
Turkey has pulled back from many Muslim Brotherhood allies while remaining an “openly active patron and supporter of Hamas,” according to a 94-page study by Austria's Documentation Center for Political Islam. The report describes a political pivot by Ankara: closer diplomatic relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, alongside continued support for Hamas and its expanding networks in Europe.
The study, titled “The AKP and the Muslim Brotherhood: The Development and Failure of an Islamist Alliance in the Middle East and Europe,” traces how Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) moved from ideological alignment toward pragmatic state relations. Its account centers on influence: who Ankara backs, where its alliances lead, and which networks remain useful as political fortunes change.
A strategic retreat, not a clean break
The AKP and the Muslim Brotherhood drew closer during the Arab Spring uprisings beginning in 2010 and 2011. Turkey and Qatar became principal regional supporters of Brotherhood-linked political movements. When Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi won Egypt's presidency in 2012, Ankara saw an opening to expand regional influence and challenge an order supported by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
That alliance took a hard hit when Egypt's military overthrew Morsi in 2013 and repressed the Brotherhood. Defeats in countries including Tunisia further weakened the movement's prospects of returning to government. Turkey had offered refuge to exiled Brotherhood members: the study estimates about 8,000 lived in Turkey in 2020, or around 20,000 when family members were included. Istanbul also became a center for Brotherhood-affiliated television stations. The report suggests Turkey and Qatar likely financed some organizational and media activity.
As the Brotherhood's political prospects faded, Ankara pursued rapprochement with Gulf monarchies, the new regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, and governments in Jordan and Morocco. The study says those governments emerged from the Arab Spring “relatively unscathed.” The shift is plain in the report's account: diplomatic priorities moved, but Turkey's relationship with Hamas remained the most significant surviving part of its former alliance with Brotherhood-associated movements.
Networks, money and claims
The report says Hamas emerged from the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and has maintained close political relations with Ankara. It points to European implications, citing an October 2024 U.S. Treasury Department statement identifying Europe as an important source of Hamas financing, including fundraising through charities operating under false pretenses. The study names financial operations involving Italy, Germany and Austria as significant channels for funds transferred from Europe to Hamas.
Those are claims attributed to the U.S. Treasury Department and the study, not evidence in the article of a unified network. The report itself says contacts among Turkish and Brotherhood-associated European organizations have not produced substantial evidence of deeper organizational cooperation or a single Islamist structure.
Among the groups it examines are the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB), which operates under Turkey's Directorate of Religious Affairs, the European Council for Fatwa and Research, the Islamic Community Milli Görüş (IGMG), the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations (FEMYSO), and the Muslim Youth of Austria. The study identifies connections and personal links, but draws a boundary around what those links demonstrate.
The report describes Qatar's financial support for religious institutions and Islamist organizations as more consequential, citing earlier investigative reporting on funding for mosques, schools, Islamic associations and religious activities across Europe. It names Eid Charity and the Qatar Foundation, and says the funding also extends to smaller Salafist groups. Money moves through institutions; the study does not claim every institution or contact is part of one coordinated apparatus.
The report warns that Turkish influence operations and media networks spread pro-Hamas and other Islamist narratives among diaspora communities in Europe. It says further rapprochement with Egypt and Gulf states could lead Brotherhood leaders and activists to move operations from Turkey to Europe, but finds no current evidence of a major relocation. Extensive new partnerships between Turkish Islamist organizations and Brotherhood-linked European groups are also described as unlikely as the Brotherhood's regional political influence declines. Ankara, the study concludes, is likely to retain its openly pro-Hamas position while improving ties with Gulf governments that oppose the Muslim Brotherhood.
- turkey
- hamas
- muslim brotherhood
- justice and development party
- europe
- islamist networks
- qatar
- documentation center for political islam