast as the country's previously dormant war against Saudi-backed government forces resumed in the summer. The war didn’t stay dormant for long. It came back with the usual gifts: armed factions, shifting front lines, and civilians trapped under rival claims to legitimacy. The Houthis’ advance has put them in a prime position to control shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb choke point, while bolstering Iran’s leverage against the US, experts told Middle East Eye. The sea lane becomes a bargaining chip. People become background noise.
Who Controls the Choke Point
Corey Ranslem, CEO of maritime security group Dryad Global, said, “The Houthis have pulled off a military victory that puts them one step closer to be in full control of the Bab el-Mandeb.” He added, “I think it will actually be easier for the Houthis to exert control in Bab el-Mandeb than it is for Iran in the Strait of Hormuz because the US doesn’t have tangible military assets in the area.” That’s the blunt arithmetic of armed power. Whoever can project force over a narrow waterway gains leverage, and everyone else gets to call it “security.”
After days of heavy fighting along a narrow plain known as the Tihama, on Thursday the Houthis routed Yemeni forces loyal to Saudi Arabia and seized the historic and strategic Red Sea port city of Mocha. Arab media reported that the Houthis made further gains throughout the day. The port city’s history doesn’t protect it. Its strategic value makes it more vulnerable. That’s how these systems work: geography becomes a prize, and the people living on it become collateral in someone else’s contest for control.
Pakistan’s position, for now, is that no military response is under discussion. That may last until the “time comes,” or until another capital decides the moment has arrived. Either way, the same old structure remains intact: armed blocs, alliance politics, and regional powers treating the Red Sea like a board game while the costs land far from the briefing room.