Iran Uranium Gap Exposes Power of Strikes and Access

The International Atomic Energy Agency still can't account for 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium in Iran, Director General Rafael Grossi told the U.N. Security Council on Tuesday. Inspectors lost access after U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear sites forced them to leave; now Tehran rejects repeated requests to return to one declared facility. The material remains unaccounted for more than a year after the attacks.

"As of today, the IAEA has not been able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material" required under Iran's safeguards agreement, Grossi said. "This can, and must, be rectified." His warning describes a system in which military strikes shut down verification, while the state controlling the sites determines whether inspectors can get back in. The agency's conclusion is blunt: remote monitoring can't replace access.

Strikes, Safeguards and Access

Verification work stopped when inspectors were withdrawn for safety after U.S. and Israeli attacks began in June 2025. Grossi said inspectors had been ready to return "for many months now." He also said remote monitoring had found no signs of attempts to repair or rebuild nuclear facilities struck in 2025 or that year. "However, nothing replaces access to the facilities to verify the actual situation," he said.

The IAEA's unresolved safeguards issues have persisted for more than five years, according to Grossi. The agency's Board of Governors reported Tehran to the Security Council on Sept. 9, 2026, in a resolution that passed with 23 votes in favor, three against and eight abstentions. The source said it was the first time in 20 years Iran had been reported for breaching its nonproliferation obligations. Tehran rejected the decision as political and unlawful. The Security Council heard the case; the practical question remains whether inspectors can reach the facilities.

Grossi said Iran's legal obligations "cannot be unilaterally suspended under any circumstances," calling that "a basic principle of international law." The same account also records the consequence of U.S. and Israeli military action: inspectors were forced out, and verification stopped. State power shows up here in more than one form—not just in the rules invoked at the council table, but in the strikes that changed what the agency could inspect.

Diplomacy on Paper, Access on the Ground

Grossi called for reviving the Cairo Agreement, signed on Sept. 9, 2025, by Grossi and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi under the auspices of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, with assistance from Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Grossi described it as a practical way to address Iran's security concerns after the airstrikes while enabling verification. Its revival, he said, could help resolve the status of facilities at Fordow, Natanz, Esfahan and Khondab.

Regional mediation efforts by Oman, Pakistan, Qatar and Egypt had made important efforts to re-engage Tehran and reach an acceptable arrangement, Grossi told the council. He also said the IAEA had held "thorough" talks with U.S. negotiating and technical teams, and technical preparations for a diplomatic agreement to secure inspectors' return were in place. Those talks haven't yet restored access to the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant. Iran had agreed to allow inspectors there before the June 2025 strikes prevented the visit; it has since rejected repeated requests.

Bushehr was the exception to the general lack of progress. Inspectors were working at the nuclear power plant, and Iran's atomic energy authority had cooperated on safeguards equipment ahead of the transfer of spent fuel to a new dry-storage facility, expected early next year.

Grossi urged Tehran to take "gradual, technical, incremental steps" toward normal safeguards, while saying the agency remained open to Iran's legitimate safety and security concerns. His condition for any path forward was equally clear: IAEA verification, "without which, no solution is verifiable and, as a consequence, sustainable." Diplomacy is being presented as the route out. But the immediate test is simpler: whether inspectors can enter the facilities and account for what remains beyond their view.