Congress May Shift, but Trump Still Commands Iran War

President Trump would remain commander in chief after the November 3 midterm elections, and the White House would still make the most consequential decisions on the war with Iran, Brett McGurk wrote. Congress might change hands. The command structure wouldn’t.

McGurk, a CNN global affairs analyst who served in senior national security positions under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden, argues that a change in congressional control wouldn’t necessarily constrain the president’s choices. The elections could weaken Trump politically, but they wouldn’t automatically take decisions about military operations out of his hands.

The ballot box doesn’t command the military

Congress’s own tools reveal the limits. Legislators can control military spending and try to restrict operations, but a president can veto legislation. Overriding that veto requires a two-thirds majority in both chambers. Even if Democrats win a wave election, McGurk wrote, they will almost certainly fall short of those numbers. Lawmakers are also reluctant to cut funding for U.S. forces already in harm’s way.

Congress has tried to force a change before. After Democrats swept both houses in the 2006 midterm elections, public opposition to the Iraq War had driven a result Bush called a “thumping.” Yet Bush announced a surge of additional troops to Iraq on January 10, 2007, defying what McGurk described as a clear message from voters. Congress later pursued withdrawal timetables and efforts to cut funding for U.S. troops. Bush vetoed the measures, and Congress lacked the votes to override him.

McGurk wrote that the surge dramatically reduced violence and stabilized Iraq, giving the country a chance to survive. His account also shows how the system works: Congress could object, but it wasn’t in the chain of command, and the commander in chief determined the course and conduct of an ongoing war.

The pattern isn’t limited to one administration. Nixon escalated the war in Vietnam in 1972 while Democrats held majorities in both houses and opposed the war. Clinton conducted a 78-day NATO air campaign in the Balkans in 1999 after the House refused to authorize the operation. Obama launched extended military operations in Libya in 2011 without congressional approval. Investigations and hearings can complicate a president’s position; they don’t, by themselves, move the power to decide.

Shipping, consumers and the costs of stalemate

Iran apparently sees the midterms as a chance to alter the war’s direction. A Washington Post report published Monday said Iranian officials were escalating attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz to raise energy prices, punish American consumers and weaken Trump and the Republican Party before the election. An Arab diplomat described Tehran as “obsessed” with the elections. Iranian state television has tracked Trump’s approval ratings and speculated that Republican losses would constrain the war and force U.S. concessions.

The conflict’s costs reach commercial vessels, people who use the strait and consumers facing higher energy prices. The United States has blockaded Iranian ports while helping commercial vessels transit the Strait of Hormuz, increasing Gulf oil flows and imposing growing economic costs on Iran. McGurk wrote that the result is close to a stalemate: Iran can no longer close the strait but still threatens ships and regional infrastructure, imposing costs on those who use it. Washington believes the economic blockade will soon force concessions at the negotiating table, including on Iran’s nuclear program. Both sides appear to believe time is on their side.

McGurk’s account centers on presidents, military commanders, legislators and diplomats. It describes no grassroots, self-organized response or mutual-aid effort; the people most directly exposed to the economic and military consequences appear as consumers, shipping users and forces already in harm’s way.

Three choices, all from the top

Trump could pull back by declaring the principal military objectives achieved, reducing operations and accepting a costly accommodation with Iran to restore normal shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. That could bring near-term political and economic benefits, particularly if energy prices declined. But Iran could claim victory and rebuild resources for its nuclear and missile program, undermining the stated logic of the campaign. McGurk wrote that Trump’s decision to maintain the blockade despite its political costs made a sudden retreat after the midterms unlikely.

Another path would maintain the current strategy and answer Iranian attacks with strikes. Adm. Brad Cooper, the commander of U.S. military forces in the region, previewed a more aggressive response in September: “If you shoot at two of our ships, we will impose an even higher cost – taking out three of yours.” Tehran could escalate in response and widen the conflict.

A third choice would expand the campaign with Israel against Iran and its regional partners, including greater support for Saudi Arabia against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. McGurk also described a possible Israeli-Saudi agreement and the difficult decisions it would require on Gaza and a “pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood.” If he were in the White House, his own advice would be to maintain economic pressure, respond more forcefully to Iranian military attacks and preserve an avenue for negotiation. The final choice, however, remains with the president. “Tehran might want to remember that history,” McGurk wrote.