Iran's Nuclear Debate: Elites Weigh Bomb, People Pay

On Saturday, October 31, Mohsen Rezaei said Iran’s government and wider establishment hadn’t approved a change in nuclear doctrine, even as officials and hardliners publicly debate moving toward nuclear weapons. The debate centers on political and military leaders, while Rezaei has acknowledged that a prolonged blockade would hurt Iranian families and investment.

Who Gets to Decide

Rezaei said Iran’s nuclear facilities had come under attack and that people were asking why the country should continue its existing policy. He said Iran had fully cooperated with International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. On September 19, he had said US and Israeli actions gave Iran grounds to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Hardliners have urged Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei to overturn his father Ali Khamenei’s religious decree prohibiting production of nuclear weapons. Ahmad Naderi, a hardline member of parliament, told Khaneh Eqtesad in October that circumstances had changed and the decree could be reconsidered. “From Mojtaba Khamenei’s behavior, my understanding is that his fatwa will be different,” Naderi said.

Tasnim news agency reported Saturday that Mojtaba Khamenei had instructed senior military commanders to answer threats immediately and effectively, “without geographical limitations.” The report didn’t announce an order to develop nuclear weapons, despite earlier hopes among hardliners on social media that it would.

Other officials have argued for expanding the policy without formally changing it. A commentary in the Revolutionary Guards-affiliated Tasnim proposed enriching uranium to levels suitable for producing a nuclear weapon, but stopping short of manufacturing one. Ahmad Bakhshayesh, a member of parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, told ChandSanieh that Iran should build a bomb before withdrawing from the NPT. “Withdrawing without building a bomb would eliminate the [current] benefits of IAEA oversight,” he said.

The public mandate claimed for the debate is disputed. Mohammad-Javad Haj Ali-Akbari, Tehran’s interim Friday prayer leader, said unspecified polls showed more than 70% of Iranians supported reconsidering the doctrine; the account offered no details about the polls or their methodology. Mahmoud Nabavian, a hardline member of parliament, wrote on X on October 29 that he had called for authorizing atomic-bomb production at a pro-government gathering in Qom, where he said the crowd welcomed the request. Revolutionary Guards-affiliated Fars and Tasnim outlets prominently covered calls for nuclear weapons as popular demands. Fars promoted calls on its My Fars platform for nuclear weapons and a missile range of 13,000 kilometers.

War, Diplomacy and the Bill

Opponents of the hardliners’ claims have asked who gets to speak for the country. Reformist politician Mostafa Hashemitaba said in September that outlets such as Kayhan should endorse a referendum if they believed their position had popular support. Nour News, a site close to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, cautioned against replacing expert assessment and national decision-making with crowds. “People’s voices should be heard, but the voices of crowds should not be turned into a substitute for expert assessment and national decision-making,” it wrote.

Javad Emam, spokesman for the Reformist Front, said the prospect of an atomic bomb can’t be reduced to slogans. “The country’s security, economy, national interests and future are at stake,” he wrote. “Can one speak on behalf of the nation without evidence and impose the costs of such a decision on the people?” Asr-e Iran warned that public calls for a bomb could damage Iran’s international standing and undermine its peaceful image.

The dispute also reaches into negotiations. President Masoud Pezeshkian warned about the economic costs of prolonged uncertainty and said on October 24, “You cannot plan in a state of indecision.” He added that Iran should negotiate and move beyond the “neither-war-nor-peace situation.” Rezaei, meanwhile, said, “economic pain and strategic collapse are not the same thing.” The analysis argued that pressure falling mainly on Iranian households could leave leaders’ incentives intact.

Tehran’s negotiating positions remain contested. On Thursday, Araghchi said Iran remained committed to the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding as a basis for negotiations, while rejecting a proposal to reopen Hormuz before verified lifting of naval restrictions and release of $24 billion in frozen Iranian assets. Iranian negotiators held a third consecutive day of Qatar-mediated talks in Doha; Araghchi said they had no plan to meet US officials directly. The proposed seven-day framework reflected a dispute over sequence: Washington wanted nuclear discussions on the first day, Tehran on the seventh.

The article’s account of Rezaei’s earlier military career records the human cost of decisions made at the top. After Iranian forces recaptured Khorramshahr in 1982 and Iraq offered negotiations, Rezaei joined those arguing that Iran should enter Iraqi territory. During Operation Ramadan near Basra in July 1982, historians Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner estimated that Iranian forces suffered 20,000 to 30,000 troops killed or critically wounded. In 1988, Rezaei set out requirements to rebuild Iran’s offensive capacity, including 350 infantry brigades, 2,500 tanks and 300 combat aircraft. Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi’s government warned it could no longer finance the war. Ruhollah Khomeini accepted a ceasefire.

Military readiness, nuclear policy and negotiations are again under debate among officials, while Pezeshkian and Rezaei have acknowledged the economic pressure on households. The decision-makers’ arguments are public. So are the costs they say may follow.